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Abstract 
 
By employing the theoretical construct of patron-client state relationships, this thesis 
conducts a historical analysis of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States 
from Pakistan‘s independence in 1947 to its first successful transition from one elected 
government to another in 2013. Specifically, the thesis places particular emphasis on two 
conflicts with global implications in which the United States and Pakistan were closely 
aligned with each other: the covert war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-
1989) and the ongoing war in Afghanistan since 2001 against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
Throughout these two periods, the US provided billions of dollars in military and economic 
assistance to Pakistan in exchange for services deemed essential for the attainment of 
America‘s vital strategic and national security objectives. On both occasions, the client 
regime benefited from considerable latitude provided by the patron to pursue domestic and 
foreign policies aimed at consolidating its own hold on power and protecting what were 
regarded as fundamental national interests but not necessarily serving the avowed objectives 
of its patron. 
The US-Pakistan case study serves to highlight a fundamental contradiction that can 
characterise strategically driven patron-client state relationships. Instead of making the 
client more susceptible to the patron‘s influence, increased assistance by the patron can 
actually make the client less likely to comply with the patron‘s demands. This is especially 
true of relationships in which the patron regards the client‘s cooperation as vitally important 
for the attainment of the patron‘s core security interests. Paradoxically for the patron, the 
assistance that it provides to a strategically important client can end up undermining the 
very reasons that led to the provision of such assistance in the first place. Chief amongst 
those reasons are ensuring the client‘s compliance and maintaining its internal stability. At 
the same time, as long as the patron‘s own strategic interests necessitate a degree of client 
cooperation, it will find itself compelled to keep the relationship going, thereby giving the 
client continued room to deviate from the patron‘s script to an extent where it can pursue its 
own national interests with relative impunity, confident in the knowledge that while its 
defiance might lead to occasional tensions with the patron, its continuing strategic 
importance will prevent a complete rupture and the consequent termination of material 
assistance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Pakistan‘s pivotal geographic location - straddling West, Central and South Asia - has been 
both a blessing and a curse, lending it an importance in the world at variance with its 
unflattering socio-economic indicators but also making it vulnerable to intrusive foreign 
involvement. At critical moments of its existence, it has functioned as a client state of the 
United States, a position that has conferred short-term strategic and financial benefits but 
which has also contributed in entrenching the dominant role of the Pakistani military within 
the state and in perpetuating a national political economy of external dependence. For its 
part, the US too has derived significant strategic dividends through its association with 
Pakistan at varying periods over the last six decades. However, such dividends have come 
at a considerable cost. American patronage has neither been able to make Pakistan 
internally more stable nor externally more receptive to American demands.  
Such is the dilemma that a patron can, and often does, confront, after entering into a 
relationship with a strategically significant client. Instead of becoming more loyal and 
compliant, the client can actually become more defiant of the patron even as it continues to 
benefit increasingly from the patron‘s largesse. This is because increased patronage can 
engender a sense of impunity in the client and bestow it with enough confidence to pursue 
its own national interests even when they conflict with those of the patron. Paradoxically, 
therefore, in patron-client state relationships of a strategic nature such as the one between 
the US and Pakistan, the client has the potential to exert as much influence on the 
relationship as the patron, and at times even more. 
I. Purpose and Significance 
 
This thesis highlights contradictions and paradoxes that can emerge out of a distinct form of 
association between dominant and subordinate states in the international system. It also 
seeks to plug a fairly obvious gap in the literature on Pakistan‘s relationship with the US by 
situating it within the parameters of a clearly articulated theoretical matrix, in this case the 
phenomenon of patron-client state relationships. The significance of employing a theoretical 
framework to comprehend the policy choices of two very different nations brought together 
at varying periods into forming close strategic associations derives not only from the 
complete absence of any previous attempt to view US-Pakistan relations through a 
theoretical lens, but because the existing scholarship on international patron-client 
relationships in general is also very limited. 
10 
 
 Although references to such relationships in international relations literature and discourse 
are by no means infrequent, there have been very few methodical attempts to actually apply 
the patron-client model in studying relationships between nations. This research aims to fill 
scholarly gaps in its subject area and, even though its focus is exclusively on US-Pakistan 
relations, the questions that it raises and the conclusions that it draws can be of relevance to 
many other instances of partnership and association between ―hegemons and followers‖ in 
the international system.1 
The thesis addresses the following central research questions:  
i) What are the factors and motivations that lead dominant and subordinate states 
in the international system to form patron-client relationships? 
ii) How do patron-client relationships differ from other forms of cooperation 
between dominant and subordinate states, especially alliances? 
iii) Why does a client risk jeopardising its relationship with the patron by pursuing 
policies that may not be in the patron‘s declared interests? 
Hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
i) Increased patronage has a positive correlation with the level of client 
compliance, that is, the greater the level of assistance provided by the patron, 
the more likely the client will be to comply with the patron‘s demands.  
ii) The greater the client‘s dependence upon the patron, the more likely the client 
will be to align itself with the patron‘s interests.  
iii) Clients deemed by the patron to be of significant strategic importance will be 
likely to receive more assistance but will be less compliant in fulfilling the 
patron‘s requirements. 
By employing the theoretical construct of patron-client state relationships, this thesis 
conducts a historical analysis of US-Pakistan relations from Pakistan‘s independence in 
1947 to its first successful transition from one elected government to another in 2013. Based 
on extensive research using both primary and secondary sources, the thesis establishes that 
Pakistan fits the theoretical model of a client state, although it also accepts that patron-client 
state relationships, being dynamic and fluid arrangements, are susceptible to frequent 
                                                          
1
 Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell and Neal G. Jesse, eds., Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: 
Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 
vii. 
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change and even to outright transformation or breakdown. America has not always been 
Pakistan‘s patron, nor has Pakistan always been an American client. There have been 
periods in their bilateral relationship when the two countries have been significantly 
disenchanted with each other, perhaps the US, being the stronger power, more so than 
Pakistan. This research does address those periods of estrangement as well, but its main 
emphasis is on exploring how the relationship played itself out during periods of close 
strategic alignment. 
Specifically, the thesis conducts an exhaustive examination of two conflicts with global 
implications in which the US and Pakistan were closely aligned with each other: the so-
called jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989) and the post-9/11 
American war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The periods in power of 
two Pakistani military strongmen, General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez 
Musharraf (1999-2008), are particularly relevant for the purposes of this research as they 
marked the most intense stages of a patron-client relationship between the US and Pakistan 
that was forged in the 1950s but whose intensity had waxed and waned in line with the 
fluctuating geo-strategic threat perceptions that shaped international relations both during 
the Cold War as well after its termination. 
Throughout these two periods, the US provided billions of dollars in military and economic 
assistance to Pakistan in exchange for services deemed essential for the attainment of 
America‘s vital strategic and national security objectives. On both occasions, the client 
regime benefited from considerable latitude provided by the patron to pursue domestic and 
foreign policies aimed at consolidating its own hold on power and protecting what were 
regarded as fundamental national interests but not necessarily serving the avowed objectives 
of its patron. 
II. Methodology 
 
This thesis uses the case study method in support of its key theoretical propositions. 
Although not without their critics, case studies continue to be extensively employed in 
social science research, not only in traditional disciplines such as anthropology, history, 
international relations and political science, but also in more policy-oriented subjects such 
as education, public health, public administration and urban planning.2 At the same time, 
they do not have a universally agreed upon definition and have been explained by scholars 
in a variety of ways. One definition reserves use of the term case study to ―those research 
                                                          
2
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 
1984), 10. 
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projects which attempt to explain holistically the dynamics of a certain historical period of a 
particular social unit.‖3 Another explanation posits a case study as an ―in-depth, multi-
faceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon.‖ It 
points out further that the study is ―conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of 
several data sources.‖4 Finally, a more technical definition of a case study is as follows:5 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
and in which 
 multiple sources of evidence are used. 
The case study method seeks to provide answers to specific research questions in the real 
world and, to that end, utilises as many sources of evidence as necessary. Those sources 
tend more often than not to be qualitative in nature but that does not at all imply that the 
case study method places no reliance at all on quantitative data. This particular project, 
however, is fundamentally an exercise in qualitative research. Moreover, the central focus 
of the thesis is on determining how and why a particular type of relationship between two 
nations of unequal strength and status has functioned in a certain way over a defined period 
of time. This singular emphasis on extensively studying and analysing the workings of a 
particular social phenomenon made the case study approach the most relevant 
methodological framework for the purposes of this research endeavour. The fact that there 
is a theoretical thread running throughout the thesis made it easier to determine how to 
collect data and how much of it to process, thereby simplifying the occasionally 
cumbersome task of sifting through masses of information. 
The great advantage of the case study method is its use of multiple sources to gather 
evidence that can be used to develop new theories or to either expand or challenge existing 
ones. In this case, the evidence collected is used to expand understanding of the theory of 
international patron-client relationships. There are several data-gathering techniques that 
can be used simultaneously in case study research including documentary information; 
archival records; interviews; direct observation; participant-observation; and physical 
                                                          
3
 Randy Stoecker, ―Evaluating and rethinking the case study,‖ Sociological Review 39, no. 1 (February 
1991): 97-98. 
4
 Joe R. Feagin, Anthony M. Orum and Gideon Sjoberg, eds., A Case for the Case Study (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 2. 
5
 Yin, Case Study Research, 23. 
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artefacts.6 This research is based on both primary and secondary sources of research. The 
former include extensive study of agreements, communiques, personal memoirs of key 
individuals, oral histories, transcripts of congressional hearings, important speeches, treaty 
instruments and, last but by no means least, declassified official documents - especially 
those from the Foreign Relations of the United States series; from the digital databases of 
the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the Cold War 
International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Centre; and from Department of State 
records maintained at the National Archives and Records Administration in Maryland. I 
also conducted semi-structured interviews in both the US and Pakistan of senior retired 
diplomats, military officers, academics and area specialists. Secondary sources consulted 
include a wide array of books, journals, policy reports and newspapers. 
Regrettably, much of the primary source material relating to the Reagan administration‘s 
policies towards Afghanistan and Pakistan has yet to be declassified. The relevant official 
documents released so far from that period primarily deal with Washington‘s unsuccessful 
attempts to dissuade Islamabad from acquiring nuclear weapons. While I have cited those 
documents at length, the absence of archival material relating to the Afghan jihad remains a 
major limitation. Moreover, the passage of almost three decades since the conclusion of the 
Reagan presidency meant that most of the senior figures of the administration that dealt 
with Pakistan were either dead or otherwise inaccessible on account of old age and 
infirmity, as indeed were their counterparts in Pakistan. Fortunately, there is a wealth of 
secondary material available on the period which enabled me to back up my main 
theoretical propositions. 
The other main focus of this research, the Musharraf era, is of course much more recent, 
which made it significantly easier to track down informed contacts. Those that I interviewed 
in the US had no objection to being cited and provided useful insights based on their 
experiences. A number of other sources who could have provided valuable information 
were approached but were either unavailable or did not respond. These included members 
of the George W. Bush administration. In Pakistan, most interviewees preferred off-the-
record conversations to attributable interviews, possibly on account of the sensitivity of the 
subject under review, especially Pakistan‘s policies in Afghanistan. I do not, however, see 
the shortage of attributable interviews as a serious shortcoming since they invariably 
covered ground that was already in the public domain. Fundamentally, this thesis remained 
focused not on uncovering new empirical ground per se but rather on situating clearly 
                                                          
6
 Yin, Case Study Research, 79. 
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observable historical evidence within a distinct theoretical framework, an approach not used 
before in scholarly examinations of US-Pakistan relations. 
One of the limitations of the case study method - especially a single-case study such as this 
one - and, indeed, one of the major criticisms against it, is that its conclusions lack external 
validity. In other words, although case study research makes it easier to establish a 
particular causal link relating to a solitary case or a small set of cases, its findings are not 
readily transplantable to a larger sample.7 This thesis admittedly faces the same limitation 
but its underlying purpose in any case is not to suggest that all patron-client state 
relationships function the same way as the US-Pakistan relationship. It makes no claims of 
universal applicability for the theoretical propositions that it presents or the hypotheses that 
it examines. What it does attempt to do is to illuminate hitherto unexplored dimensions of 
real-world applications of a particular theoretical paradigm. The primary concentration of 
this thesis is on examining the nature of Pakistan‘s relationship with the US, that is, on 
particularisation rather than generalisation. If any of its findings can be validly applied to 
other similar cases, then so much the better but the thesis itself does not make any such 
presumption, although it does carry the implicit hope that the wider applicability of its 
conclusions might be considered a worthwhile subject for future research. 
III. Structure 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter One lays out the theoretical foundations of 
patron-client state relationships, examines the relevant literature in the field, points out the 
contradictions that distinguish certain types of such relationships and argues that the US-
Pakistan case study provides significant evidence of those contradictions. The following 
five chapters all proceed in chronological sequence. Chapter Two provides a historical 
overview of the US-Pakistan relationship from 1947 to 1977. Chapter Three is based on a 
detailed examination of the bilateral relationship during the Zia-ul-Haq era, with particular 
focus on US-Pakistan collaboration in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. Chapter 
Four looks at the breakdown in bilateral relations during the brief democratic interlude 
between the dictatorships of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf. Chapter Five contains a 
comprehensive analysis of US-Pakistan relations during both the pre- and post-9/11 periods 
up to Musharraf‘s exit from office in 2008. Chapter Six sets out how the relationship 
between the US and Pakistan played itself out in the post-Musharraf phase leading up to the 
most recent elections held in Pakistan in May 2013. The thesis ends with a conclusion that 
sums up its main arguments and tests the hypotheses mentioned above. 
                                                          
7
 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 43. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTERNATIONAL PATRON-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIPS - THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND 
ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
I. Origins 
 
The phenomenon of patron-client relationships has its origins in social anthropology and, 
while the actual use of the terms ‗patron‘ and ‗client‘ is confined predominantly to the 
Mediterranean and Latin American areas, similar relationships can be found in most other 
cultures. James Scott defines the patron-client relationship as a ―dyadic‖ (two-person) 
association involving a ―friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status 
(patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for 
a person of lower status (client),‖ who in turn reciprocates by offering ―general support and 
assistance, including personal services‖ to his benefactor.1 Alex Weingrod sees the study of 
patronage as an analysis of how ―persons of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of 
interest and friendship, manipulate their relationship in order to attain their ends.‖2 A 
simpler definition propounded by Christopher Clapham envisages ―clientilism‖ as a 
―relationship of exchange between unequals.‖3 
Patron-client analysis both originated in anthropological studies and for long remained the 
exclusive preserve of anthropologists, who primarily employed it to comprehend inter-
personal power relationships within small local communities. Tribes, villages and regions 
became the units of analysis for gauging how tribal leaders, village headmen and regional 
notables dispensed favours in exchange for the allegiance of their subjects or subordinates.4 
From an anthropological viewpoint, therefore, patron-client relationships constitute the 
bedrock of factional organisation.5 
Inequality and reciprocity signify the core elements of a patron-client relationship and its 
other dimensions stem in large part from them. Inequality does not merely refer to the 
existence of two individuals with differing degrees of power, wealth or social standing; it 
also implies that they be ―brought together within a set of interactions which define the 
                                                          
1
 James C. Scott, ―Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,‖ American Political 
Science Review 66, no. 1 (March 1972): 92. 
2
 Alex Weingrod, ―Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties,‖ Comparative Studies in Society and History 
10, no. 4 (July 1968): 379. 
3
 Christopher Clapham, ―Clientilism and the State,‖ in Private Patronage and Public Power: Political 
Clientilism in the Modern State, ed. Christopher Clapham (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), 4. 
4
 Scott, ―Patron-Client Politics,‖ 92. 
5
 Christopher P. Carney, ―International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework,‖ Studies 
in Comparative International Development 24, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 43. 
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superiority of one over the other.‖6 Similarly, reciprocity denotes more than just the 
possession of assets or attributes required by each other; it is also essential that the 
exchange of benefits be ―in some degree voluntary, a matter of discretion or personal 
choice.‖7 This element of voluntary reciprocity separates patron-client dyadic relationships 
from those that rest purely on coercion or the bonds of rigidly delineated authority.8 
In addition to inequality and reciprocity, scholars have also identified a third important 
characteristic of patron-client relationships, namely, proximity. Ergun Özbudun views 
proximity as the ―diffuse, personal, face-to-face‖ nature of the relationship, which often 
leads to ―feelings of affection and trust between the partners.‖9 Keeping the central 
attributes of inequality, reciprocity and proximity in mind, a patron-client relationship can 
thus be summed up as ―a more or less personalised relationship between actors (i.e., patrons 
and clients), or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status, or influence, based on 
conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions.‖10 
Much of the literature on patron-client relations produced by political scientists draws on 
the research conducted by anthropologists and sociologists to examine how such 
relationships influence the political behaviour of individuals and communities, and how 
they in turn have an impact on the political dynamics of their respective states.11 For 
instance, in his examination of political developments in Brazil during the nineteenth 
century, Richard Graham declared patronage to be ―the connecting web‖ that bound 
Brazilian politics together and the element that ―sustained virtually every political act.‖12 
Studies on more recent political phenomena such as, for instance, Conor O‘Dwyer‘s work 
                                                          
6
 Clapham, ―Clientilism and the State,‖ 4. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 John D. Powell, ―Peasant Society and Clientilist Politics,‖ American Political Science Review 64, no. 2 
(June 1970): 411-425. 
9
 Ergun Özbudun, ―Turkey: The Politics of Political Clientilism,‖ in Political Clientilism, Patronage and 
Development, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger (London: Sage Publication, 1981), 250. 
10
 René Lemarchand, ―Political Clientilism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in 
Nation-Building,‖ American Political Science Review 66, no. 1 (March 1972): 69. 
11
 See, for instance, Arnold Strickon and Sidney M. Greenfield, eds., Structure and Process in Latin 
America: Patronage, Clientage and Power Systems (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 
1972); Anthony H. Galt, ―Rethinking Patron-Client Relationships: The Real System and the Official 
System in Southern Italy,‖ Anthropological Quarterly 47, no. 2 (April 1974): 182-202; Carl Lande, 
―Introduction: The Dyadic Basis of Clientilism,‖ in Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in 
Political Clientilism, ed. Steffin W. Schmidt et al (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); S.N. 
Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, ―Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange,‖ 
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on state-building in post-communist Eastern Europe13 or Mohamed Fahmy Menza‘s 
identification of patronage-based networks as a prominent feature of Hosni Mubarak‘s rule 
in Egypt14 testify to the continuing use by political scientists of the theoretical model of 
patron-client relationships to explain domestic political outcomes. 
In comparison to studies on the political impact of patronage and cliency within 
communities, nations and societies, there is significantly less research examining the 
theoretical underpinnings of international patron-client relationships, that is, patron-client 
relationships between states. This dearth of scholarship is surprising in view of the fact that 
the policy of powerful political units to safeguard their interests and expand their influence 
through the adoption of clients is by no means a recent one. In fact, the origins of this policy 
can be traced back to the Roman Empire, which employed client states to defend its 
extended frontiers, maintain stability within their own territories and supply troops to fight 
alongside Roman forces when required. Despite benefiting substantially from the assistance 
provided by its clients, Rome took care to keep them at an ―optimal strength,‖ that is, 
―strong enough to protect themselves and help the Romans, but too weak to threaten Roman 
interests.‖15 
No client was permitted to expand at the expense of another client without Rome‘s explicit 
sanction: ―It was understood that Roman interests were best served by maintaining local 
balances of power between nearby clients, so that the system could keep itself in 
equilibrium without recourse to direct Roman intervention.‖16 Many of the features of 
Rome‘s system of patron-client relations were adopted by the British Empire, which 
maintained a string of client states and dependencies across Africa and the Middle East.17 
The same held true of the Soviet Union in its relations with its East European satraps during 
the Cold War.18 But perhaps the most extensive use of client states as instruments of foreign 
and security policies can be seen in the once formidable but now increasingly embattled 
Pax Americana19 of the post-World War Two international order.20 According to Sylvan 
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and Majeski, one of the ―fundamental components‖ of U.S. foreign policy for over a 
hundred years has been, and indeed continues to be, the ―acquisition and protection of client 
states.‖21 
II. Characteristics 
 
International patron-client relationships vary considerably in terms of their specific 
characteristics but, at their core, are all structured on a reciprocal exchange of goods and 
services that are meant to increase the level of security of the patron and the client and 
usually cannot be obtained by them from other sources. The criticality of these items of 
exchange joins the two countries together in a mutually advantageous relationship. The 
patron normally provides the client with ―economic aid, including loans, grants, technical 
advice and indirect transfers; security assistance, including training, liaison, and equipment 
for the client‘s military, police and intelligence forces; security agreements, such as treaties, 
alliances, and informal commitments of support; and often overt or covert intervention in 
the client‘s domestic politics.‖22 In exchange, the client typically responds by providing 
services that enhance the patron‘s security. For instance, ―it may agree to serve as a regional 
policeman on the patron‘s behalf; it may carry out joint military or intelligence operations 
with the patron; or it may permit the patron to establish military bases or intelligence-
gathering facilities on its territory.‖23 
Studies of asymmetrical power relationships between states have subsumed various forms 
of cooperative bilateral security interaction beneath the broad rubric of alliances in the 
international system.24 For that reason, it is essential at the outset to briefly explain why 
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patron-client state relationships must be set apart from alliances between strong and weak 
states. There is considerable disagreement among scholars on what constitutes an alliance. 
One of the most influential voices on international alliance formation and functioning, 
Stephen Walt, sees virtually any agreement between states as an alliance. His definition of 
an alliance as ―a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or 
more sovereign states‖ effectively blurs the distinction between alliances and patron-client 
relationships.25 Jacob Bercovitch describes alliances in similarly broad terms as ―a 
collaborative agreement between two or more states to join together, for a stipulated period, 
to pursue common political, economic or security interests.‖26 In contrast to such expansive 
definitions, Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond have taken a much more focused view 
of alliances by narrowing them down to ―formal agreements between sovereign states for 
the putative purpose of coordinating their behaviour in the event of specified contingencies 
of a military nature.‖27 
Owing to their formal and often explicit nature, alliances make relationships between states 
more precise and thus make a deterrent threat more visible and, consequently, more 
credible.28 According to the realist approach to international relations, states invariably join 
forces to balance against potential hegemons by forming alliances that are more powerful 
than any single state.29 However, while alliances undoubtedly play a vital role in ensuring 
the stability of the international system, their applicability may extend more to major 
powers, for whom the ―salient political environment‖ is the worldwide distribution of 
power.30 For most other states, the main security concerns are generally of a more 
proximate regional nature rather than an extended global one. Thus, military and political 
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dynamics in a regional context are ―different from - and, in many ways, more complex than 
- global power balancing.‖31 
As opposed to superpowers that ―seek allies in order to balance against those with the 
largest capabilities,‖ weaker states often perforce must rely on the assistance of outside 
states to balance a threat from within their region.32 Specifically, non-regional powers may 
provide money, weaponry, training or even their own military personnel. However, such 
assistance is usually sought and obtained not under the framework of formal alliances but 
rather on the basis of more informal patron-client relationships. According to Bercovitch, 
such relationships are based on ―informal understandings, trust, loyalty, solidarity and 
shared interests‖ but are ―not fully legal or contractual.‖33 The patron provides military, 
economic and diplomatic support to its regional client without explicitly committing to 
military involvement, neutrality or consultation.34 Patron-client relationships are often 
preferred over formal alliances because of the greater room for manoeuvre that they afford. 
Not only do they ―allow governments to act quickly and quietly‖ but they are also ―more 
easily renegotiated and less costly to abandon than treaties.‖35 At the same time, however, it 
is precisely the fluidity of such relationships and their vulnerability to easy abandonment 
that makes them more unreliable than formal treaty-based alliances. 
In his examination of alliance formation and patron-client relationships in the Middle East 
during the Cold War, Gerald Sorokin also distinguishes alliances as ―formal promises of 
military support‖ from patron-client relationships, which are ―informal relationships that 
entail the actual provision of political, economic and military assistance…‖36 After 
analysing Israeli and Syrian Cold War-era security policies, Sorokin concluded that the 
costs of alliance support often outweighed the costs of assistance from a patron, thereby 
meaning that ―where possible, states involved in regional conflicts will form patron-client 
relationships with outside major powers.‖37 Sorokin‘s contention that regional conflicts are 
often the primary drivers behind the formation of patron-client state relationships provides 
the main rationale for Pakistan‘s frequent assumption of the role of an American client 
state. Pakistan‘s foreign and defence policies have historically been shaped overwhelmingly 
by its regional rivalry with India. Although having ―issued from the same colonial womb‖ 
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after the partition of the British Indian subcontinent in 1947, the two countries have 
remained bitter rivals ever since.38 Thus, Pakistan‘s desire to acquire a powerful external 
patron has been motivated primarily by the need to ―balance‖ against a much larger and 
stronger regional adversary.39 
A notable contribution to the regrettably limited literature on international patron-client 
relationships has been made by Christopher Shoemaker and John Spanier in their work on 
the impact of such relationships on multilateral crises during the Cold War. The writers 
identify two major analytical weaknesses most commonly found in the study of patron-
client state relationships. First, most analysts and policymakers implicitly assume that 
patrons are motivated exclusively by the desire to maximize their influence and power 
everywhere and at all times. In making this assumption, they disregard both the basic goals 
that drive a superpower and its weak, usually Third World, ally into a patron-client 
relationship as well as the international political context within which such a relationship is 
formed. This first weakness in analysis in turn leads to a second erroneous assumption 
whereby patron-client state relationships are regarded as static and rigidly ordered 
arrangements. The presumption of rigidity ignores ―the most important dimensions of 
patron-client state relationships,‖ which is that they are, in reality, ―fuzzy, fluid, fluctuating 
partnerships, subject to constant change and only becoming sharply defined in the context 
of a crisis.‖40 
The arguments made by Shoemaker and Spanier hold true in the context of US-Pakistan 
relations. The US was never desirous of maintaining overpowering influence over Pakistan 
at all times; it was only when the international political environment necessitated greater US 
engagement in Southwest Asia that patron-client linkages were established with Pakistan. 
By extension, relations between the two countries were never rigidly structured; the US 
invariably discarded Pakistan, as it did during most of the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s, when 
Pakistan appeared to have lost its utility, in turn compelling it to turn towards China for 
partial fulfilment of its defence requirements. Nevertheless, whenever the US has sought 
Pakistan as a client, the latter has never been reluctant to embrace American patronage. 
Patron-client state relationships can be distinguished from other forms of bilateral interplay 
between states on the basis of several dominant characteristics. First, there is a substantial 
disparity in the military capabilities of the states involved in the relationship. In other 
words, ―the principal security transfers between patron and client are unidirectional in 
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nature, flowing from the patron to the client.‖41 The client cannot, on its own steam, become 
a military superpower; nor, indeed, can it effectively guarantee its own security from 
external threats. In the US-Pakistan context, there was always a huge power differential in 
terms of military capabilities that propelled a vulnerable and weak Pakistan to seek help 
from the much stronger US in exchange for services firstly in the struggle against 
communism and subsequently in the war on terror. Pakistan‘s military weakness vis-à-vis 
India and its vulnerability to the threat from that quarter drove it towards enlisting in the US 
alliance network of the 1950s, hoping for assurances of American protection against India 
that, however, were never forthcoming.  
Second, the client usually plays a prominent role in inter-patron competition. The greater 
the edge the patron acquires over its rivals through its association with the client, the more 
value the patron will place on keeping that association intact, thereby providing the client 
with its primary means of influence over the patron. At various times during the Cold War, 
Pakistan was important to the success of American efforts at containing communism, 
especially during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. General Zia-ul-Haq, secure in the 
knowledge that his country‘s alliance with the US gave the latter a significant advantage 
over the Soviet Union, used the influence acquired thereby to secure massive military and 
economic funding that was partially used to further American interests in Afghanistan but 
which also went into crushing domestic opposition to the regime, Islamising the state and 
building up the country‘s nuclear programme, policies that ran counter to America‘s 
professed adherence to the principles of democracy, secularism and nuclear non-
proliferation. 
Finally, patron-client relationships are accompanied by ―a critical perceptual 
dimension…derived from consistent association between the two states for a recognizable, 
if sometimes only brief, period of time.‖42 Such association between patron and client can 
manifest itself in a number of ways but it must be readily apparent to the international 
community that the two states are closely linked to each other. During the Cold War, 
Pakistan‘s membership of US-sponsored regional military networks, the pro-US 
inclinations of its military and political ruling elites, and its willingness on more than one 
occasion to serve as America‘s ―most allied ally‖ in Asia left little room for ambiguity 
regarding its position as an American client state.43 Similarly, General Pervez Musharraf‘s 
decision in 2001 to reverse the Pakistani military‘s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and his subsequent enlistment in America‘s ―war on terror‖ was also indicative of the fact 
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that Pakistan, although capable of occasional bouts of defiance, would officially never stray 
too far from its American patron. 
III. Goals 
 
Any logical analysis of patron-client state relationships must begin by identifying and 
examining the goals or objectives that necessitate the formation of such a relationship.  
Patron’s Goals 
 
For its part, the patron will aim to expand its control over the client through the attainment 
of specific goals of varying description. The contours of the relationship and its potential to 
remain intact over a reasonable timeframe will be determined in large measure by the 
patron‘s assessment of the client‘s contribution towards achieving the patron‘s goals. These 
can be goals of ideological conformity, international solidarity or strategic advantage. 
According to Shoemaker and Spanier, the relationship between the respective goals of the 
patron and its measure of influence over the client can be shown through the following 
diagram:44 
Strong Patron Control                                                                      Weak Patron Control    
            +                    _______________________________                  _ 
Ideological Goals                          International Solidarity          Strategic Advantage                                                                                             
 
i) Ideological Goals 
 
A patron may have objectives of an ideological nature, whereby it seeks to restructure its 
client in line with its own political, economic and cultural practices and institutions. Such a 
transformation is undertaken in order to demonstrate the patron‘s systems of governance 
and overall way of life as superior to those of its rivals. In the pursuit of ideological goals, 
the patron may demand alterations in the client‘s political structure or national security 
architecture, the implementation of specific economic programmes, the inculcation of the 
patron‘s own cultural and societal values and even the assumption of direct control over the 
client‘s domestic and foreign policies.45 
Ideological goals undeniably influenced US nation-building efforts in post-World War Two 
Germany and Japan, as well as its relations with long-standing clients such as South Korea 
and Taiwan. Similarly, in addition to the economic and strategic purposes behind America‘s 
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decision to finance the reconstruction of Western Europe after World War Two through the 
European Recovery Program (popularly known as the Marshall Plan), there was also the 
ideological need to set up thriving capitalist democracies in Western Europe as a more 
attractive alternative to the Soviet Union‘s array of East European communist satellites.46 If 
goals of an ideological nature govern the patron‘s interests in its relationship with the client, 
then the patron will most likely insist upon an unflinching adherence to its demands and 
―tolerate few digressions‖ on the part of the client.47 
ii) Goals of Solidarity 
 
Another objective that a patron might wish to attain through the client is international 
solidarity, that is, public demonstrations of loyalty by the client towards the patron. Such 
displays of allegiance can be shown through measures such as voting conformity with the 
patron in the United Nations and other multinational forums; the signing and ratification of 
international agreements and treaties; regular visits by heads of state and government; and 
consistently voiced public expressions of support for the patron‘s external policies. As long 
as the patron is driven by goals of international solidarity, it will permit the client a 
reasonable degree of freedom in its internal functioning, provided that it continues to stand 
by the patron on international issues of significance. 
iii) Strategic Goals 
 
The third and most important type of goal that the patron seeks to attain is strategic 
advantage, by which the patron strives to gain access to, and control of, all or part of a 
client‘s territory or major resource in order to deny the use of such strategic assets to its 
rivals. The patron may also seek to use the client as a surrogate in regional conflicts. For 
instance, the Soviet Union used North Vietnam as its proxy during America‘s war in 
Vietnam (1963-1975), with the US returning the compliment by using Pakistan as its 
primary surrogate against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Ironically, 
both the US and the Soviet Union used Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq as a surrogate during the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), especially when it appeared likely that Iran was going to prevail 
over its opponent in that conflict.48 
The patron could also utilise the client‘s territory in order to station its own armed forces or 
position its strategic assets in order to counter the expansion of a rival‘s influence. 
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Examples would include the stationing of American troops in several Western European 
client states during the Cold War to prevent Soviet encroachment; the positioning of Soviet 
nuclear missiles in Cuba to bolster the communist regime of Fidel Castro against American 
attempts to overthrow it; and the continued presence of substantial American troops on the 
territory of clients such as Japan and South Korea. 
Goals of strategic advantage are sought when the patron demands military bases and/or 
intelligence outposts on the client‘s territory, access to a diverse range of facilities at the 
client‘s disposal, and cooperation and collaboration between the armed forces and 
intelligence services of the two countries. As of 2014, for instance, according to the US 
Department of Defence‘s own figures, the American military‘s global ―real property 
portfolio‖ spanned 576 overseas sites, with the army using 248 such sites, the air force 
running 186, the navy operating 120 and the Marine Corps in possession of 22.49 
In exchange for the client‘s assistance in the fulfilment of the patron‘s strategic goals, the 
latter will allow the former considerable latitude in pursuing a wide range of domestic and 
international policies, provided, of course, that they do not imperil the patron‘s strategic 
advantage. Patron-client relationships bound by strategic considerations can end up 
becoming skewed in favour of the client by compelling the patron to ―go to great lengths to 
preserve the relationship, even to the extent of allowing the client some measure of access 
to the patron‘s political and military resources.‖50 
The category of goals sought by the patron can change over the course of the relationship 
and, owing to such alterations, the nature and extent of the demands imposed on the client 
and the degree of influence wielded over the client by the patron will fluctuate accordingly. 
In addition, there is nothing to prevent the patron from seeking more than one type of goal 
simultaneously; for instance, goals of international solidarity can - and often are - sought in 
conjunction with goals of strategic advantage. The premium that the patron places on the 
relationships will therefore be determined by the client‘s ability and willingness to fulfil all 
those goals, although goals of strategic advantage will remain preeminent.51 
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Client’s Goals 
 
If the demands that the patron imposes upon the client are dependent on the patron‘s goals 
in forming and sustaining their relationship, the client‘s readiness to fulfil those demands 
will be determined in large measure by the client‘s own objectives in entering into the 
relationship. Client goals differ markedly from patron goals primarily due to the glaring 
power differential between them. Most clients tend to find themselves enmeshed in what 
they see as deeply hostile security environments and, therefore, client goals tend to revolve 
around the nature and intensity of the threat closest to them. A superpower patron, on the 
other hand, operating on a much wider political canvas, will inevitably have a broader and 
more diversified range of both interests and threats than its client. 
From the client‘s perspective, the relationship with the patron will be determined by the 
level of threat faced by the client. If the threat level is low, the client will be much more 
difficult for the patron to manage than if the threat level is high, since the client will have 
―less incentive to surrender its internal autonomy, its international independence, or its 
territorial integrity to the patron.‖52 If the threat level is high, however, the client will be 
much more likely to give in to the patron‘s demands. Manifestations of high threat levels 
include ―the mobilization of the client‘s armed forces, the presence of hostile forces in close 
proximity to the borders, the sudden influx of large numbers of weapons to the client‘s 
enemies, or unusual domestic violence within the client state itself.‖53 Under such 
conditions, the patron will tend to dominate the relationship as long as the high-threat 
situation persists and as long as the client continues to envisage its salvation lying in the 
hands of the patron. According to Shoemaker and Spanier, the relationship between the 
client‘s goals, as shaped by its threat environment, and the client‘s ability to manipulate the 
relationship in its favour can be shown as follows:54 
 
Strong Client Control                                                     Weak Client Control 
+                                       _________________________________                           _                                                                
Low Threat Environment                                                                High Threat Environment 
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i) Strategic Goals 
 
In exchange for relinquishing a measure of autonomy to the patron, what are the benefits 
that the client seeks to gain through its association with the patron? One goal often of great 
importance to the client is to use its relationship with the patron to strengthen its position 
relative to one or more regional rivals. Thus, Pakistan has traditionally used its position as 
an American client to offset a stark regional imbalance of power in favour of its main rival, 
India. Similarly, South Korea and Taiwan have also used their cliency relationship with the 
US as a counterweight to militarily more powerful regional rivals such as North Korea and 
China. For significant periods of the Cold War, Egypt and Syria functioned as clients of the 
Soviet Union in order to combat the regional challenge of Israel, which itself operated as an 
American client.  
ii) Internal Goals 
 
In addition to improving its own position externally, a client state might also use its 
relationship with the patron to enhance the internal legitimacy of its collaborating client 
regime vis-à-vis its domestic opposition, disburse material benefits accrued from the patron 
to purchase internal allegiance and thereby solidify its grip on power. However, if the client 
regime is unable or unwilling to ensure effective distribution of the patron‘s material 
favours amongst the mass of the population, then both the regime as well as its patron will 
face increasing internal resentment, leading on occasions to the outbreak of violent 
overthrows and even revolutions. Prominent examples of American-backed client states that 
failed to spread their wealth equitably, tyrannized their own people and ended up as major 
strategic disasters for American foreign policy include Iran under the Shah, Cuba under 
General Fulgencio Batista and Nicaragua under the Somoza political dynasty. 
iii) Goals of Solvency in the International Market 
 
External goals for the client are not confined exclusively to strategic and diplomatic issues. 
Many weak states find themselves confronted not only by more powerful external enemies 
on the security front but also consider themselves vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the 
global economy, making it even more imperative for them to find a powerful patron to cling 
to in the ―harsh environment of the international arena.‖55 For an underdeveloped country 
with a weak economy, poor governance and insufficient resources, the material benefits of 
external patronage can - and often do - outweigh the costs of diminished sovereignty and 
circumscribed internal autonomy.56 
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iv) Cliency by Choice 
 
Most states that seek external patronage are prompted to do so out of necessity, in that their 
own resources are often not sufficient to guarantee their security against external aggression 
or to build up a viable and self-sustaining national economy. However, patron-client state 
relationships are not always confined to those between a great power and a weak state and 
can also extend to relationships between great powers and middle powers. For instance, 
Australia and, to a lesser extent, Canada, are examples of states that have become clients 
more by choice rather than necessity. Although advanced industrial economies with few 
proximate external threats, both countries have voluntarily become American clients in 
order to ―accumulate credit‖ with their patron.57 Post-World War Two Britain, although 
carrying significantly more weight internationally than both Australia and Canada, could 
also be said to fall into the category of states that follow an ―affiliation strategy‖ towards 
the US, an approach by which a small or middle power effectively adopts a great power as 
its leader in international affairs.58 
v) Clients as Patrons 
 
Weak states that may be clients of superpowers can become patrons in their own right of 
states weaker than themselves. For instance, Nasserite Egypt, although dependent on Soviet 
military and economic assistance, nevertheless attempted to patronise a number of other 
Arab countries. Similarly, Pakistan‘s attempts to act as a patron of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan during the 1990s were undertaken in spite of its own problems of internal 
governance and a weak economy dependent in large measure on hand-outs from 
international financial institutions. Before 1948, Yugoslavia was regarded as a Soviet client 
state but nevertheless remained determined to make Albania its own client.59 Thus, the 
prestige and material benefits gained from their association with their patron can in turn 
encourage weak states to entertain ambitions of recruiting client states of their own. 
IV. Categories 
 
In their seminal work on patron-client state relationships, Shoemaker and Spanier present a 
typology based on six such relationships, each with its own distinct characteristics and 
implications for the international order. Through the aid of this typology, patron-client state 
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relationships can be better understood as ―fundamentally bargaining relationships in which 
each state tries to extract from the other valuable concessions at a minimum cost.‖60 
Type 1: Patron-Centric 
 
This sort of relationship emerges out of the patron‘s desire for ideological conformity on the 
part of the client combined with the client‘s security concerns arising from its presence 
within a high-threat environment. The client‘s excessive dependence on the patron for what 
it perceives as its very survival allows the patron to dominate such relationships and exert 
much of the influence within them. At the same time, however, the patron derives little of 
actual strategic significance through its association with the client, whose need for 
patronage is considerably greater than the value of the services it can render in exchange. 
Indicators of a type 1 relationship include a wholesale governmental change in the client 
country and the rise to power of a new leadership that enjoys the patron‘s favour; sudden 
and far-reaching changes in the economic and social institutions of the client state; and 
equally dramatic changes to long-standing internal and foreign policies followed by the 
client. 
Type 2: Patron-Prevalence 
 
In such relationships, the patron will be driven by goals of international solidarity whereby 
it will seek to prevail upon the client to align with it on key international issues. In return, it 
will allow the client a greater degree of internal autonomy than in patron-centric 
relationships, since the edge derived by the patron over its competitors through displays of 
international solidarity on the part of the client will be greater than the limited strategic 
benefits arising from type 1 associations. One of the primary manifestations of a patron-
prevalence relationship is the conclusion of a formal agreement or treaty between a patron 
and its client. Even if the specific provisions of such a treaty are not publicly revealed, 
awareness of the fact that the treaty exists is by itself a ―clear signal to the international 
community of the solidarity between the patron and the client.‖61 
Type 3: Influence Parity 
 
These relationships diverge from patron-centric and patron-prevalence arrangements in 
terms of the objectives pursued by the patron and the premium placed by the patron on 
keeping its relationship with the client intact. Instead of ideological conformity or 
international solidarity, the goals for the patron in influence parity relationships are strategic 
in nature and are often linked to its rivalry with other potential patrons for global 
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supremacy. A client in possession of strategic assets such as military bases, logistical 
facilities, a critical geographical location or a major natural resource such as oil becomes a 
major catch for the patron.  
On account of the strategic advantages that it can offer the patron, the client is particularly 
well placed to exert a significant degree of influence in the relationship, since the patron 
will be willing to ―go to great lengths, expense, and risk‖ to keep the client on board.62 At 
the same time, the client, situated in a high-threat security environment, will also be 
desperate for patronage and will be ready to provide major concessions to the patron in 
return. Both parties will be willing to go the extra mile in keeping the relationship intact as 
long as each continues to meet the other‘s core requirements. At the same time, however, 
influence parity relationships are susceptible to sudden and dramatic change, as both states 
push the boundaries of the relationship ever further in a relentless quest to extract as much 
as possible from each other. 
Type 4: Patron and Client Indifference 
 
Whereas types 1, 2 and 3 are characterised by clients in high-threat environments and have 
the ―goal calculus‖ of the patron as their ―principal differentiating variable,‖ the remaining 
three types are marked by clients situated in low-threat environments who are, as a 
consequence, far less amenable to the patron‘s demands, especially if such demands are 
seen as unduly intrusive or internally destabilising.63 A type 4 relationship is, therefore, one 
which neither partly values in particular and in which both patron and client remain largely 
indifferent to each other‘s demands. 
In type 4 relationships, the patron is driven by ideological goals and seeks to establish direct 
control over the client‘s internal politics and national security apparatus. However, the 
client, not being beset by an immediate threat to its security, will normally be unwilling to 
grant the patron the degree of control it desires unless the patron can make an outstanding 
contribution in spheres other than security-related ones. For its part, the patron will not 
consider the overall relationship worth the cost of making ―sweeping offers of vast 
support.‖64 Owing to the indifference of both patron and client, type 4 relationships can just 
meander along without causing any danger to global or even regional tranquillity. What 
such relationships can do, however, is to provide a historical platform from which they can 
subsequently morph into more collaborative associations of strategic significance. 
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Type 5: Client-Prevalence 
 
These relationships also revolve around clients based in low-threat environments but as 
opposed to type 4 relationships, the patron‘s goals in this case pertain to international 
solidarity rather than ideological conformity. The patron is, therefore, no longer indifferent 
towards the client and will be willing to invest more in keeping the relationship intact. The 
client, however, does not have a similarly keen interest in the relationship and consequently 
will extract a steep price from the patron in return for its continued participation. Thus, the 
client‘s influence is greater in type 5 relationships than in any of its predecessors. 
Type 6: Client-Centric 
 
In the estimation of Shoemaker and Spanier, such relationships are the most dangerous 
category of patron-client state relationships owing to their tendency to ―run the greatest risk 
of escalating into a larger confrontation, perhaps involving the superpowers themselves in 
direct conflict.‖65 As their name suggests, client-centric relationships revolve around a 
client that enjoys maximum influence over the patron and has virtually unrestricted access 
to the patron‘s military, economic and diplomatic resources. Such relationships are formed 
when the patron is in pursuit of a major strategic objective that can only be obtained 
through the cooperation of the client and which, once obtained, will lend the patron a 
substantial and potentially decisive advantage over its rivals. Not facing a hostile 
environment, the client is ideally placed to negotiate the best possible deal for itself, 
especially when it can successfully convey to the patron the impression of being available 
to those amongst the patron‘s competitors who are willing to bid higher for its services. 
V. The Domestic Impact of External Patronage 
 
Patron-client relationships at the international level do not simply impinge upon the foreign 
policy of the client state; they also have a significant bearing on the client state‘s internal 
autonomy. In his examination of America‘s patron-client relationship with the Shah of Iran, 
Mark Gasiorwoski identifies two main groups of structural factors that constitute ―higher-
level‖ determinants of state autonomy: endogenous determinants, which are intrinsic to the 
society in question, and exogenous determinants, which arise out of a state‘s (and by 
extension its society‘s) presence in an international system whose developments have a 
direct impact on the state‘s domestic politics.66 Endogenous structural determinants include 
the mode of production, which influences state autonomy through its framing of the class 
                                                          
65
 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships, 42. 
66
 Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and the Shah, 10. 
32 
 
structure of society and the division of power between classes;67 the stage of development 
attained by the mode of production, which also determines the distribution of power in 
society;68 the particular form assumed by the mode of production, as in, for instance, the 
extensive state control associated with state capitalism or centrally planned socialism;69 and, 
in the case of rentier states, the substantial autonomy enjoyed by the state on account of 
most of its revenue being generated from external sources instead of through domestic 
resource mobilisation.70 
The most common exogenous determinants of state autonomy are the level of economic 
dependence on external states and international financial institutions71 and the impact of 
post-colonial political and economic legacies.72 To these two factors, Gasiorowski adds a 
third, namely, patron-client state relationships. Based on his examination of US policies 
towards Iran under the Shah and their impact upon Iran‘s domestic politics, he concludes 
that the ―cliency‖ relationship established between the US and Iran was an exogenous 
structural factor that dramatically increased the autonomy of the Iranian state by 
strengthening its ―autonomy-enhancing capabilities.‖73 
Having entered into a mutually beneficial relationship with a strategically important client, 
a patron will try its utmost to ensure stability in that country so as to safeguard those vital 
national security interests that necessitated forming the relationship in the first place. 
Patrons attempt to reduce unrest or instability in the client country by providing the latter 
with ―goods and services that enhance their ability to repress or co-opt unrest; indeed, 
economic aid, security assistance, and intervention are often used solely for this purpose.‖74 
When a client is pivotal to a patron‘s security, the patron will tend to provide ―whatever 
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goods and services are necessary to maintain political stability, including emergency 
economic aid and even military intervention.‖75 
There are several instruments through which the patron endeavours to promote stability in 
the client state by increasing its capacity to either co-opt or crush domestic opposition. 
Economic assistance of varying forms is one of the primary tools at the patron‘s disposal in 
that regard. Private capital injection in the domestic economy can be particularly effective 
in increasing the state‘s autonomy, although such a rise in the power of the state does not 
necessarily ensure higher growth or greater social equity.76 Nevertheless, external economic 
assistance, be it in the form of loans, grants, direct investment or indirect transfers, 
generally provides the client, at least in the short term, with enough fiscal manoeuvrability 
to purchase the support of key societal groups or at the very least prevent their active 
opposition. The lesser the influence that those groups are able to wield over the state, the 
greater will be the state‘s autonomy. 
Along with economic aid, security assistance features as the other primary instrument 
through which a patron attempts to ensure political stability within the client state. Such 
assistance acquires particular importance when the client is beset by internal disorder and 
strife, be it through opposition groups launching strikes and demonstrations or guerrilla 
forces waging insurgencies. During the Cold War, the provision of security assistance in the 
form of weapons, training and other logistical support to the military, paramilitary and 
police forces of client states was an integral component of US foreign policy. American 
foreign security assistance programmes had wide-ranging objectives and combined 
―elements of foreign aid, military assistance, diplomacy, propaganda, and intelligence.‖77 
Foremost amongst the goals sought through the provision of such support were the 
prevention of communist penetration and the suppression of all forms of internal dissent. 
Moreover, a well-trained and well-equipped coercive apparatus of the state was deemed 
important for the attainment of economic growth and national development.78 
Another potential option that the patron can exercise in order to keep a client stable and 
compliant, or to restore stability where its absence is leading - or might lead - to an 
undermining of the patron‘s vital national interests, is intervention. For Margaret Hermann 
and Charles Kegley, foreign military intervention is ―arguably the most frequent type of 
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military force in use and under debate today.‖79 Others, such as Richard Little, maintain that 
military involvement by one state in the internal affairs of another constitutes ―only a small 
segment of the intervention field.‖80 Non-military forms of intervention could include 
verbal instigations or ―declaratory diplomacy‖; economic carrots such as loans and grants or 
economic sticks such as embargoes and sanctions; intelligence operations and similar covert 
activities; and military moves short of direct intervention, such as aid, training and 
advisors.81 Both direct military involvement and the non-military measures mentioned 
above signify attempts to ―coercively influence the internal political order of another 
state.‖82 
For the client state to remain internally stable, a delicate balance has to be struck in terms of 
the internal autonomy that it is to have. A state that lacks the autonomy to transform society 
and bring about ―revolutions from above‖ may have to suffer ―revolutions from below.‖83 
In other words, a state whose leading officials can rise above the interests of powerful social 
groups to bring about major structural transformations will be in a better position to avoid 
the mass revolutions that are likely in states where societal groups are dominant, leading to 
a breakdown in repressive controls over the lower classes.84 In contrast to a state with little 
or no autonomy, a state that, while subject to societal constraints, nevertheless remains 
―relatively autonomous‖ is better equipped to ―pursue the long-term, systemic interests of 
society‖, thereby staving off major domestic unrest that could potentially lead to 
revolution.85 
If too little state autonomy is a recipe for chronic domestic instability, unrest and even 
revolution, then too much autonomy can be equally destabilizing. A state that attains a high 
degree of autonomy will not be constrained by the fundamental interests of various societal 
groups or of society in general; instead, the ―whims and personal priorities‖ of state officials 
will determine both the framing of state policies as well as the methods chosen to 
implement them.86 Freed from societal constraints, these superintendents of the state may 
respond to both domestic and external challenges in ways that are not in consonance with 
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perceived societal interests and needs. In case this divergence between state and society 
―persists and becomes acute,‖ political instability will continue to increase and in some 
cases may even lead to revolution.87 
External patronage, be it through security assistance, economic aid, or some form of direct 
or indirect intervention, has the potential to make a client state highly autonomous. As 
indicated before, when the patron is confident that vital strategic benefits can be attained 
through its association with the client, it will go to great pains to ensure that the client 
remains politically stable. To that end, the patron will provide the client with a range of 
instruments to quell domestic opposition, including ―emergency economic aid, crowd 
control or counterinsurgency equipment, and perhaps even military intervention.‖88 The 
patron‘s largesse may not be enough to keep its client regime in power in the long run but, 
over a short term period, it facilitates an increase in the client regime‘s autonomous power 
over its societal rivals. According to Gasiorowski, the domestic political effects of patron-
client state relationships are contingent on the intensity of the relationship, which in turn is 
shaped primarily by ―the strategic importance of the client and by domestic political 
conditions in the client country.‖89 
Gasiorowski‘s use of the theoretical model of patron-client state relationships to analyse the 
domestic effects of US patronage upon the Iranian state under the Shah constitutes a 
departure from the prevalent literature on relationships between dominant and subordinate 
states in the international system. Much of that scholarship is based on the foreign policy 
aspects of relationships between hegemons and their dependents rather than on their internal 
impact, particularly for those nations falling in the latter category.90 Gasiorowski argued 
that US policies towards Iran during the rule of the Shah were aimed at building up a client 
state that would safeguard vital American economic and security interests in the Middle 
East. Accordingly, for over two decades, US financial and military largesse flowed into 
Iran, enabling the state, embodied in the form of the Shah himself, to become highly 
autonomous. Instead of stabilizing the state, however, such elevated levels of autonomy led 
to greater instability, stemming from the increasing divergence of the policies of the highly 
autonomous state from the interests of major segments of society. It was this widening 
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chasm between the state and key societal groups that eventually led to the Iranian 
Revolution. 
Gasiorowski thus identifies a fundamental paradox in patron-client state relationships in that 
while one of their primary objectives is to promote political stability in the client country, 
they could instead promote instability by enabling the client state to become too 
autonomous for its own good. Whereas US policies towards Pakistan have not sparked an 
actual revolution thus far, they have undeniably contributed towards another, albeit less 
extreme form of political instability, namely, the prevalence of military authoritarianism 
and the continuing weakness of democracy.  
While there is a considerable body of literature examining the role of historical and 
structural factors in explaining Pakistan‘s democratic deficit and the military‘s persistent 
political ascendancy, there is comparatively much less research on the role of external 
forces in influencing Pakistan‘s internal politics.91 Most accounts of the US-Pakistan 
relationship, for instance, have focused on foreign policy dimensions and strategic issues 
without delving in any great depth into the domestic political and socio-economic fallout of 
the relationship for Pakistan.92 Although the domestic impact of US policies on Pakistan is 
too broad a subject to form the exclusive focus of this thesis, the issue is certainly worthy of 
some scrutiny, especially since it tends to support Gasiorowski‘s contention that external 
patronage can end up undermining the client‘s internal stability rather than improving it. 
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American support for authoritarianism in Pakistan dates back to 1953, when it backed 
Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad‘s dismissal of Prime Minister Khawaja 
Nazimuddin‘s constitutionally mandated government. Ghulam Muhammad, a senior civil 
servant with a pronounced contempt for politicians and democratic norms, had occupied the 
largely ceremonial position of governor-general after Nazimuddin himself had vacated that 
office to become prime minister, the main executive authority in Pakistan‘s parliamentary 
system of government. Prior to his dismissal, Nazimuddin had opposed proposals for a 
security alliance with the US as part of ―a US-sponsored military strategy…for west Asia, 
based on military alliances with local client regimes‖ such as Pakistan and Turkey.93 
Accordingly, Nazimuddin ―had to be removed‖94 and to this end, the US supported the 
destabilizing efforts of three men occupying key positions in the executive who were united 
in their pro-US - and anti-democracy - inclinations; Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, 
Secretary of Defence Major General ® Iskander Mirza and the army chief, General Ayub 
Khan. 
A series of riots, strikes and demonstrations were engineered to weaken the Nazimuddin 
government and an artificial food crisis was created to propagate the ―spectre of an 
impending famine.‖95 In desperation, Nazimuddin turned to the US, in particular, for food 
aid but the latter showed no urgency in responding to his appeals and an emergency 
shipment of US wheat was delivered only after Ghulam Muhammad, with the support of the 
civil-military bureaucracy, had sent Nazimuddin packing. In Nazimuddin‘s place, Ghulam 
Muhammad appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra, ―a political non-entity from Bengal who 
seemed more concerned about promoting American interests than those of his province.‖96 
Prior to being made prime minister, the ―enthusiastically pro-American‖ Bogra had been 
serving as Pakistan‘s ambassador in Washington.97 
The US embassy in Pakistan reported back to the State Department that Nazimuddin‘s 
dismissal had been ―planned and accomplished‖ by the pro-US troika of Ghulam 
Muhammad, Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan, with the last named having informed the US 
consul-general in Lahore that he had ―worked hard to have something along this line 
accomplished.‖98 Washington hailed Bogra as ―energetic and progressive-minded‖99 and 
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regarded Nazimuddin‘s dismissal as a ―welcome gain as far as US interests are 
concerned.‖100 What remained unacknowledged, or was perhaps wilfully ignored, was that 
Nazimuddin‘s dismissal actually signified ―an important step towards the demise of popular 
government and the control of the central government by the….civil service and military 
leadership.‖101 
In 1954, fearful that the Constituent Assembly - the elected legislative body tasked with 
framing a new constitution for Pakistan - was going to clip his powers, Ghulam Muhammad 
ordered its dismissal.102 Although patently arbitrary and undemocratic, such moves were 
regarded with equanimity by Washington since they ―did not seem likely to bring about a 
change in Pakistan‘s policy of cooperation with the US‖.103 Ghulam Muhammad retained 
Bogra as Prime Minister but promoted Mirza to Home Minister and brought Ayub Khan 
into the cabinet as Defence Minister, a move that formalised the army‘s entry into political 
affairs. The US expressed its confidence in the civil-military bureaucratic troika ruling 
Pakistan by signing the Mutual Defence Agreement of 1954 that further strengthened the 
military‘s hand over the politicians and paved the way for eventual military rule.  
In 1955, Home Minister Iskander Mirza - another stalwart remnant of British India‘s 
colonial bureaucracy - replaced Ghulam Muhammad as governor-general. Shortly 
thereafter, he became Pakistan‘s first president when the country‘s new constitution 
transformed it from a dominion into a republic. Although theoretically a parliamentary 
democracy, Pakistan was actually ruled by two unelected bureaucrats: President Mirza and 
army chief General Ayub Khan. The American embassy in Pakistan contentedly reported 
back to the State Department that the ―pro-United States group which had aligned Pakistan 
with the free world‖ enjoyed complete ascendancy in the existing dispensation and 
emphasised that the continuance in power of that group was ―important to our objectives 
here.‖104 
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Between 1956 and 1958, Mirza, whose pro-US inclinations were further strengthened by 
the marriage of his son to the daughter of the then US ambassador to Pakistan, operated as 
an unabashed autocrat, appointing and dismissing prime ministers and cabinets at will. Yet 
the US refused to be critical of Mirza on the ground that any such criticism would be seen 
in Pakistan as ―tutelage of the leadership.‖105 When Mirza, with the backing of the army, 
abrogated the constitution and declared martial law in October 1958, the US expressed a 
―certain sadness‖ at the formal dismantling of Pakistan‘s fledgling democracy but Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles reassured the Pakistani president that ―the changes which have 
occurred do not alter in any respect the close ties which exist between our two countries.‖106 
Within just a few weeks of his promulgation of martial law, Iskander Mirza had a major 
falling out with his partner in power, General Ayub Khan, with whom he was now jostling 
for absolute power. Deeply alarmed that the president was conspiring to remove him, Ayub 
Khan struck first by mounting a bloodless coup that quickly secured Mirza‘s resignation 
and his banishment into exile in Britain. The army‘s decision to assume direct control over 
the country did not stem solely from the rivalry between Mirza and Ayub Khan. In fact, it 
was driven primarily by the acute concern of the Punjabi-dominated army and its civilian 
allies that elections scheduled to take place in 1959 could erode their dominance of state 
power and place it in the hands of nationalist politicians, especially those from the more 
populous eastern half of the country.  
In their decision to ―tear down the façade of parliamentary democracy,‖ Pakistan‘s civil-
military bureaucratic partners had the unconditional support of ―their international patrons,‖ 
particularly the US.107 Indeed, the steady flow of military assistance by Washington 
following Pakistan‘s entry into the constellation of America‘s Cold War satellites in 1954 
played a vital role in enlarging the autonomy of the military over its domestic political 
rivals. Access to American training methods and weaponry accelerated the Pakistani army‘s 
transition from ―an ex-colonial army into a national army with its own corporate identity 
and ethos.‖108 The rapid modernisation and institutional development of the military, 
stemming in large part from the security assistance provided by the US, strengthened the 
―soldiers‘ belief in the superiority of their skills over those of civilian politicians‖ and 
encouraged the army‘s high command to ―expand into an array of civilian roles and 
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functions.‖109 Such notions of superiority within the military became even stronger in view 
of the abject failure of the political class to deliver in terms of democratic consolidation and 
good governance.  
With an organised and powerful army at his command, a civil bureaucracy eager to position 
itself as his chief domestic collaborator, and a superpower patron which voiced no criticism 
of his usurpation of power, Ayub Khan embarked upon an ambitious programme of 
economic liberalisation and socio-political reengineering. With input from a phalanx of 
American economic advisors from the Harvard Advisory Group and the Ford Foundation 
and steady injections of aid from the US and other Western countries, the military regime 
achieved significant growth in both agriculture and industry. However, the fruits of such 
growth were not equitably distributed and wealth became concentrated in the hands of a 
miniscule minority. In 1968, when Ayub‘s sycophants within the civil bureaucracy were 
organising ceremonies marking a ‗Decade of Development,‘ the chief economist of his own 
Planning Commission conceded that 66% of all industrial projects, 97% of all insurance 
funds and 80% of all bank deposits were in the hands of some twenty-two families.110 These 
industrial families combined with an estimated 15,000 senior civil servants and around 500 
generals and senior military officers111 to form the ―core of the regime‘s bases of support in 
the urban areas.‖112 
In the political arena, Ayub sought to impose a system suited to what he deemed the 
―genius‖ of the Pakistani people.113 In practice, that meant working out an arrangement 
which lent a legitimising veneer of democracy to his authoritarian rule. Ayub‘s solution was 
a scheme for local government labelled Basic Democracy, whereby the country was divided 
into 80,000 constituencies, each of which would elect a Basic Democrat on a non-party 
basis. Local councils were installed and given a range of civic responsibilities but had very 
little authority with which to discharge them; instead, effective power over all local matters 
was tightly controlled by civilian bureaucrats, the primary executors of the military 
regime‘s policies.  
In addition to serving on the local councils, the Basic Democrats formed an electoral 
college for the selection of the president. In 1960, Ayub Khan had himself elected president 
                                                          
109
 Shah, The Army and Democracy, 17. 
110
 Mahbubul Haq, ―System is to blame for the 22 wealthy families,‖ Times (London), March 22, 1973. 
111
 Angus Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan since the Mughals (New 
York: W.W Norton, 1971), 143. 
112
 Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, 306. 
113
 Khan, Friends Not Masters, 186. 
41 
 
after obtaining 95.6% of the votes cast by the Basic Democrats.114 By 1962, Ayub had 
promulgated a new constitution that transformed Pakistan‘s governing system from 
parliamentary to presidential, with extensive powers vested in the presidential office.115 In 
1965, he was re-elected by the Basic Democrats as president in an election marred by 
widespread instances of electoral malpractice and misuse of power by his collaborators 
within the civil bureaucracy.116 
America‘s priorities with regard to democracy promotion in Pakistan during the first two 
decades after independence can be gauged from the fact that, of the $3.5 billion in economic 
aid between 1952 and 1967, the overwhelming bulk was provided during periods of civil 
bureaucratic/military rule. From a total of less than $20 million in 1952, when elected 
politicians were in power, aid rose to $260 million in 1959, when martial law was firmly in 
place, and to more than $550 million in 1965, when Ayub Khan had further cemented his 
authoritarian rule through his manipulated presidential election victory.117 By 1969, 
however, massive social unrest unleashed by Ayub‘s American-backed economic policies 
and tightly controlled political system had forced the dictator from office. In violation of his 
own constitution, he handed over power to army chief General Yahya Khan, under whose 
rule Pakistan descended into a brutal civil war that ended with the secession of the eastern 
half of the country to form independent Bangladesh. Yahya Khan‘s relations with the Nixon 
administration and the latter‘s policy approach towards the East Pakistan crisis are covered 
in detail in Chapter Two. 
Pakistan‘s first ever transition from dictatorship to democracy took place in 1972 and lasted 
just five years before being wrapped up by yet another praetorian adventurer. The transition 
coincided with a steady deterioration in relations between Washington and the civilian 
government in Islamabad headed by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, primarily because 
of Bhutto‘s aggressive pursuit of a nuclear-weapon capability. Aid provision during that 
period sank to unprecedented lows, further weakening Bhutto‘s internal position vis-à-vis 
the powerful civil-military establishment, although it must be said that Bhutto‘s own 
autocratic tendencies118 combined with misguided socio-economic policies119 were arguably 
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the greatest contributors towards his eventual downfall. In any case, there were few tears 
shed in Washington when General Zia-ul-Haq upended Pakistan‘s brief experiment with 
electoral democracy through yet another military coup. 
Backed by US patronage, Zia fanned the flames of jihad in Afghanistan (discussed 
exhaustively in Chapter Three) whilst simultaneously using Islam at home to legitimise his 
rule and combat his secular democratic opponents. In 1981, the same year the US 
announced a five-year $3.2 billion aid package for Pakistan, Zia gave himself powers to 
arbitrarily remove judges and disallow the judiciary from reviewing any of the military 
regime‘s actions. Similarly, the press was coerced, through forced closures and stringent 
censorship, into ―the service of building Zia‘s artefact of an Islamic social order.‖120 The 
military‘s interventions into all aspects and areas of civil society were dramatically 
increased.121 After repeated postponements, Zia finally allowed a carefully controlled 
election in 1985 but was still taking no chances; just months before permitting the return of 
a semblance of parliamentary democracy, he had himself elected to a fresh five-year 
presidential term through a sham referendum in which he received 98 per cent of the 
vote.122 US support for the regime played a critical role in reinforcing its ―sense of 
impunity‖ for its unconstitutional actions and allowed it to commit ―gross human rights 
violations without any serious repercussions.‖123 Exactly the same criticism can be made 
about the role of US patronage in nurturing the Musharraf regime‘s sense of domestic 
impunity, a subjected addressed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
In the context of the US role in influencing Pakistan‘s domestic politics, particularly with 
regard to strengthening authoritarianism and weakening democracy, significant theoretical 
backing can be found in an empirical study conducted by Abraham Diskin, Hannah Diskin 
and Reuven Hazan on the contributory factors behind democratic collapse. Four groups of 
relevant independent variables are employed for this purpose. The first group is made up of 
institutional variables and addresses elements ranging from the type of regime to the 
concentration of powers within it. The second group includes societal variables and focuses 
on factors ranging from the democratic historical background to social cleavages. The third 
group consists of mediating variables - situated between the institutional and societal groups 
- ranging from the nature of the party system to the level of government and coalition 
stability. The last group is actually a single variable, foreign involvement, which has ―rarely 
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received any attention in the discussion of democratic stability, but which has proven to be 
essential.‖124 
Diskin et al maintain that foreign involvement, including both intervention by, and threats 
from, foreign countries, as well as the involvement of other external elements in domestic 
politics, is an ―extraneous variable that does not fit into any of the three previous 
categories‖ but whose ―explanatory power‖ makes its inclusion ―imperative in any analysis 
of democratic collapse.‖125 Based on an examination of 30 cases of collapsed democracies 
compared to 32 cases of stable democracies with at least a generation of uninterrupted 
democratic government, it is hypothesized that countries experiencing serious levels of 
involvement by foreign forces, be they states or non-state actors, are more prone to 
democratic collapse than those with low involvement. 
VI. Extending the Paradox 
 
Whilst agreeing with Gasiorowski, therefore, that substantial external patronage can lead to 
greater political instability in the client state by making it highly autonomous and, therefore, 
dismissive of key societal groups that consequently become alienated and resentful, this 
research aims to extend his paradox. It argues for the inclusion of the following related 
paradox that can afflict certain types of patron-client state relationships: 
While various forms of assistance and intervention on the part of the patron can strengthen 
the internal autonomy of the client  - thereby allowing it to temporarily quell domestic 
opposition and continue protecting the patron’s interests - they can also make a client 
externally autonomous to an extent where it will pursue what it deems its vital national 
interests - even if they are directly opposed to those of the patron - secure in the knowledge 
that its strategic importance will compel the patron to keep the relationship intact. 
In other words, thanks to the patron‘s support, the client state can become highly 
autonomous not only internally but also with respect to crucial foreign policy interests that 
might be directly opposed to those of the patron, thereby defeating one of the primary 
motivations for the patron to have entered into the relationship: maximum compliance on 
the part of the client. This paradox gives rise to two interrelated questions: (a) why does the 
client imperil the continuation of its relationship with the patron - and risk losing the 
material benefits that it derives therefrom - by acting against the patron‘s interests?; and (b) 
how does the patron respond to such defiance on the part of the its client? 
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As mentioned before, the patron‘s motivation in providing military and other forms of 
assistance to the client is to keep it stable and secure its alignment with the patron‘s own 
interests. By extension, the patron generally operates on the assumption that an increase in 
the amount and/or quality of financial and military aid being provided to the client will 
result in a corresponding rise in the client‘s level of compliance with the patron‘s directives. 
In the context of international relations, compliance can be defined as ―a sacrifice, wherein 
actors abandon their preferences as they conform to another‘s dissimilar foreign policy 
wishes.‖126 By becoming increasingly dependent on the patron‘s material support, it is 
assumed that the client will be less likely to jeopardize its relationship with the patron and 
will be more willing to subordinate its own interests to those of its benefactor. 
According to Stephen Walt, a patron‘s leverage over its client is enhanced when it enjoys an 
―asymmetry of dependence‖ over the latter. In other words, if a client finds itself 
confronting a looming threat to its security at a time when its patron does not face a 
challenge of similar intensity, then the patron‘s ability to influence the client‘s behaviour 
will increase.127 On the flip side, the greater the importance of the client for the patron, the 
more assistance the client will be likely to secure but the lesser will be the leverage 
generated for the patron through increased aid.128 Wary of placing an important client under 
serious pressure, the patron will be unlikely to reduce its support even in the face of 
mounting non-compliance on the client‘s part. Thus, large aid programmes, instead of 
increasing the patron‘s control over the client, may actually be indicators of its growing 
dependence on the client. 
In their empirical investigation of the relationship between US military assistance and 
recipient state cooperation, Patricia Sullivan, Brock Tessman and Xiaojun Li propose three 
―competing, clearly defined, and falsifiable‖ theoretical models encapsulating the linkage 
between the provision of American military aid and the behaviour of recipient states.129 The 
first of these, termed the Arms for Influence model, envisages military aid as an effective 
form of leverage through which to extract recipient state cooperation. This assumption 
stems from precedents established centuries before the US and Soviet donor-recipient 
linkages set up during the Cold War. The Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman empires, amongst 
others, all employed military assistance as a ―primary, independent instrument for 
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promoting their interests.‖130 The hypotheses logically arising out of the Arms for Influence 
model are:131 
 As the total amount of military aid to a country increases, the level of cooperation 
the recipient displays towards the donor will increase ―beyond what would be 
expected based on shared preferences alone.‖ 
 Increasing dependence of the recipient on military assistance will increase 
―cooperative foreign policy behaviour towards the donor.‖ 
 The donor will ―decrease or eliminate‖ its military support to states that become less 
compliant. 
In contrast to the Arms for Influence approach, which emphasises a positive relationship 
between US military aid and the degree of cooperation shown by its recipients, the second 
explanatory model proposed by Sullivan et al maintains that instead of generating greater 
compliance, increasing dependence on the donor can actually lead to the recipient becoming 
more defiant. Termed the Lonely Superpower model by its authors, it argues that regimes 
dependent for their security and survival on their patron‘s military assistance may seek to 
dispel the impression amongst key domestic and international audiences that they are mere 
vassals of the donor by adopting a defiant posture towards it on certain issues of global 
significance.132 On the basis of this model, the authors hypothesise that growing dependence 
on the patron‘s military assistance will lessen the client‘s inclination to remain aligned with 
the former‘s strategic foreign policy objectives. 
The third and final explanatory framework, termed the Reverse Leverage model, identifies a 
paradoxical effect of military aid in that donors can end up becoming dependent on their 
recipients. Liberal injections of military assistance ―runs the risk of creating militarily 
strong, assertive clients‖ that consider themselves equipped well enough to ignore their 
patron‘s interests without facing the threat of the patron‘s chastisement.133 The patron‘s 
dependence on strategically important clients for facilities such as preferential access to 
hydrocarbon resources, permission to establish military bases and intelligence-gathering 
stations, granting of over-flight rights, and the joint prosecution of counter-
terrorism/counter-insurgency operations makes the cessation of military assistance to those 
countries potentially costlier for the patron itself than for its clients.  
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The Reverse Leverage model generates the following hypotheses:134 
 States that the patron regards as vital to its security interests will be more likely to 
secure military aid but will be less likely to increase their compliance with the 
patron‘s directives ―as the amount of aid they receive increases.‖ 
 Keeping ―all else equal,‖ states that secure substantial amounts of military 
assistance will be less cooperative than those receiving comparatively modest 
support. 
 The patron will be unlikely to significantly reduce or to terminate assistance when 
important clients become more assertive and less compliant. 
After rigorously testing their various hypotheses through a combination of statistical 
methods, Sullivan et al find little evidence to back up the Arms for Influence model; on that 
basis, they posit an inverse relationship between levels of US military aid and recipient state 
cooperation. The Lonely Superpower model is perceived as being ―on the right track‖ by 
predicting ―an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation‖ but it does not stand 
up to statistical scrutiny as well as some of the hypotheses associated with the Reverse 
Leverage model in explaining the exact forms that ―such unorthodoxy would take.‖135 
In line with the contentions of the Reverse Leverage model, it is statistically demonstrated 
that (a) ―states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of 
cooperation than states that do not receive military aid‖; (b) ―in the population of all states, 
higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behaviour‖; and (c) ―the United 
States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with 
increases in military aid.‖136 These results affirm that patrons, in this case the US, will be 
prepared to countenance a considerable level of defiance on the part of certain strategically 
important clients, and that such defiance will most likely not lead to cessation of, or even 
reductions in, assistance to those states. Clients in receipt of higher levels of aid will view 
such assistance not as evidence of the patron‘s munificence but instead as a fairly reliable 
barometer of its dependence. Paradoxically, therefore, the very tools that the patron uses to 
increase its influence over the client may instead end up increasing the client‘s control over 
the patron. 
The US-Pakistan relationship clearly appears to fit the Reverse Leverage model. The long 
history of association between the two countries notwithstanding, Pakistan has traditionally 
been a problematic client for the US, just as the US itself has generally been regarded as an 
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untrustworthy patron by Pakistan. Each country‘s perceived need for the other has been 
shaped by security considerations that have seldom been in confluence. During much of the 
Cold War, for instance, Pakistan leveraged the strategic advantages offered by its 
geographical position at the crossroads of West, Central and South Asia to secure access to 
US military assistance in order to build up its defence against India. The US, for its part, 
intended its weaponry and other tangible forms of patronage to be used to deter communist 
expansionism in the region. During the 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq proved particularly adept 
at manipulating the US into supporting his regime by building up the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as a precursor to an eventual takeover of Pakistan as well. Assured of US 
patronage, Zia was able to get away with policies manifestly against America‘s avowed 
interests, most notably those directed at dominating Afghanistan as well as those aimed at 
acquiring a nuclear-weapon capability to deter India. 
Similarly, in 2001, General Pervez Musharraf took advantage of America‘s need for 
Pakistan‘s logistical, military and intelligence services in the war against Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan to strengthen his own position over his domestic civilian opposition 
as well as to pursue regional policies that reflected the long-term strategic interests of the 
military and its intelligence apparatus instead of the objectives of their American patron. 
Thus, while American interests centred on dismantling al-Qaeda, defeating the Taliban and 
installing a relatively stable pro-US dispensation in Afghanistan, Pakistan‘s interests, as 
defined by its military, dictated a continuation of support to the Taliban in Afghanistan as 
well as to those Islamist forces within Pakistan deemed to possess strategic value. While 
supporting the Taliban was considered essential for the protection of Pakistan‘s long-term 
interest in using Afghanistan as its ‗strategic depth‘ against India, Musharraf‘s policy of 
cracking down on certain strands of militant Islamism while tolerating and even 
encouraging others was meant to blackmail the US into supporting him or else risk a 
nuclear-armed Pakistan falling into the hands of extremists.  
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CHAPTER TWO: SETTING THE STAGE - THE FIRST THREE 
DECADES OF PAKISTAN’S CLIENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE UNITED STATES 
 
I. The Rationale for Cliency: Post-Colonial Legacies 
 
Pakistan‘s search for external patronage began almost immediately after its creation in 
1947. Alignment with a major foreign power was deemed essential by the country‘s early 
leadership in order for it to have any chance of confronting the formidable economic, 
societal and security-related challenges arising out of its traumatic birth. Pakistan‘s 
establishment as an independent state was the outcome of a campaign waged by India‘s 
Muslims to have a separate state of their own following the culmination of almost two 
centuries of British colonial rule in India. The partition of the subcontinent into Hindu-
majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan constituted one of the largest mass migrations 
in human history with around twelve million people moving between the two countries.1 
In addition to causing displacement on such a colossal scale, partition became the catalyst 
for horrific communal violence, with Hindus and Sikhs slaughtering Muslims escaping to 
Pakistan and Muslims in Pakistan massacring Hindus and Sikhs fleeing to India. At least a 
million people are believed to have been killed in the carnage that accompanied the division 
of the subcontinent, a gory statistic that considerably dampened the initial euphoria in both 
new countries of freedom from colonial rule.2 
Demographic Challenges 
 
Carved out of the north-western and north-eastern parts of British India, the state of 
Pakistan was distinctive in two fundamental respects: its raison d‘être was based entirely on 
the religion practiced by most of its citizens and its constituent geographical units were 
separated by over a thousand miles of foreign territory. The western part of Pakistan, 
comprising the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
Balochistan, was larger in size but smaller in population than the eastern part, known as 
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East Bengal.3 In 1955, by means of an administrative arrangement known as One Unit, the 
four western provinces were lumped into a single provincial entity known as West Pakistan, 
while the sole province in the east became East Pakistan. 
Although united by their shared Islamic faith, there was little else that the two regions had 
in common; in fact, the predominantly Muslim population of West Pakistan, particularly in 
Punjab, had a far greater cultural, ethnic and linguistic affinity with Hindus and Sikhs 
across the eastern border with India than with their Bengali compatriots a thousand miles 
away. At the same time, on the other side of the divide, the mainly Muslim inhabitants of 
East Pakistan had the same linguistic and cultural make-up as their Hindu neighbours in the 
bordering Indian state of West Bengal but, outside of a common religion, had no other 
major linkages with their fellow Pakistanis in the distant western portion of the country. 
Such differences were magnified by the physical gulf between the two wings, leading to the 
existence of opposing world views with those in the west looking towards the Middle East 
and those in the east turning towards Southeast Asia.4 
While East Pakistan was ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, the four provinces of 
West Pakistan, although geographically contiguous, were distinct in most other respects, 
including culture, ethnicity and language.5 In addition to bridging the territorial differences 
between the eastern and western portions of the country, Pakistan‘s political leadership had, 
therefore, to grapple with the dilemma of fostering a sense of national unity amongst 
populations that, apart from their belief in the same religion, were fundamentally distinct 
from each other. 
Economic and Administrative Challenges 
 
The daunting task of forging a common national identity amongst markedly disparate 
peoples and territories was matched by the equally formidable challenge of ensuring 
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Pakistan‘s economic viability in the face of crippling institutional and resource constraints. 
Pakistan commenced its existence with a pronounced industrial deficit. It was an 
overwhelmingly agrarian society, with agriculture accounting for 60 per cent of total output 
and 70 per cent of total employment, as compared to just 6 per cent of output and 10 per 
cent of employment for industry.6 The political economy of each of Pakistan‘s constituent 
units was, therefore, shaped primarily by agrarian forces. 
The British had presided over a rigidly centralized unitary state in India with a tightly 
integrated economy; however, they had neglected to ensure an even-handed development of 
various regions around the country. Major port cities such as Bombay, Calcutta and Madras 
all ended up in independent India, as did most of the industrial centres that had emerged 
under British auspices. Even though Pakistan possessed 23 per cent of the territory of 
undivided India and 18 per cent of the population, it inherited a mere 10 per cent of the 
industrial base in the two countries and just a shade over 7 per cent of the overall 
employment facilities.7 On the eve of partition, only one out of the leading fifty-seven 
Indian companies was owned by a Muslim.8 
Partition not only left the bulk of industrial and commercial development in India but also 
split Pakistani raw materials away from their primary marketplaces. The main cotton 
producing areas of what became West Pakistan, for instance, had supplied raw materials to 
cotton mills in Ahmedabad and Bombay, both of which were now in independent India.9 
Pakistan itself had just 14 of the subcontinent‘s 394 cotton mills at the time of partition, in 
spite of the fact that cotton was one of its two main cash crops, the other being jute.10 East 
Pakistan, which produced much of the world‘s jute supply, did not possess a single jute 
processing mill.11 Prior to partition, its jute crop had been sent to the industrial heartland of 
Calcutta which, after the division of the subcontinent, now formed part of Indian West 
Bengal. 
In addition to inheriting most of the commercial and industrial establishments of the 
colonial era, India had the added advantage of taking over both the central bureaucratic 
apparatus in the former imperial capital, New Delhi, as well as the Bengal provincial 
secretariat in Calcutta. Pakistan, on the other hand, had to build up both its federal 
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government from scratch in Karachi, the new capital and the country‘s only port city, as 
well as create a completely new provincial government in Dhaka, the capital of East 
Pakistan. Most of the native members of the elite Indian Civil Service (ICS), the ‗steel 
frame‘ of British rule in the subcontinent, were Hindus who opted for India at the time of 
partition. Afflicted by a chronic shortage of trained manpower and resources, Pakistan‘s 
nascent bureaucracy had to contend with the ―impossibly difficult‖ task of resettling and 
rehabilitating millions of refugees who had migrated from India, primarily to areas in West 
Punjab.12 
Security Challenges 
 
Pakistan‘s financial woes were compounded by the fact that, within a few months of 
partition, it was at war with India over control of the strategically significant princely state 
of Jammu and Kashmir. At the time of independence, Pakistan had received 17.5 per cent of 
the financial assets and 30 per cent of the defence forces of British India; however, with a 
paltry 200 million rupees (then around $60 million US dollars) as its opening cash balance, 
Pakistan soon had to pump in 35-50 million rupees every month towards the upkeep of its 
defence forces alone.13 Not surprisingly, the assumption of responsibility for safeguarding 
the strategically vulnerable north-western and north-eastern wings of the subcontinent was 
―well beyond the capacities of the newly created state‖ which, in the initial year of 
independence, incurred a higher defence expenditure than that of the undivided government 
of India.14 
The conflict between Pakistan and India over ownership of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter 
referred to as Kashmir) was to bedevil relations between the two countries right from the 
time that both attained independence a day apart from each other in August 1947. Prior to 
partition, India had been divided into 11 provinces under direct British control and some 
562 states ruled by native princes. These princely states, covering over one-third of the 
subcontinent, enjoyed considerable internal autonomy but externally remained under the 
suzerainty of the British Crown, an arrangement referred to as ―paramountcy.‖15 Once India 
and Pakistan were created, the paramountcy of the British Crown over the princely states 
came to an end and, under the terms of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, they were 
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given the right to accede to either state or to remain independent, although on the latter 
option the act was ―not without its ambiguities.‖16 
With an area covering almost 85,000 square miles, Kashmir was one of the largest of the 
princely states of British India and occupied a vital strategic position in the extreme north-
western portion of the subcontinent. Not only did it share borders with the new states of 
India and Pakistan but it also adjoined Tibet and the Chinese province of Sinkiang. 
Moreover, it provided access to Soviet Central Asia through the Wakhan Corridor, a narrow 
strip of Afghan territory bordering Kashmir that led into Tajikistan. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, both India and Pakistan regarded Kashmir as a key strategic prize and made 
frenetic attempts to woo the state‘s ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh.  
On a number of grounds, Pakistan‘s claim to Kashmir appeared stronger than that of India. 
Although ruled by a Hindu, the overwhelming majority of the state‘s population was 
Muslim and the state itself was geographically contiguous to the Muslim majority region of 
Punjab that eventually became part of Pakistan. Kashmir‘s economy was inextricably linked 
with Pakistan and its communication with the outside world lay through Pakistan. Finally, 
the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers, which flowed through Kashmir, were 
indispensable to the agricultural life of Pakistan.17 
The state‘s ruler, however, was inclined to commit to neither Pakistan nor India and instead 
desired independence.18 His procrastination created alarm among sections of his Muslim 
subjects that he eventually intended to accede to India, leading to an open revolt in the 
region of Poonch.19 The maharajah‘s brutal suppression of the Poonch uprising prompted 
the tribesmen along Pakistan‘s border with Afghanistan to come to the aid of their 
oppressed co-religionists. Thousands of fanatical tribal fighters, accompanied by Pakistani 
irregulars, swept into Kashmir and were on the verge of taking the state capital, Srinagar. 
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With his fiefdom slipping out of his hands, a desperate Hari Singh turned to New Delhi for 
help, which agreed to do so provided the maharaja formally acceded to India.  
Once the instrument of accession was signed on October 27, 1947, Indian troops were 
airlifted to Srinagar and the advance of the tribesmen was halted. Pakistan sent its regular 
forces into Kashmir in 1948, thereby marking the commencement of the first of its four 
wars with India. Hostilities continued until 1949 when the UN brokered a ceasefire that left 
India in possession of two-thirds of the former princely state and Pakistan in control of the 
remainder. The Kashmir dispute, however, stayed alive and would remain one of the chief 
determinants of Pakistan‘s foreign and defence policies in the decades to follow.  
With a significantly larger and more powerful neighbour breathing down its neck in the 
east, Pakistan‘s already precarious security situation was further imperilled by a similarly 
threatening adversary on its western flank. The kingdom of Afghanistan was the only 
member of the United Nations to oppose Pakistan‘s entry into the world body in 1947, an 
opposition stemming from its refusal to accept the dividing line between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan‘s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as a legitimate international boundary. In 
1893, the border between British India and Afghanistan had been demarcated by Sir Henry 
Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary for India, following an agreement with Amir Abdur 
Rahman, the potentate of Afghanistan. Taking its name from its originator, the Durand 
Line, as the border became known, ran for some 2,430 kilometres across a broad swathe of 
territory descending from the snow-capped peaks of the Hindu Kush down to the dust-laden 
but equally inhospitable terrain of Balochistan.20 It also cut across the rugged tribal belt 
between Afghanistan and British India populated by tribes belonging to the Pashtun ethnic 
group,21 an affiliation they shared with the Afghan monarch.22 
Jealous guardians of their independence and ferociously warlike, the Pashtun tribes had for 
centuries subsisted on raiding the fertile plains of India and British efforts to subdue them 
had met with fierce resistance. Once the border was demarcated, the tribal belt, split 
between Afghanistan and British India, became virtually a ―no man‘s land‖ until 1901, 
when Viceroy Lord Curzon declared it a Tribal Territory under the direct control of the 
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central government of India.23 At the same time, he cobbled together the British-
administered districts adjoining the tribal areas into a separate province known as the North-
West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Tribal Territory thus became a ―marchland‖ in which 
the north-western frontier of the British Indian Empire could be protected from threats 
emanating from Czarist Russia, its rival in the nineteenth century quest for Central Asian 
supremacy immortalized by the epithet, the Great Game.24 
The legitimacy of the Durand Line as an international frontier was reaffirmed by subsequent 
agreements between British India and Afghanistan in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930.25 
However, the eventual withdrawal of the British from their Indian colony in 1947 and the 
transfer of British control over the subcontinent‘s north-western frontier to Pakistan 
prompted Afghanistan to challenge the continued validity of the Durand Line. Shortly after 
Pakistan‘s creation, Afghanistan proceeded to raise vociferous calls for the creation of an 
independent Pashtunistan (also referred to as Pakhtunistan) or ―land of the Pashtuns,‖ 
incorporating Pakistan‘s entire North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the tribal areas 
along the Durand Line, the south-western province of Balochistan and parts of the former 
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir such as Gilgit and Baltistan.26 Claiming that its 
original acceptance of the Durand Line in 1893 had been extracted under duress, 
Afghanistan argued that Pakistan could not inherit a territory seized by the British through 
force and that ―treaties are binding on governments and not their subjects…‖27 
Pakistan repudiated the Afghan demand for Pashtun self-determination as a violation of 
international law and asserted the validity of the Durand Line as the legitimate border 
between itself and Afghanistan. Pakistan‘s claim had the support of the departing British, 
who regarded it as ―the inheritor,‖ under international law, of the ―rights and duties of the 
old Government of India‖ in the territories along the erstwhile northwest frontier of India.28 
Nevertheless, Afghanistan refused to give up its calls in favour of Pashtunistan and its ties 
with Pakistan consequently remained under considerable strain, especially during the 
decade-long premiership of Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan (1953-1963), a cousin and 
brother-in-law of the Afghan king, Zahir Shah. A staunch nationalist and an ardent advocate 
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of Pashtunistan, Daoud took a hardline position on relations with Pakistan. During his 
period in office, there were frequent instances of cross-border incursions, trade and transit 
disputes and vitriolic propaganda campaigns mounted by both sides against each other. On 
two occasions, in 1955 and 1961, Afghanistan severed its diplomatic ties with Pakistan.29 
Owing primarily to the threat from India in the east and, secondarily, from Afghanistan in 
the west, Pakistan‘s early leadership accorded top priority to national defence through the 
creation of a strong military. Such a need appeared even more pressing on account of the 
weakness of Pakistan‘s military capacity in the immediate aftermath of partition. Out of the 
46 military training establishments found in British India, only 7 were based in Pakistan.30 
The three key command workshops of the British Indian army that repaired and maintained 
military vehicles and machines were all in India.31 Out of 40 ordnance depots, Pakistan 
inherited only 5 and out of 17 ordnance factories, it inherited only 3.32 Pakistan‘s share of 
the erstwhile British Indian army approximated 36 per cent, or around 140,000 out of a total 
strength of some 410,000 in 1947. However, it had to settle for 30 per cent of the Indian 
army, 40 per cent of the navy and 20 per cent of the air force.33 The shambolic condition of 
Pakistan‘s military infrastructure in the initial years after independence was summed up by 
its first military ruler, General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan:34 
So our army was badly equipped and terribly disorganized. It was almost immediately engaged 
in escorting the refugees who streamed by the million into Pakistan; and not long after that it 
was also involved in the fighting in Kashmir. Throughout this period we had no properly 
organized units, no equipment, and hardly any ammunition. The position was so bad that for the 
first few years we could only allow five rounds of practice ammunition to each man a year. Our 
plight was indeed desperate. 
 
II. The Quest for Patronage 
 
In the words of a leading South Asian historian, ―few countries have emerged with as many 
disadvantages as Pakistan.‖35 Abandoned in a perilous environment by its ―British 
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midwife,‖ it did well merely to survive what was a tempestuous birth.36 However, the 
magnitude of the economic, political and security problems that it confronted convinced its 
early leadership, both civilian and military alike, that their country‘s survival lay in 
attaching it to the coattails of a powerful external patron. With Britain in no position after 
the ravages of World War Two to bankroll its former colonial satrapies, it was left to the 
United States to take over many of the interests of the British Empire around the globe, 
most prominently in Europe and followed soon thereafter in the Middle East. It was to the 
US, therefore, that Pakistan would turn very early on for patronage and, although initially 
reluctant to respond favourably for fear of alienating India, several American 
administrations from Eisenhower onwards would eventually come to see the merits of 
having a loyal client located in a strategically critical part of the world. 
Pakistan‘s overriding security concern after independence was the threat of a much larger 
and more powerful India seeking to overturn partition by forcibly reincorporating Pakistan 
within its fold. Most Pakistanis were convinced that the acceptance of partition by the 
Indian leadership had been a ―cunning and temporary expedient‖ to ensure an early 
departure of the British, following which India would be free to dominate and even ―absorb 
Pakistan as it saw fit.‖37 Indeed, no less a figure than India‘s first prime minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, had conceded that his rationale for accepting partition was that ―in this way we shall 
reach that united India sooner than otherwise.‖38 Even the departing British validated 
Pakistani concerns about India‘s hostile designs. Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, 
supreme commander of the Indian army in 1947, affirmed to the British government that 
―the present Indian Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent 
the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis.‖39 
In view of the imbalance between Pakistan‘s limited indigenous military capability and the 
enormous domestic and external security challenges that it confronted, its early leaders 
wasted little time in seeking powerful foreign patrons to bankroll the modernization of its 
armed forces as well as to inject much-needed foreign exchange into a cash-strapped 
economy. That recourse to outside help would have to be made to ensure Pakistan‘s 
survival had been proclaimed by Pakistan‘s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a few months 
before his country‘s creation. According to Jinnah, Pakistan ―could not stand alone‖ and 
would have to befriend a superpower. Out of the potential candidates, Russia had ―no 
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appeal‖ and France was ―weak and divided,‖ thereby leaving only England and America, of 
which he deemed the former the ―natural friend.‖40 
Following partition, Jinnah again emphasised the pro-West orientation of his foreign policy: 
―Pakistan is a democracy and communism does not flourish in the land of Islam. It is clear 
therefore that our interests lie more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the 
UK and the USA, rather than with Russia.‖41 Having quickly realized that the UK no longer 
had the resources to oblige Pakistan with the level of assistance it required, Jinnah turned 
his attention towards the US. He despatched an envoy to Washington entrusted with the 
unenviably challenging task of securing a massive $2 billion loan to meet Pakistan‘s 
economic and defence requirements for the next five years. In effect, Jinnah was offering 
the US a reciprocal arrangement whereby Pakistan‘s alignment with US strategic interests 
would be rewarded with an American commitment to guarantee Pakistan‘s economic and 
territorial viability. Not surprisingly, the request was politely turned down and Pakistan was 
left to console itself with a paltry $10 million humanitarian relief grant.42 
The extraordinarily large amount of the loan sought from the US betrayed Jinnah‘s lack of 
understanding of American foreign policy priorities at the time. It also demonstrated 
unrealistic expectations - at least at that point in time - of American assistance, arising out 
of an exaggerated view of Pakistan‘s strategic importance. Shortly after Pakistan‘s creation, 
Jinnah had declared that ―America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America‖ on 
account of Pakistan‘s position as the ―pivot of the world.‖ He also reminded the US that 
―Russia is not so very far away‖ and expressed a hope that, as had been the case in Greece 
and Turkey, American money and weapons would be provided to Pakistan as well in order 
to deter potential communist penetration.43 Much to Jinnah‘s disappointment, the US was 
far too involved with European post-war reconstruction and the containment of communism 
in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East to attach more than peripheral importance to 
South Asia.44 
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America‘s policy towards India and Pakistan after their independence was essentially a 
continuation of its pre-independence approach, which was predicated on the assessment that 
the subcontinent had been within the British sphere of influence for the last two centuries 
and would in all probability remain so even after the sun had finally set on the British 
Indian empire. In the lead up to Britain‘s withdrawal from its Indian colony, the US had 
―forcefully supported‖ British attempts to leave behind a united India.45 Once Pakistan 
became inevitable, however, Washington was quick to come to terms with India‘s partition, 
although its opinion of Pakistan‘s viability as an independent nation remained 
unfavourable.46American perceptions of India, on the other hand, were much more 
flattering. For most Americans, ―the land of Gandhi and Nehru…was destined to play a 
great role on the world stage.‖ Jinnah‘s Pakistan, on the other hand, was regarded as ―a sad 
mistake‖ whose future was ―no more than a question mark on the surface of the globe.‖47 
Not all official American assessments of Pakistan were as gloomy. As early as 1948, 
Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Hoskot, the US defence attaché in Pakistan, had been 
sufficiently impressed by its ―strategic worldwide importance‖ to recommend to his 
government that military assistance be provided forthwith. In the event that such assistance 
was not provided, Hoskot warned that Pakistan could be compelled to seek relief 
elsewhere.48 A 1949 Joint Chiefs of Staff study outlining US interests in South Asia singled 
out Pakistan as the only country in the region of significant strategic and military 
importance to the US, with the Karachi-Lahore corridor serving as a potential base for air 
operations against the Soviet Union.49 Nevertheless, the Truman administration generally 
remained content with having the British play the lead role on all significant matters 
affecting the subcontinent and followed a policy of studied neutrality towards India and 
Pakistan, especially over the Kashmir dispute. As part of its regional approach that 
precluded favouring one side over the other, Washington imposed an informal arms 
embargo on both India and Pakistan during the 1948 war and only lifted it after hostilities 
had fully ended.  
If the Americans were to have picked sides in South Asia, there is little doubt that India, 
with its size, population and resources, would have been the preferred choice. The success 
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of the Chinese communists in 1949 led to considerable speculation in the US about India‘s 
use as a bulwark against further communist inroads into the Asian mainland. Any hopes in 
that regard were quickly dashed, however, when India, under Nehru, proclaimed its 
unswerving adherence to a policy of complete non-alignment with the Western and Soviet 
blocs that were contesting the Cold War. Nehru‘s refusal to even endorse, let alone be a part 
of, American plans to contain communism gradually awakened the US to the possibility of 
enlisting Pakistan as a replacement.  
Unlike Nehru, Pakistan‘s leaders from Jinnah onwards made no secret of their willingness 
to side with the West in its conflict with the Soviet Union in exchange for financial and 
security guarantees. In 1950, on what was the first of numerous subsequent trips by 
Pakistani heads of state or government to Washington, Pakistan‘s first prime minister, 
Liaquat Ali Khan, emphasised to his American interlocutors both the incompatibility of 
communism with Pakistan‘s Islamic way of life as well as the ―fighting qualities of her anti-
Communist Muslim warriors.‖50 Such words were music to the ears of an American 
audience that had felt bitterly disappointed by Nehru‘s declaration on a visit to the US a 
year before that ―we have no intention to commit ourselves to anybody at any time.‖51 
While there was no immediate change in US policy towards the region, there was a growing 
awareness in Washington that in the event of an American war with the Soviet Union, it 
appeared likely that Pakistan would be ready to help out ―in every way possible, such as 
making air bases available.‖52 
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 afforded Pakistan a very useful opportunity - one 
that it accepted with both hands - to convince the US of its reliability as an ally. Liaquat Ali 
Khan immediately and fully endorsed the US decision to invoke the UN collective security 
system against the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea. Pakistan‘s 
unstinted diplomatic support to the US during the Korean War was greatly appreciated by 
Washington and stood in stark contrast to India‘s assumption of a mediatory role in the 
conflict, viewed by the US as appeasement of China.53 Another notable event in which 
Pakistan was able to demonstrate its alignment with US interests occurred in 1951, during 
the signing of the US-sponsored peace treaty with Japan in San Francisco. While Pakistan 
not only signed the treaty but also provided strong support to it from the floor of the 
conference, India refused to even attend the ceremony. Once hailed by the US media as ―the 
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world‘s most popular individual,‖54 Nehru was now excoriated as ―the Lost Leader.‖55 
Pakistan, on the other hand, began increasingly to be seen as America‘s ―one sure friend in 
South Asia.‖56 
In spite of a growing recognition both of Pakistan‘s loyalty to the anti-communist cause as 
well as of its strategic potential in the defence of the Middle East against communist 
penetration, the Truman administration remained wary of making a formal military 
commitment to Pakistan for fear of antagonizing India. Nevertheless, modest amounts of 
military assistance began to be provided in order to placate the demands of a country 
increasingly being viewed by American strategic planners as indispensable to the protection 
of critical areas of the Middle East, in particular the oil fields of the Persian Gulf.57 Instead 
of being seen exclusively through a South Asian prism as was traditionally the case, 
Pakistan now began to be envisaged in Washington as potentially a key factor in 
safeguarding US interests in the Middle East. 
III. Tying the Patron-Client Knot 
 
Although the wheels of a formal US-Pakistan alliance had been set in motion during the 
Truman administration, the actual crystallization of Pakistan‘s aim to become a bona fide 
client state of the US had to wait until President Dwight Eisenhower was in office. The 
former supreme commander of allied forces in Europe during World War Two was 
determined to further intensify his predecessor‘s policy of containing communism, an aim 
in which he had the staunch support of his militantly anti-communist Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles.58 The Middle East accordingly became a central arena of US-Soviet 
competition, starting with Iran. In 1951, a major threat to Western oil interests had arisen in 
Iran when its Prime Minister, Muhammad Mossadegh, ended the hegemony of Western oil 
companies by nationalizing Iranian oil. Months after Eisenhower took office, the 
democratically elected Mossadegh was removed through a coup that was planned and 
sponsored by the governments of the US and Britain.  
Having successfully neutralized a serious threat to its strategic interests in the Middle East, 
the US deemed it essential to erect institutionalized arrangements not only for the protection 
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of oil supplies but, more broadly, to counter the danger of any potential transference in the 
regional balance of power towards the Soviet Union and China. In other words, Eisenhower 
and Dulles embarked upon a more aggressive strategy of containment aimed not only at 
preventing further Soviet and Chinese military expansion but also at ―restricting their 
political and cultural intercourse with states outside their sphere of control lest the 
pestilence [of communism] spread.‖59 
Pakistan‘s geographic position, situated as it was between the Soviet Union and China, now 
carried considerable appeal for the US in the execution of its policy of enhanced communist 
containment. Following a trip to Pakistan in 1953, Dulles expressed his appreciation for the 
―genuine feeling of friendship‖ that he found there and formed a favourable opinion both of 
―the appearance and spirit of what we saw of the armed forces and their leaders‖60 as well 
as of the ―martial and religious characteristics‖ of Pakistanis in general.61 Dulles‘ main 
reference point with regard to the armed forces was army chief General Ayub Khan, a 
physically imposing ethnic Pashtun who made a powerful impression on the American 
Secretary of State both on account of his martial bearing as well as his articulation of 
Pakistan‘s strategic situation. In Ayub‘s assessment, Pakistan confronted a clear and present 
danger of a Soviet invasion through Central Asia that sought access to the warm waters of 
the Arabian Sea. To fend off such a threat, Ayub pressed upon Dulles the indispensability of 
building up Pakistan‘s military forces.62 
By this time, Pakistan‘s leaders had realised that their best chance of securing US patronage 
was to minimise references to the Indian threat and to instead consistently play the anti-
communist card in its parleys with the Eisenhower administration. That such a strategy 
would reap dividends in Washington can be gauged by Dulles‘ testimony before Congress 
that ―those fellows [Pakistanis] are going to fight any communist invasion with their bare 
fists if they have to.‖63 In spite of such ringing endorsements, however, there continued to 
be considerable foot-dragging within the US diplomatic and national security establishment 
regarding the actual provision of aid to Pakistan, mainly on account of the fallout of such 
assistance on America‘s relations with India. Such vacillation in turn led to increasing 
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frustration amongst Pakistan‘s leadership. On a visit to the US in September 1953 to inspect 
army facilities, General Ayub Khan memorably told off his American interlocutors for their 
indecisiveness: ―For Christ‘s sake, I didn‘t come here to look at army barracks. Our army 
can be your army if you want us. But let‘s make a decision.‖64 
It took the exhortations of another powerful supporter of assistance to Pakistan - Vice-
President Richard Nixon - before a decision was finally taken in that regard. Following a 
visit to Pakistan in December 1953, Nixon declared Pakistan a country that he ―would like 
to do everything for‖ and considered it ―disastrous‖ if aid to Pakistan was not 
forthcoming.65 Nixon‘s effusive advocacy of Pakistan‘s cause proved conclusive and in 
May 1954, a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between the US and Pakistan was 
signed by which the latter officially became part of a ‗Northern Tier of Defence.‘ Through 
this strategic mechanism, the US wished to reduce its own involvement in future Korea-like 
crises by building up the military forces of frontline client states such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Pakistan. In exchange for US arms, Pakistan formally joined a US-sponsored network 
of anti-communist alliances by entering the South-East Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (later to become CENTO) in 1955.66 
Under the terms of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, the US undertook to equip 4 
Pakistan army infantry and 1.5 armoured divisions, provide modern aircraft for 6 air force 
squadrons, and deliver 12 vessels to the navy, all at an estimated cost of $171 million.67 
However, in order to assuage Indian concerns regarding the decision to arm Pakistan, the 
agreement explicitly committed Pakistan to the use of American weaponry only in instances 
of internal security, self-defence, or UN collective security efforts and forbade their 
employment in ―any act of aggression against any other nation.‖ Moreover, it bound 
Pakistan to obtain the prior approval of the US before utilising the assistance received under 
the agreement for ―purposes other than those for which it was furnished.‖68 
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As a quid pro quo for the provision of American aid, Pakistan agreed to make ―the full 
contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic 
condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the 
defensive strength of the free world.‖69 Its membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact 
was partially a fulfilment of treaty obligations arising out of the Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement but was also seen by the country‘s civil-military leadership as a potential 
mechanism for preventing aggression from all threats, and not just communist ones. 
However, Pakistan‘s attempts to obtain a security guarantee against India came to naught, 
with the US making it clear that the alliance networks would deal only with cases of 
communist aggression.70 This failure was outweighed, however, by the realization that 
American patronage was finally in Pakistan‘s grasp and that the US, which had for long 
rejected its Pakistani supplicant, had now come to regard the country as ―America‘s most 
allied ally in Asia.‖71 
IV. Twists and Turns 
 
It took just a couple of years, however, for America‘s ardour for its ―most allied ally‖ to 
cool. Questions increasingly began to be raised within the US national security 
establishment about the wisdom of enlisting Pakistan as a client in view of the absence of 
any tangible benefits for the US to be drawn thereby. Moreover, there was also a growing 
recognition in US foreign policy-making circles that the alliance with Pakistan rested on 
aims that were fundamentally contradictory: while the US wanted to build up Pakistan‘s 
military forces as a defence against regional communist expansion, Pakistan desired to use 
American military support to shore up its own defences against India. Such conflicting aims 
led one US ambassador to Pakistan to voice his concern that the bilateral relationship was 
―based on a hoax, the hoax being that it is related to the Soviet threat.‖72 By 1957, even 
Eisenhower himself lamented the decision to aid Pakistan as a ―terrible error‖ but chose not 
to discontinue the assistance programme for fear of its ―severe repercussions‖ on relations 
with Pakistan as well as the potentially deleterious impact on the future of the Baghdad 
Pact.73 
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Although at times strained in private, the US-Pakistan relationship remained close in public 
and was further solidified through the conclusion of a bilateral agreement of cooperation in 
1959, by which time Ayub Khan had taken over the reins of political power as Pakistan‘s 
first military ruler. Under the agreement, the US committed to come to Pakistan‘s assistance 
if it was the victim of aggression, with the proviso that that aggression must emanate from a 
communist entity in order to justify American intervention on Pakistan‘s behalf.74 Yet 
again, Pakistan did not get what it really wanted, that is, a promise of US support in case of 
an attack by India.  
For its part, Pakistan responded by allowing the establishment of a secret US intelligence 
base in Badaber, near Peshawar. Known as the 6937th Communications Group or, more 
informally, as Operation Sandbag, the base employed radio receiver and transmitting 
facilities and also supported the flight of American U-2 spy planes that took off from 
Pakistan air force facilities in Peshawar to fly over Soviet Central Asia in order to collect 
information on Soviet military installations and equipment.75 Under the 1959 agreement, the 
US was allowed unfettered access to the Badaber airbase for ten years. The grant of this 
critical intelligence facility went a considerable way towards convincing the US that it was 
finally getting its money‘s worth from its Pakistani client.  
In exchange for the Badaber base, Pakistan received a long sought after addition to its air-
force in the form of F-104 supersonic fighter aircraft. However, although greatly valued, 
even those jets might not have seemed to Ayub Khan to have been worth the cost after a U-
2 spy plane flying from Badaber on a reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union on May 
1, 1960, was shot down and its pilot taken hostage. After initially lying to the world that the 
aircraft had been observing weather patterns, Eisenhower came clean and accepted full 
responsibility for the flight. In accordance with pre-planned arrangements, however, the US 
State Department continued to lie that Pakistan‘s territory had been used without its 
permission even as the Pakistan government dissembled for its part by claiming that it had 
not authorized the U-2 flights.76 
An incensed Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader at the time, refused to be placated by the 
fabricated responses and warned Pakistan that Peshawar had been ―circled in red‖ on Soviet 
maps.77 He also threatened immediate retaliation if, in future, any American plane was 
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allowed to use Peshawar as a base of operations against the Soviet Union.78 Although Ayub 
Khan attempted to counter Soviet intimidation by claiming that in the event of Soviet 
aggression, Pakistan ―will not be alone,‖ he was alarmed not only by Moscow‘s threats but, 
more worryingly, by the ―cumbersome, sluggish and clumsy‖ response of his own 
American patron to the crisis.79 With his confidence in America‘s security guarantees 
against communist aggression shaken by the fallout of the U-2 affair, Ayub thought it 
expedient to mollify the Soviets by accepting their offer to conduct oil exploration in 
Pakistan, this being ―one way a smaller power apologizes for its actions against a major 
power in the modern world.‖80 
The bonhomie between the US and Pakistan that had been restored as a result of their 
agreement in 1959 was partially damaged by the U-2 incident; whatever remained 
disappeared soon thereafter once the US began to display a renewed interest in cultivating 
India. America‘s conferment of patronage upon Pakistan was never meant to be at the 
expense of India; indeed, it was only when American efforts to woo the Indians had 
foundered on the hard rock of Nehruvian non-alignment did the US turn towards Pakistan. 
At the same time, however, although critical of India‘s neutralist foreign policy, Eisenhower 
and Dulles were desperate to prevent India‘s fall to communism and continued to provide 
significant amounts of aid to India concurrently with their assistance to Pakistan. In fact, 
between 1956 and 1957, US aid to India jumped dramatically from $92.8 million to $364.8 
million while that to Pakistan grew from $162.5 million to only $170.7 million.81 
By the early 1960s, the patron-client relationship between the US and Pakistan started to 
unravel as Eisenhower‘s successor, John F. Kennedy, resolved to assist India in becoming 
―a free and thriving leader of Asia.‖82 The Sino-Indian border war of 1962, in which India 
suffered a humiliating defeat, compelled Nehru to abandon his neutralist pretensions by 
seeking US military aid, which Kennedy was quick to provide. Pakistan felt let down by 
what it perceived as an alarming realignment of US priorities in South Asia in India‘s 
favour and began to explore the possibility of building ties with China in view of their 
shared enmity with India. However, Pakistani measures to secure alternative sources of 
external support were, at least at that stage, cautious and tentative and there was no stomach 
for terminating its cliency relationship with the US. The American decision to arm India 
was a bitter pill but one that Pakistan‘s leaders reluctantly swallowed, consoling themselves 
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with the forlorn hope that they might prevail upon their patron to condition military aid to 
India with a permanent settlement of the Kashmir dispute. When the US and other 
influential members of the international community refused to oblige Pakistan in that 
regard, the latter eventually sought to resolve - unsuccessfully as it turned out - the deadlock 
over Kashmir militarily during the second India-Pakistan war in 1965.83 
If American military assistance to India in 1962 had been an unwelcome surprise for 
Pakistan, the US approach to the India-Pakistan war of 1965 left Pakistanis shell-shocked 
by what they perceived as a cruel and undeserved betrayal on the part of their American 
patron. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Lyndon Johnson administration suspended 
military and economic assistance to both countries. Since the US had provided the bulk of 
Pakistan‘s military hardware for over a decade, the arms suspension had a much more 
serious impact on Islamabad than on New Delhi, which received its weaponry from a 
number of sources, most prominently the Soviet Union. It was not until 1967 that the sale of 
American spare parts to Pakistan was resumed but prohibitions remained in place regarding 
the supply of tanks, fighter and bomber aircraft and artillery, thereby allowing China to 
replace the US as Pakistan‘s main arms supplier.84 
The 1965 war marked an acceleration of the drift between the US and Pakistan. With 
American forces becoming increasingly embroiled in the quagmire of Vietnam, there was 
little appetite in Washington for the sort of high-level engagement in South Asia that had 
characterized the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. As a consequence, Pakistan 
increasingly moved closer to China and even began to improve relations with the Soviet 
Union; by 1968, Moscow became Islamabad‘s second largest arms supplier after Beijing.85 
In return for increased Soviet economic and military assistance, Pakistan chose not to 
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extend the lease of the American intelligence base at Badaber.86 By 1969, when the Johnson 
presidency came to an end, Pakistan technically remained an American ally by continuing 
to be a member of SEATO and CENTO but, for all intents and purposes, the patron-client 
relationship forged between the two countries a decade and a half earlier was over. 
V. Nixon and the “Tilt” to Pakistan 
 
The election of Richard Nixon to the US presidency in 1968 raised expectations in Pakistan 
of a much-needed upswing in a relationship that had virtually hit rock bottom. Pakistanis 
had not forgotten Vice-President Nixon‘s forceful advocacy of military assistance to their 
country in 1954 and looked forward to a period of closer ties with Washington with Nixon 
as president. The likelihood of a restored relationship became even greater in view of 
Nixon‘s wish to employ Pakistan as an intermediary in order to initiate highly secret 
contacts with China. Such a policy represented a complete shift from those of Nixon‘s 
immediate predecessors, Kennedy and Johnson, both of whom had been critical of 
Pakistan‘s ―flirtation‖ with Beijing.87 
That initial flirtation had been transformed into a firm partnership when Beijing provided 
diplomatic and military support to Islamabad during the 1965 war with India. In view of 
Pakistan‘s closeness to China, President Nixon decided to use the good offices of his 
Pakistani counterpart, General Yahya Khan, to confidentially convey his peace overtures to 
the Chinese leadership.88 Once a favourable response was received from Beijing, the US 
immediately rewarded Pakistan for its services by announcing a one-time exception to an 
existing ban on transfers of lethal weapons and allowing Pakistan to procure $50 million 
worth of aircraft and some 300 armoured personnel carriers.89 
The failure to devise a power-sharing formula between Pakistan‘s western and eastern 
wings following the country‘s first national election in 1970 prompted the Bengali 
population of East Pakistan to unfurl the banner of an independent state of Bangladesh, 
leading in turn to the outbreak of a bloody civil war. The Pakistani military‘s brutal 
suppression of the Bengali secessionist movement earned it considerable opprobrium in the 
US Congress, which compelled the Nixon administration to terminate all military aid. 
However, dependent on Pakistan for the success of his secret opening with China, Nixon 
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refused to withhold economic assistance and continued to provide resolute diplomatic 
support to an increasingly embattled Yahya Khan.  
On July 9, 1971, Nixon‘s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, finally made the first 
US high-level contact with communist China by means of a secret flight from Islamabad to 
Beijing. A week later, Nixon formally announced Kissinger‘s trip to a stunned global 
audience and declared his own intention to visit China. Soon thereafter, a deeply grateful 
US president sent his Pakistani counterpart an effusive letter of thanks in which he hailed 
the latter‘s ―great service in the cause of world peace‖ by means of his ―indispensable role 
as a bridge‖ between the US and China.90 Even in the face of growing demands at home for 
the US government to be more critical of the Yahya Khan regime for its military operation 
in East Pakistan, Nixon privately sent a strong message to relevant officials: ―To all hands. 
Don‘t squeeze Yahya at this time.‖91 
Notwithstanding Nixon‘s wish to avoid ―squeezing‖ Yahya Khan, neither he nor his 
Pakistani ally could prevent the civil war that officially began in March 1971 from 
mushrooming into a wider conflict that would end up squeezing the life out of united 
Pakistan. The initial military operation had resulted in a massive exodus of refugees across 
the border into India, including members of the Bengali secessionist forces, known as the 
Mukti Bahini, who were joined by Bengali defectors from the Pakistan army. Sensing its 
opportunity to inflict a crushing defeat on its arch-foe, India immediately began to train and 
arm the Bengali rebels and permitted a Bangladesh government-in-exile to operate from 
Calcutta.92 
After a war of attrition spanning several months during which the Indian military 
engineered Mukti Bahini guerrilla raids on Pakistani military personnel and installations, 
India began to use its own troops alongside the insurgents and by November 22, 1971, it 
had physically occupied areas across the East Pakistan border. In early December, a full-
scale Indian invasion of East Pakistan was underway and, although a weakened and 
outnumbered Pakistan attempted both to defend its eastern wing as well as divert India by 
launching an offensive of its own in the west, the outcome of the third India-Pakistan war 
was a foregone conclusion. On December 16, 1971, Pakistani forces in East Pakistan 
surrendered to the Indians in Dhaka, marking the creation of independent Bangladesh. 
According to his own testimony, the American ambassador to Pakistan at the time, Joseph 
Farland, received a direct order from Washington to meet Yahya and tell him to call off the 
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war, an undertaking that was ―quite an activity for the ambassador of a foreign country to 
tell the president of another country.‖93 
Throughout the East Pakistan crisis, spanning almost ten months, Nixon provided consistent 
diplomatic support to Pakistan, a policy that subsequently became known as his ―tilt‖ 
towards that country in its conflict with India.94 In the formulation and execution of this 
policy, he had the full backing of his national security advisor but encountered serious 
opposition from within the South Asia section of the State Department, which generally 
favoured a public condemnation by the US government of the military operation in East 
Pakistan and increased US pressure on Yahya Khan to pursue a negotiated settlement.95 
Nixon and Kissinger, on the other hand, believed that there were crucial geopolitical 
considerations at stake in the conflict which made it essential to avoid giving the impression 
that the US was letting down a loyal ally in its time of need.96 Besides, Nixon had a ―special 
feeling‖ for Yahya Khan which he was loath to discard and which influenced much of his 
conduct throughout the crisis.97 
Notwithstanding Nixon‘s empathy with Yahya Khan, Kissinger later conceded that both he 
and Nixon had realized fairly early on into the military crackdown in East Pakistan that it 
heralded a ―period of transition to greater East Pakistani autonomy and, perhaps, eventual 
independence.‖98 As a result, they focused their energies on trying to ―reduce the pain‖ for 
their ―friends in West Pakistan‖ by ensuring that a potential break-up of the country would 
not be a violent one.99 This involved private discussions with the military regime in 
Pakistan regarding the need to seek a political solution to the crisis. After initially appearing 
―oblivious to his perils,‖ Yahya Khan eventually accepted several US proposals, including a 
US offer to mediate a deal with the secessionists as well as a promise not to execute their 
arrested leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.  
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According to Kissinger, Indian obstructionism put paid to all initiatives aimed at a 
negotiated settlement of the crisis. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had ―no intention of 
permitting Pakistan‘s leaders to escape their dilemma so easily‖100 and shot down Yahya 
Khan‘s offer for a unilateral ceasefire, the repatriation of most refugees and a return to 
civilian government in East Pakistan, concessions that had been extracted from him by 
Nixon.101 After failing in its objective of preventing another India-Pakistan war, the US then 
attempted to bring an end to hostilities as quickly as possible. Nixon and Kissinger were 
convinced that India‘s war aims were not confined merely to defeating the Pakistan army in 
East Pakistan but also envisaged the ―disintegration‖ of West Pakistan.102 This view 
possibly gained currency after a frosty meeting between Nixon and Mrs Gandhi at the 
White House in November 1971, during which the latter had claimed that not only East 
Pakistan but areas in the western wing such as Balochistan and the NWFP both desired and 
deserved greater autonomy. The statement appeared to her American interlocutors, Nixon 
and Kissinger, as ―at best irrelevant to the issues and at worst a threat to the cohesion of 
even West Pakistan.‖103 
While the Nixon administration had reconciled itself to the eventual separation of East 
Pakistan, it was not prepared to countenance the fragmentation of the country‘s western 
half, particularly at the hands of a close Soviet ally like India. Just months before the 
outbreak of war, India and the Soviet Union had signed a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and Cooperation, a move aimed at countering an emerging US-Pakistan-China 
axis and giving India enough international muscle once it decided to go to war with 
Pakistan.104 In view of Pakistan‘s membership of CENTO, its proximity to the Persian Gulf, 
and its close relations with other important Muslim countries (and fellow US clients) such 
as Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the maintenance of West Pakistan‘s territorial 
integrity was viewed by the US as a strategic imperative. 
Whether or not India actually intended to follow up its victory in East Pakistan with a full-
blown offensive aimed at turning West Pakistan into a ―vassal state‖, as claimed by 
                                                          
100
 Kissinger, White House Years, 871. 
101
 Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 42. 
102
 Kissinger, White House Years, 886. 
103
 Ibid., 881. 
104
 While not exactly a military pact, the treaty provided that in case either party was attacked by another 
or even threatened to be attacked, both parties would ―enter into mutual consultations in order to remove 
such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.‖ 
Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, August 9, 1947, in Robert 
Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangladesh (London: Chatto &Windus, 1975), Appendix 8, 
190. 
71 
 
Kissinger, has been the subject of considerable debate.105 What is certain, however, is that 
Nixon and Kissinger viewed Soviet-backed India‘s designs against West Pakistan as 
sufficiently serious to merit the despatch of an eight-ship task force headed by an aircraft 
carrier to the Bay of Bengal. They also believed, mistakenly as it turned out, that China 
would intervene militarily on Pakistan‘s behalf and that a US naval presence would be 
necessary to deter a potential Soviet offensive against China.106 The US fleet arrived only a 
day before the Pakistani surrender in Dhaka, following which India agreed to an 
unconditional ceasefire in the west.  
Nixon and Kissinger claimed that their decision to send the taskforce was successful both in 
deterring potential Indian aggression in West Pakistan as well as in convincing the Soviets 
to exercise restraint over its Indian ally. By preserving at least that much of Pakistani 
territory, they prevented what they saw as a clear threat to international order through the 
―naked recourse to force by a partner of the Soviet Union backed by Soviet arms and 
buttressed by Soviet resources…‖107 Opponents of their policy maintain that it was ―flawed 
both in conception and implementation‖ and that it needlessly transformed a local conflict 
into a great-power confrontation.108 
On balance, it is reasonable to conclude that Nixon allowed the crisis to degenerate into war 
by his refusal to put meaningful pressure on Yahya Khan to end military atrocities in East 
Pakistan and bring about a political solution to the conflict. Obsessed with cementing his 
place in US presidential history as the initiator of peaceful relations with communist China, 
Nixon was unwilling to risk the success of his China initiative by weakening the position of 
his chosen intermediary. He therefore looked the other way as Yahya Khan unleashed a 
wave of brutality over his own people. Even if assertions by Nixon and Kissinger regarding 
the US role in ―saving‖ West Pakistan are allowed credence, they should not in any way 
absolve them of their share of responsibility in providing legitimacy and support to a regime 
that had lost all credibility in the eyes of most of its own people. 
VI. Nuclear Defiance 
 
After presiding over his country‘s disintegration, General Yahya Khan resigned the 
presidency in the wake of the defeat to India and handed over power to a civilian politician, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an ambitious protégé-turned-opponent of Ayub Khan whose Pakistan 
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People‘s Party (PPP) had won a majority of seats in West Pakistan in the 1970 elections. As 
Ayub‘s foreign minister, Bhutto had been one of the chief planners and supporters of the 
1965 war with India but had shrewdly used the negative fallout of that conflict to build his 
own political base in opposition to Ayub. Once out of office, Bhutto became a populist 
politician, using his personal charisma and fiery oratory to tap into an increasingly bitter 
anti-American sentiment amongst Pakistanis at what they perceived as American perfidy in 
refusing to come to the aid of their once ―most allied ally‖ in its war with India.  
Even during his time as foreign minister, Bhutto had been an ardent advocate of building up 
Pakistan‘s relations with China and lessening its dependence upon the US. During his 
period in opposition, his calls for an independent foreign policy became more strident and 
his condemnation of America‘s broken commitments to Pakistan became more 
pronounced.109 Upon his ascension to power, however, Bhutto showed greater pragmatism 
in his approach to the US. Shortly after becoming president, he broke with protocol by 
calling upon the American ambassador to Pakistan at the latter‘s residence as a way of 
expressing the sincerity of his desire to inaugurate ―a whole new period of close and 
effective relations with the United States.‖110 
In other words, Bhutto wished to resurrect his country‘s cliency relationship with its 
traditional source of military and economic assistance. In March 1972, the US was 
presented with a formal request for a resumption of military aid, with the Pakistani 
shopping-list including 100 M 47/48 tanks, 4 submarines, 12 B-57 bombers, 25 F-5 fighter 
jets, 1000 M-601 trucks and an unspecified amount of artillery and communications 
equipment. In addition, it also petitioned the US to provide replacements for American-
supplied weaponry lost during the 1971 war including 74 tanks, 25 F-86 fighter aircraft, 4 
B-57 bombers and 3 F-104 jets.111 In exchange, Bhutto proposed a more active role for 
Pakistan within CENTO,112 the provision of port and ―tracking station‖ facilities to the US 
along Pakistan‘s Arabian Sea coastline and the enhancement of American ―collaboration‖ in 
Pakistan‘s strategic military planning.113 
With a battle for re-election coming up later that year, Nixon pleaded his inability to resume 
military aid before winning a second term in office but Pakistan was reassured that if it 
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faced another Indian attack, the US would ―react violently‖ in response.114 While 
understanding the need to wait until after the elections to seek US assistance, Bhutto kept 
playing the old anti-Soviet card employed to good effect by his predecessors in order to 
make the case for Pakistan‘s need for US patronage. He warned his American interlocutors, 
without providing hard evidence to the effect, that the Russians were moving into India and 
Bangladesh in large numbers, which made it essential for the US to retain a presence in 
South Asia and the Indian Ocean. According to Bhutto, the Russians desperately wanted 
access to a warm water port in close proximity to the Persian Gulf and it would be a great 
setback to them if the US built and operated such a port from one of the sites being offered 
by Pakistan.115 
In a meeting with Nixon during his state visit to the US in 1973, Bhutto came equipped with 
maps of Pakistan‘s Arabian Sea coastline to again push the idea of the proposed US-built 
port in Balochistan where ―if the US is interested, there could even be a US presence.‖116 
Bhutto declared that he was ―morally certain‖ that such a US presence would be ―justified 
in terms of Pakistani interests.‖117 Although ―intrigued‖ by the idea, Nixon declined to say 
anything definitive on it until it had been checked with the US Navy. In the meantime, 
however, he assured Bhutto that even without such incentives being offered, the 
independence of Pakistan would remain ―a cornerstone of US foreign policy.‖118 Much to 
Bhutto‘s disappointment, however, there would be no immediate resumption of US military 
aid. Even though Nixon had won a second term, his internal battle for survival in the midst 
of the Watergate scandal that eventually brought a premature end to his presidency meant 
that he had precious little domestic manoeuvrability to manage a lifting of the arms 
embargo imposed on Pakistan during the 1971 war.  
Knowing that mere expressions of American goodwill and verbal declarations of support 
for Pakistan‘s independence would neither address the country‘s pressing economic and 
military needs nor strengthen his own internal position, Bhutto began to look for alternative 
sources of support. While continuing to build on the friendship with China, he also 
managed to normalize relations with the Soviet Union after they had been badly damaged 
during the East Pakistan crisis. This was in line with Bhutto‘s diplomatic strategy of 
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―trilateral bilateralism,‖ by which he resolved to maintain reasonably friendly and 
cooperative relations with all three great powers - China, Russia and the US. 
Bhutto also achieved considerable success in wooing Iran and the Arab oil-producing states, 
whose windfall profits generated in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo made them 
particularly attractive potential sources of assistance. He played the Islamic card to great 
effect, most prominently in 1974 when he hosted an Islamic summit at Lahore that was 
attended by 37 Muslim countries. His vocal championing of Islamic causes made a very 
favourable impression on conservative monarchs such as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and 
Sheikh Zayed of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but Bhutto was versatile enough to 
develop equally close relations with more secular Muslim rulers as well, most prominently 
the Shah of Iran and Libya‘s Colonel Qaddafi. As a consequence, in terms of economic 
assistance, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the UAE became Pakistan‘s most generous 
benefactors during the 1970s.119 
Diversifying its sources of material assistance became particularly crucial for Pakistan once 
nuclear weapons entered the South Asian strategic environment following a successful 
atomic test by India in May 1974.120 Indian acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability, 
coming on the heels of its success in the 1971 war, compelled a deeply worried Pakistan to 
launch ―all-out efforts‖ to extract security guarantees and weapons from the major 
powers.121 Bhutto himself declared that were Pakistan‘s security interests to be satisfied by 
the US through the provision of adequate security guarantees against an Indian nuclear 
attack, then Pakistan ―will not squander away limited resources in [the nuclear] 
direction‖.122 When neither a security guarantee nor a resumption of conventional weaponry 
was offered, Bhutto felt Pakistan was left with no option but to follow India down the 
nuclear path, a decision that would put him increasingly at odds with the US. 
Although Bhutto can lay a legitimate claim to being the father of Pakistan‘s bomb, the 
country‘s actual nuclear programme had commenced even before he had become a cabinet 
minister. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) had been set up in 1956 with 
the assistance of the US government‘s Atoms for Peace initiative and its mandate was 
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confined to the promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy. As minister for mineral 
resources between 1958 and 1962, Bhutto took a keen interest in the nuclear programme 
and supported both the creation of the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Sciences and 
Technology (PINSTECH) in 1960 and the implementation of an ambitious training program 
run by the PAEC by which hundreds of Pakistani students were sent abroad to obtain 
research degrees in physics and nuclear-related subjects.123 
By the time he became foreign minister in 1963, Bhutto had already begun ―lobbying in 
earnest‖124 to use nuclear technology for military purposes as a response to what appeared 
to Pakistan as alarmingly imminent moves by India in that direction.125 Once China went 
nuclear in 1964, Pakistan considered it only a matter of time before India followed suit. 
After India‘s commissioning of a nuclear reprocessing plant in 1964, Bhutto famously 
declared that if India developed a nuclear weapon, then ―even if we have to feed on grass or 
leaves - or even if we have to starve - we shall also produce an atomic bomb as we would 
be left with no other alternative.‖126 In his study of the impact of India‘s nuclear weapons 
on global proliferation, George Perkovich suggests that Pakistan‘s decision to initiate the 
1965 war with India could well have been prompted by a desperate urge to settle the 
Kashmir issue in its favour before its adversary acquired nuclear capability.127 
The unwillingness of key allies such as the US and China to intervene on Pakistan‘s behalf 
in the 1971 war convinced Bhutto that his country would need nuclear weapons to deter 
future Indian aggression, especially in view of a growing imbalance of conventional 
weapons in India‘s favour stemming from the continuing US arms embargo on Pakistan.128 
Two years before India went overtly nuclear and just a couple of months after becoming 
president, Bhutto assembled a secret gathering of Pakistan‘s leading scientists and informed 
his stunned audience that Pakistan would have to build an atomic bomb at all costs. He 
declared that he had always wanted Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons and now fate had 
placed him in a position to make it happen.  
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When he asked the scientists how long it would take them to build a bomb, Bhutto initially 
received ambivalent responses from his audience, with some expressing the impossibility of 
giving a definite timeframe and a few even doubting if Pakistan had the requisite 
technological capacity to pull it off at all. Finally, one intrepid scientist put forward five 
years as a realistic period in which to make the bomb upon which Bhutto, with his 
characteristic flair for the dramatic, lifted his hand, pushed forward three fingers and said 
―Three years. I want it in three years.‖129 
Caught up in the sheer electricity of the moment and fired up by Bhutto‘s call to ―vindicate 
the country‘s honour‖ after its humiliation by India in 1971, the scientists agreed to do it in 
three years if given the required resources and facilities. Bhutto gave them his personal 
assurance that he would find them all that they required to get the job done. India‘s 
explosion in 1974 only lent further urgency to a quest that had been initiated at least two 
years earlier, a quest that would, according to one account, result in ―one of the most 
audacious forays ever into the world of nuclear and industrial espionage.‖130 In securing 
external financial backing for Pakistan‘s nuclear programme, Bhutto wielded the Islamic 
card to full effect. King Faisal and Colonel Qaddafi, in particular, proved especially 
receptive to Bhutto‘s offer of ―the one thing that their billions could never buy on their own 
- the promise of an Islamic bomb.‖131 
Whilst embarking on their quest for the bomb in 1972, Bhutto and his team of scientists 
decided to adopt what was regarded as the ―most efficient pathway‖ to nuclear weapons: the 
production of weapons-grade plutonium.132 The reprocessing technology required to extract 
it was ―widely understood, easily available and relatively cheap,‖ thereby convincing the 
Pakistanis that the plutonium route was ―their easiest way to the Islamic bomb.‖133 It did not 
take long, however, for roadblocks to emerge, stemming primarily from export controls and 
safeguards imposed by leading Western industrialized nations in order to prevent further 
proliferation after India‘s ‗peaceful nuclear explosion‘ of 1974.  
Ironically for Pakistan, it would become the first and most obvious test-case for the 
credibility of the US-led international nuclear non-proliferation regime, even though it was 
India that had actually tested a nuclear weapon. In anticipation of the probable obstacles 
that lay ahead, Pakistan had decided as early as 1974 to secretly pursue an alternative to the 
plutonium route, even as it carried on with its efforts to secure reprocessing facilities for 
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plutonium extraction. The second pathway to the bomb was uranium enrichment, a highly 
complicated process mastered at the time by only a handful of the most scientifically 
advanced Western countries, which had built their enrichment facilities under complete 
secrecy and kept the technology used therein equally confidential.134 
In September 1974, Bhutto received a letter from Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan (better known as 
A.Q. Khan), a Pakistani metallurgist working for a specialized engineering firm in Holland. 
Khan‘s firm provided sub-contracting and consultancy services to a European nuclear 
consortium called URENCO, which used a new and highly secret ultracentrifuge 
technology to enrich uranium as a fuel for nuclear power plants. In his letter, Khan 
advocated the use of highly enriched uranium as an alternative to the plutonium route and 
offered his expertise in centrifuge technology to help Pakistan obtain enough fissile material 
for a nuclear weapon. His offer was accepted but he was asked to stay on in Holland and 
acquire greater knowledge of the process. At the same time, however, his advocacy of the 
uranium route was cogent enough to compel Bhutto to initiate a secret uranium enrichment 
plan code-named Project 706.135 In February 1975, the prime minister approved the 
construction of a secret centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facility in the small town of 
Kahuta, thirty kilometres southeast of Islamabad. 
In the meantime, A.Q. Khan had gained vital information about gas centrifuge technology 
through visits to URENCO‘s uranium-enrichment facility in the Dutch town of Almelo. By 
1975, he was passing on centrifuge designs to his Pakistani colleagues working on Project 
706. Once the Dutch authorities became suspicious of Khan‘s activities, he moved back to 
Pakistan in December 1975 and formally joined the secret uranium enrichment programme. 
In July 1976, he managed to prevail upon Bhutto to give him complete control over the 
centrifuge project, which included presiding over a secret procurement programme 
operating through Pakistani embassies and consular offices in Europe. The Kahuta facility, 
which had previously fallen under the ambit of the PAEC, was now made an autonomous 
organization called the Engineering Research Laboratories and placed under A.Q. Khan‘s 
unfettered authority. 
Even as he clandestinely pursued nuclear weapon capability, Bhutto continued to urge the 
US to end its arms embargo on Pakistan, a decision that was finally taken in 1975 by 
Nixon‘s successor, Gerald Ford, who restored American arms sales to both Pakistan and 
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India concurrently.136 Despite the generally friendly attitude of the Ford administration 
towards Pakistan and the ―personal relations‖ that Bhutto claimed he enjoyed with 
Kissinger (whom Ford had retained as Secretary of State), strains in the overall relationship 
between the US and Pakistan soon began to emerge over the nuclear issue.137 Of particular 
concern to the US was Pakistan‘s agreement with a French engineering firm in 1974 for the 
construction of a facility to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, which the Americans feared would 
be used by the Pakistanis to extract weapons-grade plutonium. When viewed in conjunction 
with Pakistan‘s negotiations with West Germany for the acquisition of a heavy water 
production plant, such measures, in the opinion of the US administration, gave rise to 
―perceptions…that non-peaceful uses may be contemplated‖.138 
A top-secret memorandum on nuclear proliferation activities prepared by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 1975 warned that Pakistan could be technically 
capable of building a nuclear device by 1978.139 In a letter to Bhutto, Ford officially 
expressed his ―deep personal concern‖ regarding Pakistan‘s nuclear-related activities and 
warned of their potentially damaging impact on the future course of US-Pakistan relations. 
He also called upon Bhutto to abandon plans to acquire the reprocessing facility and heavy 
water plant until Pakistan‘s nuclear programme was ―sufficiently developed to establish a 
clear need‖ for their acquisition.140 While sympathising with Pakistan‘s nuclear ambitions in 
private deliberations with his own officials,141 Kissinger engaged in muscular diplomacy 
with Bhutto in a determined - albeit unsuccessful - attempt to wean him away from the 
nuclear option. Bhutto‘s verbal assurances that Pakistan‘s nuclear facilities would be placed 
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under adequate safeguards were dismissed by Kissinger on the grounds that he was ―not so 
interested in words but concerned about realities.‖142 
Undeterred by US pressure, Bhutto forged ahead in his quest to build the bomb, even as he 
undertook to assure the international community that he had no intention of doing so.143 The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finally gave its approval to the Franco-
Pakistani nuclear agreement after Pakistan consented to place the facility in question, the 
Chashma reprocessing plant, under international safeguards, including regular visits by 
IAEA inspectors. Pakistan also undertook to ensure that the reprocessing equipment or the 
material produced by it would not be used for ―the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to 
further any other military purpose or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive 
device‖.144 Such assurances were not sufficient to convince the US, which decided to pursue 
a carrot-and-stick approach towards Pakistan.  
In August 1976, on his final trip to Pakistan as Secretary of State, Kissinger offered to 
strengthen Pakistan‘s conventional defence capabilities by providing 110 Corsair A-7 attack 
bombers in exchange for an abandonment of the reprocessing plant. In case Pakistan 
refused, Kissinger threatened that all aid could be cut off under new legislation passed by 
the US Congress in a bid to curtail further nuclear proliferation. Under the terms of the 
Symington Amendment to the foreign assistance act introduced in June 1976, all economic 
and military aid was prohibited to any non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories 
involved in importing or exporting reprocessing facilities or unsafeguarded enrichment 
plants.145 
Whilst urging Bhutto to accept the American offer, Kissinger warned that if the Democrats 
under Jimmy Carter came to power in the forthcoming US presidential election, they would 
adopt a much tougher stance on non-proliferation and would make a ―horrible example‖ out 
of Pakistan. In a meeting with Pakistan‘s ambassador to the US the following month, he 
reiterated his warning that if the Democrats won, ―they would like nothing better than to 
make a horrible example about somebody.‖ Since it would be very difficult for them to take 
                                                          
142
 Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Bhutto, February 26, 
1976, DNSA, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/HAK%202-26-76.pdf  
143
 According to Perkovich, Bhutto‘s own statements during his murder trial as well as later American 
intelligence reports indicate that during a May 1976 visit to China, he managed to convince the Chinese 
to provide important material assistance towards the Pakistani bomb effort. See Perkovich, India’s 
Nuclear Bomb, 196. 
144
 Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, 96. 
145
 The amendment took its name from its author, Democratic Senator Stuart Symington. 
80 
 
on the French, Kissinger cautioned that Pakistan would be a far easier victim for an 
―assault‖ by a future Carter administration.146 
Bhutto‘s version of his meeting with Kissinger is different, in that he accuses the latter of 
having threatened to make a horrible example out of him personally if he did not desist 
from going after the bomb. Even if such were indeed the case, that did not prevent Bhutto 
from writing to Kissinger in evidently warm terms following Ford‘s defeat by Carter in 
November 1976: ―The termination of your present high office saddens me…I shall always 
cherish my association with you as a friend with esteem and affection‖.147 Yet Bhutto did 
not allow his personal friendship with Kissinger to influence his stand on the reprocessing 
plant; nor did Kissinger‘s policy of combining incentives such as the A-7 bombers with dire 
warnings of ―horrible‖ consequences have any impact. Bhutto remained defiant and 
Kissinger returned empty-handed.  
Notwithstanding their differences over the nuclear issue, Pakistan and the US enjoyed 
generally cooperative ties during the brief period of the Ford presidency, in no small 
measure due to the close working relationship between Bhutto and Kissinger. With Bhutto 
at the helm, Pakistan diversified its foreign policy and the US no longer remained its only 
source of external patronage; at the same time, however, American economic and military 
support continued to be sought as assiduously as before. While Ford and Kissinger were in 
charge, such support was forthcoming, most notably with the lifting of the arms embargo in 
1975. But the return of the Democrats under Jimmy Carter who, during his presidential 
campaign, had promised to be resolute on non-proliferation and human rights, did not augur 
well for the future of America‘s relationship with its once ―most allied ally.‖ 
As expected, US-Pakistan relations rapidly plummeted to unprecedented depths after Jimmy 
Carter assumed the presidency. Bhutto soon found himself facing growing US pressure to 
roll back the nuclear programme at a time when domestic opposition to his rule was 
intensifying rapidly. Bhutto‘s overwhelming victory in national elections held in March 
1977 was tainted by allegations of widespread rigging. His main opposition, a nine-party 
grouping called the Pakistan National Alliance, rejected the election results and took to the 
streets demanding Bhutto‘s resignation, sparking widespread demonstrations and strikes. 
Bhutto‘s attempts to suppress the protests led to violence and significant loss of lives, 
eventually forcing him to call in the army to restore order. With governance in a state of 
paralysis and a national economy teetering on the brink of collapse, the Pakistan army was 
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provided the rationale for another overt foray into the country‘s political process. On July 5, 
1977, Bhutto was removed through a bloodless military coup carried out by army chief 
General Zia-ul-Haq. 
During his final months in office, an increasingly desperate Bhutto had trained his guns on 
the US, accusing the Carter administration of orchestrating the domestic protests against 
him as part of a ―vast, colossal, huge international conspiracy‖ to topple him and thereby 
prevent Pakistan‘s nuclear programme from attaining fruition.148 In his last political 
testament written from a cell where he had been placed on a murder charge that eventually 
cost him his life, Bhutto maintained that Pakistan had been on the ―threshold of full nuclear 
capability‖ when he left the government to ―come to this death cell.‖ He alleged that the 
―Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations,‖ all of which already possessed nuclear 
capability, wished to deny it to the ―Islamic civilization‖ just when it was on the cusp of 
attaining it.149 Bhutto was unable to present hard evidence to substantiate the allegation of 
US involvement in his overthrow, but even if his claim were true, any hopes that the 
Americans might have had of the nuclear programme going out with its originator were to 
be dashed. Zia-ul-Haq would be just as resolute in the pursuit of nuclear capability as the 
man he had replaced, a theme addressed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
 
The turbulent history of Pakistan‘s relationship with the United States during the first three 
decades of its existence testifies to the inherently changeable nature of international patron-
client relationships. Their fluidity, in turn, stems from the volatility of the strategic 
environment in which they are formed and which serves as the battleground upon which 
they operate. Constant permutations and shifts of alignment on that battleground in turn 
determine the direction that patron-client relationships must take; indeed, they even 
determine if such relationships need be maintained at all. As argued in the first chapter, 
patron-client state relationships are not static arrangements in which an all-powerful patron 
exerts hegemonic control over its supine client; on the contrary, the client invariably exerts 
considerable pressure on the patron and, given the right circumstances, is capable of a high 
degree of strategic defiance, even at the risk of depriving itself of the patron‘s material 
assistance.  
In the initial years after independence, Pakistan desperately sought an external patron to 
guarantee both its economic solvency as well as its territorial integrity against threats from 
India and, to a less pressing extent, from Afghanistan. Until the early 1950s, the US saw 
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little of strategic significance to engage its attention in South Asia; whatever interest it had 
was directed at securing a cooperative relationship with India, which it saw as a potential 
ally in preventing communist penetration into Asia. When India opted to remain non-
aligned in the Cold War, the US reluctantly turned towards Pakistan, which readily agreed 
to serve as a foot-soldier in the battle against communism in exchange for American arms 
and economic aid. Whereas America desired its weapons to be used solely for the purpose 
of countering communist aggression, it soon became clear that Pakistan‘s only purpose in 
seeking them was to build up its military against India. A relationship that, from its outset, 
rested on contradictory purposes and which, moreover, could not claim a clear ideological 
or historical basis for its continuity, was never likely to be one that would fulfil the 
expectations of either party. 
By the early 1960s, Pakistan began to entertain serious misgivings about America‘s 
reliability as a patron in case of a conflict with India. The relationship was put to its first 
real test during the 1965 India-Pakistan war and, at least from Pakistan‘s perspective, the 
US miserably failed it. Instead of assisting Pakistan in its hour of need, the American 
response was to punish its once ―most allied ally‖ by choking off its access to US weaponry 
at a time when it needed it most. With American interest in South Asia once again in 
decline, Pakistan‘s strategic importance diminished, resulting in a considerable weakening 
of the patron-client bonds forged during the 1950s.  
Nixon‘s decision to utilise Pakistan as the medium through which to achieve a 
rapprochement with China temporarily restored a measure of strategic value to the 
relationship. However, his controversial ―tilt‖ towards Pakistan did not extend to preventing 
the separation of half the country. Pakistan‘s subsequent embarkation on a determined quest 
to acquire nuclear capability was met with sustained and, on occasions, stern US opposition, 
both in the form of verbal cautions as well as through more practical measures such as the 
stoppage of military aid. But Pakistan refused to submit to American pressure to abandon its 
nuclear ambitions, just as it had earlier defied American strictures not to use US-supplied 
weaponry against India. Instances such as these are stark reminders of the often rather 
limited influence that a patron state, even if it be a superpower, can bring to bear on a client 
that is fully committed to pursuing what it deems its fundamental national interests, even 
when those interests conflict with those of the patron.  
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CHAPTER THREE: FRONTLINE STATE - THE ZIA-UL-HAQ ERA 
 
 
General Zia-ul-Haq‘s coup of July 1977 abruptly terminated Pakistan‘s brief experiment 
with representative democracy and inaugurated what still remains its longest period of 
direct military rule. Upon taking over the country, Zia solemnly proclaimed his intention to 
hold elections within ninety days and hand over power to the people‘s elected 
representatives. Instead of honouring that pledge, he proceeded to rule Pakistan with an iron 
fist for the next eleven years. Even when the end finally came, it arrived not through a 
voluntary relinquishment of power but through Zia‘s death in a mysterious plane crash in 
the sandy wastes of the Bahawalpur desert in Pakistan‘s south-east.  
The impact of Zia‘s policies continued to be felt long after the demise of their originator. 
Indeed, more than two and a half decades after Zia plunged to his fiery death, his shadow 
still looms large over Pakistan‘s political, societal and geo-strategic landscape. At the same 
time, however, it is debatable if Zia could have ruled for as long as he did or had as 
powerful an influence within Pakistan as well as beyond had it not been for a single 
exogenous factor: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which catapulted 
Pakistan virtually overnight from an international pariah into a bastion of resistance to 
communist aggression.  
With Zia at the helm, Pakistan became an indispensable part of the largest covert operation 
mounted by the CIA during the Cold War. Once again, America and Pakistan found 
themselves locked in the bonds of a patron-client relationship whereby, in exchange for its 
services in coordinating the Afghan resistance, Pakistan was rewarded with substantial 
American military and economic aid and Zia‘s military dictatorship was provided 
international legitimacy. Although clearly in pressing need of American patronage, Zia was 
by no means a mere pawn to be used whichever way his superpower patron deemed fit. In 
fact, he shrewdly manipulated the relationship with the US in ways guaranteed not only to 
prolong his own rule but to also protect what he viewed as Pakistan‘s core interests, even 
when they conflicted with those of the US itself.  
I. A Troubled Beginning: Carter and Zia 
 
During the first half of Jimmy Carter‘s one-term presidency, relations between the US and 
Pakistan reached the nadir of their fortunes. By the time Carter took office in 1977, 
Pakistan‘s geographic location had lost much of the strategic allure that had made it a 
recipient of US patronage at varying periods over the previous three decades. The absolute 
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monarchies of Iran and Saudi Arabia had become the leading pillars of support for US 
interests in the Middle East and West Asia. Moreover, under Carter, the US was committed 
to lowering tensions with the Soviet Union, part of which would involve an effort to 
―negotiate itself and the Soviets out of the Indian Ocean power race.‖1 Finally, the US no 
longer required Pakistan to function as an intermediary with China, to which it now had 
direct access. 
Even more worryingly for Pakistan, the diminution of its strategic importance for the US 
was accompanied by the realization that Carter and his foreign policy team appeared much 
more favourably disposed towards India. This was in line with an approach propounded by 
Carter‘s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, which sought to ―weave a 
worldwide web‖ of bilateral relations between the US and emerging regional ―influentials‖ 
in the Third World.2 Within the South Asian region, that meant India and not Pakistan; 
accordingly, in July 1977, as General Zia-ul-Haq was upending democracy in Pakistan, 
Carter welcomed India‘s newly elected prime minister, Morarji Desai, to the White House.3 
The following year, Carter became the third US president after Eisenhower and Nixon to 
undertake an official trip to India; unlike his predecessors, however, he chose not to include 
Pakistan in his travel itinerary to the subcontinent.  
Although concerned about Pakistan‘s reversion to military rule, the Carter administration‘s 
major bone of contention with its new interlocutors in Islamabad remained the nuclear 
issue. While Bhutto was in office, Carter had continued to pursue the carrot-and-stick 
approach of the Ford/Kissinger period of threatening sanctions but also keeping the 
incentive of military aid on the table if Pakistan gave up its nuclear ambitions. However, 
neither Bhutto nor the man who removed him would cave in to American pressure. Shortly 
after taking over, Zia made it clear to the US that he would continue his predecessor‘s 
policies regarding Pakistan‘s nuclear programme, thereby demonstrating a regime-
transcendent consensus that no compromise would be made on what had become a core 
security interest as well as a matter of national prestige. In response, the Carter 
administration suspended all economic assistance under the terms of the Glenn Amendment 
of 1977.4 
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Having failed to convince Pakistan to abjure the nuclear option, the US then decided to 
persuade France to back out of its contractual obligation regarding the building of the 
Chashma reprocessing plant. Earlier US attempts to scuttle the Franco-Pakistani nuclear 
agreement had been criticised by France as a violation of sovereignty and the French had 
consistently maintained their intention to honour the contract.5 However, a combination of 
renewed diplomatic pressure from the US and France‘s own suspicions about Pakistan‘s 
real motivations in seeking the reprocessing technology gradually forced a change in its 
policy regarding nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.  
In September 1977, the French suggested a modification of the fuel reprocessing process so 
as to prevent the production of pure plutonium and instead generate a mixture of plutonium 
and uranium that could not be used in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Pakistan‘s rejection 
of the change and its insistence on acquiring plutonium alone finally convinced France that 
it was indeed the bomb that Islamabad was after. In July 1978, France despatched an envoy 
to inform Zia that it was suspending its nuclear agreement with Pakistan. Having expected 
loud recriminations and protests, the envoy was surprised to find Zia ―full of self-control‖ 
and ―more a diplomat than a simple military man.‖6 While such a restrained response was in 
keeping with Zia‘s outward persona of self-effacing humility, his sangfroid at what was 
undoubtedly a bitter blow might well have stemmed equally from the knowledge that 
Pakistan still had an ace up its sleeve. The plutonium route to the bomb may have been 
temporarily closed but the uranium route still lay open.  
By the time Zia removed Bhutto from power, Pakistan was well on the way towards 
gathering the tools needed to make its nuclear dream a reality. A.Q. Khan‘s extensive 
network of contacts built during his time in Europe allowed Pakistan to find loopholes 
within the regulatory mechanisms set up by the US and its European allies to restrict access 
to major components used in uranium enrichment.7 Although such components were 
classified and subject to strict import controls, individual parts were not guarded as closely. 
Pakistan was thus able to activate its enrichment plant by ―proceeding systematically from 
country to country, buying the essential items - part by part - from dozens of companies in 
at least five different Western European nations.‖8 
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The Carter administration had heaved a sigh of relief after France pulled out of its nuclear 
agreement with Pakistan. For Washington, the French decision symbolised a much needed 
victory for the nascent international non-proliferation regime. With the reprocessing plant 
taken out of the equation, the primary irritant in US-Pakistan relations was removed, 
thereby allowing a resumption of economic aid, albeit to the tune of a fairly modest $69 
million. Before long, however, the nuclear factor re-emerged as a major source of friction 
between the two countries.  
Pakistan‘s covert procurement programme in Europe could not remain under wraps 
indefinitely. Towards the end of 1978, it was becoming apparent to the US that Pakistan had 
hedged its bets on the plutonium route to the bomb by simultaneously seeking to enrich 
uranium. When the American ambassador at the time, Arthur Hummel, confronted Zia with 
intelligence emerging about Pakistan‘s clandestine enrichment programme, he found the 
general ―a very good actor‖ who indignantly denied the existence of such a programme. Zia 
even offered to allow American experts to inspect any facility in the country that might be 
under suspicion. The ambassador promptly accepted the invitation but Zia made sure not to 
follow through on it.9 
Apart from the nuclear issue, the bleak prospects for a restoration of democracy and the 
equally grim fate awaiting former prime minister Bhutto were other areas of concern for the 
US, albeit not as serious as Pakistan‘s quest for the bomb. Zia repudiated his promise to 
hold elections in October 1977 and postponed them indefinitely. In September 1978, he 
cemented his grip on power by assuming the office of president whilst remaining army 
chief and keeping martial law in place. Moreover, in order to lend domestic legitimacy to 
his rule, Zia began to promulgate measures aimed at the Islamisation of the Pakistani state 
and society including the institution of Quranic punishments, the establishment of a shariah 
court to bring existing laws in greater conformity with Islamic strictures and the promotion 
of madrassas (Islamic schools). 
In the meantime, the pronouncement of Bhutto‘s death sentence by the Lahore High Court 
in March 1978 had prompted calls for clemency from a number of foreign leaders, 
including President Carter. In February 1979, Bhutto‘s appeal to the Supreme Court - the 
highest court in the country - against his earlier conviction was rejected, leading to another 
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request from Carter to Zia to commute Bhutto‘s death sentence to life imprisonment.10 This 
was followed by the passage of a resolution in the US House of Representatives calling on 
Zia to spare Bhutto‘s life.11 Just weeks before the execution, Zia received a third message 
from Carter to pardon Bhutto but remained unmoved and allowed the sentence to be carried 
out on April 4, 1979.12 
Two days after Bhutto was hanged, the US once again suspended economic assistance to 
Pakistan. Although there was speculation in some quarters in Pakistan that the American 
decision stemmed at least partly from a desire to chastise Zia for ignoring Carter‘s 
supplications to spare Bhutto‘s life, the truth was that Pakistan had again fallen foul of US 
non-proliferation strictures. By March 1979, US intelligence had received enough evidence 
to conclude that Pakistan was engaged in operating secret facilities ―whose only 
conceivable purpose was to enrich uranium for a nuclear explosive capability.‖13 What 
made this programme ―even more egregious‖ than the reprocessing project was that it was 
―undertaken covertly and relied on deception to obtain the needed equipment abroad.‖14 
Prior to imposing sanctions under the Symington Amendment, the US had sought ―reliable 
assurances‖ that Pakistan was not seeking nuclear weapons.15 While Zia denied that 
Pakistan had such an intention, he refused to rule out the possibility of conducting a 
―peaceful nuclear explosion‖ and rejected placing all of Pakistan‘s nuclear facilities under 
international safeguards.16 Not sufficiently reassured of Pakistan‘s nuclear bona fides, the 
US cut off economic aid. Although not unexpected, the continuing American opposition to 
its nuclear ambitions appeared to be particularly galling for Pakistan at a time when the 
Carter administration was fighting a tough domestic battle with Congress to continue 
supplying Indian nuclear power reactors with enriched-uranium fuel.17 An increasingly 
fraught bilateral relationship was placed under added strain when it was revealed that an 
inter-agency group within the State Department had been considering a range of options on 
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derailing Pakistan‘s nuclear programme, including examining the possibility of mounting an 
attack on the Kahuta enrichment facility.18 
Even as their overall diplomatic relations visibly worsened during the first two and a half 
years of Zia‘s rule, there was a substantial improvement in the level of covert intelligence 
cooperation between the US and Pakistan. The fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979 had 
deprived the US not only of its principal regional gendarme but also of electronic 
monitoring facilities set up in Iran to spy on Soviet Central Asia. Upon being approached by 
the CIA as an alternative to Iran, Zia agreed to the installation of listening posts in 
Pakistan‘s northern border areas adjoining Soviet missile-testing and anti-satellite launch 
sites.19 Ambassador Hummel confirmed that the US had ―very good cooperation from the 
Pakistanis‖ and that ―almost anything that we wanted to do, we could do, as long as we 
could figure out how we could keep it hidden.‖20 
Pakistan‘s willingness to accommodate US strategic objectives to such great lengths did not 
result in any immediate material rewards; military aid remained suspended and economic 
assistance was cut off under the Symington Amendment even as negotiations for the 
monitoring facilities were still in progress. However, the burgeoning intelligence 
cooperation remained unaffected by such setbacks. Zia took a carefully calculated decision 
to make a more long-term investment in his relationship with the US by acquiring a 
potentially powerful bargaining chip that could be cashed in at a more opportune time later 
on. At the same time, he did manage to reap some short-term dividends from the grant of 
the eavesdropping facilities, most notably in the form of shared intelligence between the 
CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), on 
events in neighbouring Afghanistan. 
Notwithstanding their growing convergence of interests in the shadowy world of covert 
intelligence, the overall diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and the US continued on a 
seemingly inexorable downward spiral. On November 21, 1979, a frenzied mob of students 
attacked and burned down the US embassy in Islamabad, killing two Americans and two 
Pakistani embassy employees in the process. The students had been enraged by 
uncorroborated reports of American and Israeli involvement in the takeover of Islam‘s 
holiest site, the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Despite frantic appeals for help from the US 
ambassador and even a personal telephone call from Carter to Zia, the military authorities 
were slow to respond to the crisis. At the time of the attack, Zia had been riding a bicycle 
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down the main road of nearby Rawalpindi as part of a public relations exercise aimed at 
promoting the ―simple virtues of self-propelled transport.‖21 Much of Islamabad‘s security 
apparatus, therefore, had been detailed to protect the pedalling president.  
It took five hours for an army unit to finally reach the charred embassy compound, by 
which time the mob had already started to melt away. Speculation abounded amongst US 
officials present at the scene that the government‘s poor response to the attack could have 
been less a result of incompetence and more a case of not rushing to save American lives in 
case the rumours of American involvement in the events in Saudi Arabia turned out to be 
correct.22 It was even suspected by some that the government had actually instigated the 
protest in order to let the Americans ―sweat a bit.‖23 Although Zia subsequently conveyed 
his regrets to Carter - who in turn thanked him for his assistance - an already strained 
bilateral relationship appeared to have deteriorated almost beyond repair before being 
dramatically revived in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  
II. Converging Interests in Afghanistan 
 
American covert involvement in Afghanistan predated the actual Soviet invasion of that 
country by several months. It stemmed from increasing anxiety in Washington about 
growing Soviet penetration into Southwest Asia at a time when US influence in the region 
had waned considerably following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. In April 1978, a 
Soviet-backed Marxist government had been installed in Kabul through a coup that toppled 
Afghan president Mohammad Daoud Khan. The US had recognised the new communist 
regime and maintained normal diplomatic relations with it until February 1979. It even 
continued to provide economic aid in a bid to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a Soviet 
satellite. By early 1979, however, it had become clear to the US that the Afghan 
government was relying increasingly on Soviet support to prop itself up against a growing 
domestic rebellion. Accordingly, President Carter ordered preliminary spadework on the 
possibility of covert assistance to the Afghan rebels.24 
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The most vocal advocate of such support within the Carter administration was Brzezinski, 
who warned the president that the Soviets‘ ―creeping intervention‖ in Afghanistan could 
eventually put them in a position to secure access to the Indian Ocean by achieving the 
dismemberment of Pakistan and Iran.25 Sensing an opportunity to further its strategic 
interests in Afghanistan as well as build on the existing intelligence cooperation with the 
CIA, Pakistan soon approached the US to discuss assistance to the insurgents, including the 
provision of small arms and ammunition. With the turmoil in Afghanistan continuing to 
grow, leading in turn to a proportionate increase in the Soviet military footprint in the 
country, Carter finally agreed to launch covert operations in July 1979, six months before 
the Soviets formally invaded. 
The initial level of covert American support to the Afghan insurgency was limited to non-
lethal aid amounting to the modest sum of $500,000, consumed within six weeks of its 
allocation.26 By that time, the administration was receiving urgent requests from Pakistan, 
both directly from Zia through normal diplomatic channels as well as from the ISI through 
its CIA connections, for weapons and equipment for the insurgents. Carter agreed to ramp 
up the level of covert support through a series of measures including the provision of funds 
to the ISI to buy weapons that were then funnelled to the insurgents as well as supplying the 
ISI with a similar amount of US lethal weaponry for onward distribution.27 The CIA and the 
ISI worked in tandem to impart training to the rebel fighters and jointly coordinated the aid 
that was trickling in from a number of other interested countries, including China, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait.28 
Months before the Soviet invasion, therefore, the basic skeleton of what would eventually 
become ―an extraordinary logistics pipeline from suppliers around the world‖ had been put 
in place.29 Pakistan was ideally placed to be the fulcrum of the pipeline not only because of 
its geographical proximity to Afghanistan but also because it already enjoyed close ties with 
several of the Afghan resistance outfits. Several years before the Soviets entered 
Afghanistan, Pakistan had secretly cultivated a number of Afghan dissident groups, 
especially those with an Islamist orientation, as a counterweight both to pro-Pashtunistan 
nationalist forces spearheaded by Daoud as well as the increasingly powerful Soviet-backed 
cadres of the Marxist Peoples‘ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).  
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During the 1960s, the liberalising instincts of the secular King Zahir Shah and the growing 
penetration of communism within Afghanistan had aroused the opposition of an incipient 
Islamist movement led by Islamic studies professors returning to their teaching positions in 
Kabul after pursuing higher degrees abroad, most notably at Egypt‘s Al-Azhar University, 
Islam‘s most renowned seat of religious scholarship.30 During their studies in Egypt, some 
of those academics, notably Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, were deeply 
inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary interpretation of political Islam 
preached by some its more radical ideologues. Upon resuming their professorial positions in 
Kabul, they proceeded to impart the lessons in religious radicalism imbibed in Egypt to a 
growing band of young Afghan Islamists, including two as yet little known men who would 
achieve much greater prominence in the years to follow: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed 
Shah Massoud.  
Daoud had resigned from the prime ministership in 1963 but returned to power a decade 
later by colluding with the Afghan communists to topple Zahir Shah while the king was on 
a visit to Italy.31 He then proceeded to abolish the monarchy, turned Afghanistan into a 
republic with himself as its first president, and unfurled the banner of Pashtunistan once 
again. Worryingly for Pakistan, the return of its seemingly implacable foe in Afghanistan 
coincided with a major political crisis at home stemming from Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto‘s unwillingness to tolerate opposition party governments in the two provinces 
sharing a border with Afghanistan: the NWFP and Baluchistan. Bhutto accused Daoud of 
fomenting unrest in both provinces and of backing an insurgency that erupted in 
Balochistan in 1973 after Bhutto dismissed the provincial government run by his 
opponents.32 
In response to Daoud‘s active encouragement of opposition groups in the NWFP and 
Baluchistan, Bhutto launched an aggressive counter-offensive. After Daoud cracked down 
on his Islamist opponents, many of them, including Rabbani, Massoud and Hekmatyar, fled 
to Pakistan where they established links with Islamist groups there as well as with Pakistani 
intelligence agencies, who were constantly ―on the lookout for potentially important Afghan 
                                                          
30
 For a detailed account of Afghanistan‘s domestic political dynamics during the 1960s and 1970s, see 
Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 
2004), 133-197. 
31
 After the coup, Zahir Shah stayed on in Italy and did not return to Afghanistan until after the overthrow 
of the Taliban almost three decades later.  
32
 Bhutto‘s allegations of Afghan involvement in stirring the pot of insurrection in NWFP and Baluchistan 
were not without substance. Daoud‘s deputy foreign minister, Abdul Samad Ghaus, conceded that the 
Afghans ―could not remain indifferent to the plight of the Pashtuns and the Baluchis, who were their kith 
and kin.‖ He maintained further that Afghanistan could not ignore those who were ―continuously coming 
to Kabul to seek help and guidance‖ and confirmed that they received ―ample moral and material help 
from the Afghans, as they had in the past.‖ Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider’s 
Account (London: Pergammon-Brassey‘s International Defence Publishers, 1988), 114,123. 
92 
 
dissidents.‖33 Bhutto not only gave the Islamists refuge but provided arms and training and 
then sent them back into Afghanistan to mount covert operations against the government. A 
dedicated Afghan cell was set up in the Foreign Office under Bhutto‘s overall supervision 
to coordinate the activities of the insurgents. For a while, Pakistan maintained a small 
contingent of Afghan fighters at an airbase in the NWFP that could be airlifted at short 
notice to carry out surprise guerrilla attacks inside Afghanistan.34 
In the summer of 1975, Pakistan-backed insurgents led by Ahmed Shah Massoud were 
infiltrated into the Panjshir Valley northeast of Kabul to stir up an insurrection against the 
government. Although the rebellion was crushed and Massoud forced to flee back to 
Pakistan, Daoud became sufficiently ―wary of Pakistan‘s hostile intentions‖ to explore ways 
of arriving at an accommodation.35 Bhutto was quick to respond and both leaders 
exchanged visits to each other‘s countries in 1976. Bhutto‘s removal from power in 1977 
did not slow down the momentum of the nascent process of reconciliation. If anything, it 
was expedited by Zia-ul-Haq, who came across to his Afghan interlocutors as ―the most 
affable, well-disposed, and farsighted Pakistani leader‖ that they had ever encountered.36 
Zia and Daoud also exchanged reciprocal visits and developed a constructive working 
relationship, leading to expectations in some quarters that they would eventually be able to 
engineer a mutually acceptable solution to the Pashtunistan issue within three to four 
years.37 Upon his return to Kabul after visiting Pakistan in March 1978, Daoud had 
expressed his satisfaction with the trip and had declared Zia ―an honest man‖ with whom he 
could do business.38 Tragically for Daoud, that was to be his last meeting with the general; 
just weeks after his return from Pakistan, Soviet-trained Marxist sympathisers within the 
Afghan army, some of whom had helped bring Daoud to power in 1973, carried out a 
bloody coup that resulted not only in his removal from power but also in his execution, 
along with eighteen members of his family.39 
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In September 1978, Zia travelled to Kabul to meet Afghanistan‘s new Marxist leaders, 
President Nur Mohammad Taraki and his deputy Hafizullah Amin, and revive the bilateral 
talks suspended after Daoud‘s overthrow. Zia was concerned by the revival of Afghan 
propaganda on Pashtunistan following the coup and adopted a conciliatory tone with Taraki 
by offering to discuss any problems that the new regime was encountering, provide 
technical support where needed and ensure that transit routes remained open.40 To his 
disappointment, he found the new Afghan president responding with ―oratory about his 
popular support and vagueness about specific issues.‖41 Having failed to secure an explicit 
assurance from Taraki that the reconciliation process would be continued, Zia decided to 
revert to Bhutto‘s initial policy of providing covert support to the Afghan dissidents, who 
had declared a jihad against the new atheistic rulers of their country and regarded 
themselves as mujahidin (Muslims fighting in the way of God to defend Islam against its 
enemies). By the winter of 1978, Pakistan was receiving significant numbers of Afghan 
refugees and had set up a network of guerrilla training camps and supply routes on its side 
of the Durand Line.42 
III. Driving a Hard Bargain 
 
On December 24, 1979, some 85,000 Soviet troops massed along the border with 
Afghanistan crossed over to remove the government of Hafizullah Amin, who was executed 
and replaced with the more acceptable Babrak Karmal.43 The increasing level of Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan‘s internal affairs had been no secret and Moscow‘s military 
action may not have been as rude a shock to Washington as has conventionally been 
believed.44 Nevertheless, it did deal a fatal blow to President Carter‘s attempts to expand 
détente with America‘s arch-rival in the Cold War. The invasion unquestionably signified a 
major shift in Soviet strategic planning since it constituted the first instance of Soviet troops 
being committed outside the Warsaw Pact theatre of operations. For the US, moreover, the 
Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, coming close on the heels of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, represented a serious threat to American and Western interests in the 
Persian Gulf. 
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Anxious to deliver an immediate and effective ―global response‖ to what he viewed as an 
alarming ―qualitative change in Soviet behaviour,‖ President Carter telephoned his 
Pakistani counterpart on the morning of the invasion to reaffirm the 1959 bilateral security 
agreement against communist aggression.45 For the US, Pakistan was once again a 
―frontline state‖ and an ―indispensable element‖ of a punitive strategy aimed at making the 
invasion as costly an adventure as possible for the Soviets.46 In January 1980, President 
Carter enunciated the Carter doctrine which proclaimed that ―any attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force.‖47 Pakistan‘s proximity to the Persian Gulf would make 
it a vital component in case a need arose to put the Carter doctrine into practice. 
The fact that, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion, it was the US that 
approached Pakistan and not the other way around signified to Zia that Washington‘s urgent 
need for Islamabad‘s cooperation at that point in time outweighed Pakistan‘s seemingly 
perpetual need for American aid. In a sudden, dramatic twist of fortune, a military 
dictatorship that had found itself banished to a diplomatic wilderness on account of its 
nuclear ambitions and human rights violations was transformed almost overnight into a 
citadel of resistance against ―dangerous Kremlin expansionism.‖48 Once castigated for his 
autocratic rule, Zia began to be wooed by his erstwhile critics, who suddenly took note of 
his ―hitherto unknown ‗sterling qualities‘ and the special importance of Pakistan in the 
changed circumstances.‖49 Provided he played his cards right, Zia could now look forward 
to US coffers being opened up for Pakistan once again.  
The prospect of being at the receiving end of an American aid windfall was no doubt a 
tantalizing one for Zia and his coterie of generals, who were presiding over an economy in 
dire straits and a military in urgent need of modernization. However, the likelihood of an 
influx of American cash and weapons, welcome though it was, should not be taken to mean 
that Zia considered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to have been a blessing in disguise. 
In fact, he regarded it as a serious threat to Pakistan‘s security. Pakistan‘s traditional 
alignment with the US meant that relations between Moscow and Islamabad had never been 
warm. At the same time, the Soviets had enjoyed close ties with Pakistan‘s arch-rival, India, 
for almost three decades and continued to maintain a military relationship with New Delhi. 
                                                          
45
 Thornton, ―Between the Stools?‖ 969 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 443. 
48
 Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding 
the Rollercoaster (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011), 121. 
49
 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics, 1977-1988 (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 314. 
95 
 
Moreover, the presence of thousands of Soviet troops along Pakistan‘s long and porous 
border with Afghanistan, also a traditional antagonist, meant that Islamabad had to confront 
the likelihood of increased Soviet-Afghan subversive activities among Pakistani dissident 
outfits.50 Afghanistan‘s earlier attempts to settle the Pashtunistan issue in its favour had 
never been much of a threat but with the backing of a superpower‘s military resources, 
―Kabul‘s ambitions had to be seen in a new light‖ by Islamabad.51 
Although conscious of the increased threat on its western border, it is unlikely that Zia 
actually shared the forebodings of some US observers that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan was the opening gambit in a wider plan to overrun Pakistan and secure access 
to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. In the months preceding the invasion, Pakistan had 
actually taken steps to improve its relationship with the USSR, most notably by finally 
withdrawing from CENTO in March 1979. Had it been genuinely concerned about 
increased Soviet penetration in its neighbourhood, Pakistan would have been unlikely to 
leave an organization put together for the very purpose of containing Soviet expansionism.  
While the Afghan threat to Pakistan had been considerably expanded as a result of the 
Soviet invasion, it was New Delhi that remained Islamabad‘s principal adversary. Instead of 
fearing outright Soviet aggression, therefore, Zia was much more concerned with the 
potential for Indo-Soviet collaboration designed to ―intimidate, destabilize, or even 
dismember‖ Pakistan.52 Nevertheless, this did not deter him from adroitly playing up the 
spectre of a direct Soviet attack on Pakistan, both to shore up his own position domestically 
as the defender of Islamic Pakistan against the godless communists as well as to make a 
convincing case for American military aid that could be used to counter India.  
Soon after the invasion, Zia sat down with his closest advisors to formulate Pakistan‘s 
response to the dramatically altered security situation on its western border. According to 
Agha Shahi, Pakistan‘s foreign minister at the time, the country had the following options:53 
One: to confront the Soviet Union directly by participating in the Afghan resistance; 
Two: to acquiesce in the fait accompli imposed by the Soviet Union with all its attendant 
security and political implications; 
Three: to protest the Soviet action for its violation of accepted international norms in the 
international forums of the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned 
Movement short of a confrontation with this superpower, while seeking to strengthen 
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Pakistan‘s security politically and its defensive capability but without aligning itself with 
one side or the other in the superpower contention. 
Officially, Pakistan decided to go with the third option and soon mounted a vigorous 
diplomatic campaign to generate international condemnation of the Soviet invasion whilst 
simultaneously seeking humanitarian assistance for masses of Afghan refugees that had 
flooded into Pakistan in the invasion‘s aftermath.54 At the same time, however, Zia and his 
fellow generals, eager to embrace a rationale for American military aid, decided to 
complement the diplomatic pursuit of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with covert 
military support to the Afghan resistance. Overriding the concerns of his civilian advisors 
who had cautioned against measures that could be construed by the Soviets as provocative, 
Zia embarked upon a highly risky policy of deliberate dissimulation. Whilst publicly 
denying any involvement in aiding the Afghan resistance for fear of incurring severe Soviet 
reprisals, he secretly expanded Pakistan‘s control over the conduct of the clandestine war 
against Afghanistan‘s Soviet occupiers.  
Although anxious to get the American aid pipeline reopened, Zia was careful not to convey 
any signs of desperation to Washington. Secure in the knowledge that he occupied a strong 
bargaining position but also mindful of past instances of American unreliability, he pursued 
a measured policy aimed at determining whether or not the proposed material and strategic 
benefits accruing from an alliance with the US would outweigh the real risk of increased 
Soviet hostility along with the probable damage to Pakistan‘s standing within the non-
aligned nations. In January 1980, Zia despatched foreign minister Shahi and a cohort of 
military advisors to Washington for the first formal talks with the US since the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Prior to his departure, Shahi had intimated to US Ambassador 
Arthur Hummel that Pakistan wished to have the 1959 bilateral security agreement - an 
executive instrument - replaced with a mutual defence treaty ratified by the US Congress, 
and sought the provision of a multi-billion dollar military and economic aid program.55 
Much to Zia‘s disappointment, both requests were rejected.  
The Pakistani delegation was informed that the NATO-type treaty that it was soliciting 
could not be provided; in other words, the US would not make an overarching security 
commitment that would cover all threats to Pakistan, including those from non-communist 
sources such as India. Moreover, although the Carter Doctrine proclaimed the Persian Gulf 
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to be of vital interest to the US, Islamabad did not receive a definite answer from 
Washington to the question of whether or not it was ―included in this definition.‖56 As for 
Pakistan‘s aid requirements, the US proposed $400 million in combined military and 
economic aid over the next two years, a sum considerably below Pakistan‘s expectations. A 
particularly bitter pill for Zia to swallow was the rejection of a request for highly advanced 
F-16 fighter jets, the ―symbolic lead item on the Pakistanis‘ wish list.‖57 Finally, while the 
Carter administration undertook to seek a Congressional waiver of the nuclear-related 
Symington restrictions in order to provide aid to Pakistan, it nevertheless affirmed that such 
an undertaking was not indicative of ―any lessening of the importance the US attaches to 
nuclear non-proliferation.‖58 
Upon hearing of the modest American aid offer, Zia famously dismissed it as amounting to 
nothing more than ―peanuts‖ and declared that ―Pakistan will not buy its security with $400 
million.‖59 In a subsequent interview, he maintained that if the US was serious about 
helping Pakistan, then ―let it come whole hog. If I accept such a meaningless level of aid, I 
will only provoke the Russians without really getting a defence against them. I will burn my 
bridges!‖60 Without naming a figure of his own, Zia pointed to the $3 billion that the US 
Congress had earmarked for Egypt as a reward for making peace with Israel and claimed 
that Pakistan was entitled to ―no less, and in terms of the threat that we face, even more.‖61 
When Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Pakistan in 
February 1980 to offer personal assurances of support, Zia pressed them for increased 
military aid as well as US security guarantees against both Soviet and Indian aggression. 
When neither plea received a favourable response, Zia informed them that in view of the 
failure of the two parties to come to an agreement, Pakistan‘s security interests would be 
better served by a ―broad understanding with the United States, reinforced by the public US 
reaffirmation of the 1959 assurances, but with Pakistan publicly distancing itself from the 
United States and collaborating more closely with other Muslim countries in opposing the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.‖62 Privately, Zia assured Brzezinski that such an 
approach would be in America‘s interests as well. 
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According to a member of the Brzezinski-Christopher delegation, both sides had 
―misjudged badly. The Americans overestimated the extent to which Pakistan had rethought 
its role following the Soviet attack; the Pakistanis erred in believing that the American offer 
could be bargained upward.‖63 Zia‘s chief of staff, who participated in the negotiations, 
found that the US alone had been guilty of misjudgement in terms of underestimating the 
―resilience of Pakistan.‖64 Zia‘s dismissal of America‘s aid offer was certainly without 
precedent in the history of the relationship between the two countries and signified an 
―embarrassing diplomatic setback‖ for President Carter, who was already increasingly 
embattled on the foreign policy front.65 
For the remainder of Carter‘s one-term presidency, Zia avoided entering into a bilateral 
security arrangement on America‘s terms and made no attempt to publicly downplay his 
rejection of the American aid offer. At the same time, he declared that although Pakistan 
was no longer interested in obtaining military aid from the US, it would not look the other 
way if economic assistance, in particular debt relief, was offered. Carter agreed to 
participate in an international debt rescheduling programme for Pakistan and, with his hopes 
for a second term dwindling rapidly in the wake of the Iran hostage crisis, tried again to 
cobble together a security arrangement with Islamabad. Zia was invited to the White House 
in October 1980 and offered the much sought after F-16s but Pakistan‘s canny dictator 
refused to take the bait. He was astute enough to know that Carter would, in all probability, 
lose the election and that it would therefore be futile to conclude an agreement that would 
inevitably be nullified by an incoming Republican administration. Accordingly, Zia 
nonchalantly deflected Carter‘s offer of the F-16s by claiming that he did not want to 
burden the latter with Pakistan‘s affairs when he was occupied with his presidential 
campaign and that the matter could be deferred until after the election.66 
The impasse over an aid package acceptable to both parties did not stand in the way of a 
substantial increase in the level of covert collaboration between the US and Pakistan to 
strengthen the Afghan resistance against the Soviets. Just days after the Soviets entered 
Afghanistan, Carter authorized the covert supply of lethal weapons to the mujahidin, 
thereby expanding the arms pipeline that had been put into operation several months prior 
to the invasion. During his trip to Pakistan in February, Brzezinski met privately with Zia to 
discuss an enhanced covert action programme. From Islamabad, he flew to Riyadh to secure 
a guarantee from the ―sensible and very pro-American‖ Crown Prince Fahd that the Saudis 
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would match every dollar given by the US to the mujahidin.67 China, another member of the 
arms pipeline, undertook to sell weapons to the US and donate some to Pakistan.68 By July 
1980, the covert programme had ―dramatically expanded‖ to include ―all manner of 
weapons and military support‖ for the mujahidin.69 
IV. Resurrecting the Relationship: Reagan and Zia 
 
Zia‘s expectation of a Republican victory in the US presidential election of 1980 was 
accompanied by a reasonable assumption that Carter‘s challenger, Ronald Reagan, would 
demonstrate a greater appreciation of Pakistan‘s security interests and be more amenable to 
requests for military assistance. On both counts, Zia turned out to be correct. Running on a 
robustly anti-communist foreign policy platform, Reagan inflicted a crushing electoral 
defeat on Carter, whom he successfully depicted as the promoter of ―a culture of national 
malaise, manifested by stagnation at home and weakness abroad.‖70 
While discarding both the realpolitik-driven détente of Nixon and the multilateral idealism 
of Carter, Reagan proposed an ideologically driven foreign policy that sought to restore 
America‘s decline in world affairs by confronting the Soviet Union wherever an 
opportunity presented itself. For Reagan and his hawkish foreign policy team, regional 
conflicts had to be addressed within the context of the global dialectic between the ―Free 
World‖71 led by the US and the ―Evil Empire‖72 presided over by the Soviet Union. In this 
cosmic battle between good and evil, there would be no room for Carter-era obsessions such 
as human rights, and even nuclear non-proliferation would have to take a backseat to the 
overriding objective of defeating communism. For Zia, who had acquired a well-deserved 
reputation for violating both human rights as well as non-proliferation conventions, Reagan 
could not have come to power at a more opportune time. 
The new administration in Washington wasted little time in reaching out to Islamabad as a 
vital collaborator in resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. One of its first foreign 
policy initiatives was a proposed five-year aid package for Pakistan amounting to $3.2 
billion, a figure unlikely to be dismissed by Zia as ―peanuts.‖ The military component of the 
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package, which included 40 F-16 jets, amounted to $1.5 billion, while the remaining $1.7 
billion was economic assistance. Reagan‘s offer, significantly larger and more long-term 
than that proposed by his predecessor, was meant to ―give Pakistan confidence in our 
commitment to its security and provide us reciprocal benefits in terms of our regional 
interests.‖73 Put more simply, American military and economic patronage would be 
extended to Pakistan in exchange for its services in resisting the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. 
Although encouraged by the more generous US aid offer, Zia was determined to ensure that 
American assistance came with no strings attached; in other words, the client, and not the 
patron, would determine the terms of the relationship. The stridently anti-communist agenda 
of the Reagan Doctrine, which involved ―surrogate wars in the Third World‖ as the ―cutting 
edge of a broader challenge to the Soviet Union,‖ provided Zia a potent bargaining tool in 
his negotiations with the US.74 While the aid package was still being finalized, Zia 
conveyed to the US that Pakistan was prepared to be the ―necessary conduit‖ for enhanced 
aid to the Afghan resistance but would perform that function only if the US gave sufficient 
evidence of its ―credibility and reliability‖ as an ally.75 The most important indicator of 
Washington‘s trustworthiness would be ―giving up its opposition to Pakistani plans to 
develop nuclear energy for ‗peaceful purposes.‘‖76 
In April 1981, shortly after receiving the American aid offer, Zia deputed his chief of staff, 
General K.M. Arif, to accompany foreign minister Agha Shahi to Washington for further 
discussions and instructed them to withhold agreement until assurances had been received 
from the Americans on major issues of concern for Pakistan. When the Pakistani delegates 
informed US Secretary of State Al Haig that there would be no compromise on the nuclear 
programme, they were reassured that the issue ―need not become the centrepiece of the US-
Pakistan relationship,‖ as had been case during the Carter presidency.77 At the same time, 
Haig did caution the Pakistanis that in the event that they exploded a nuclear device, the 
reaction in the US Congress would make it difficult for the administration to cooperate with 
Pakistan to the extent that it hoped. Pakistan interpreted this as a tacit admission by the US 
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that it could ―live with Pakistan‘s nuclear program as long as Islamabad did not explode a 
bomb.‖78 
Another carryover concern for Pakistan from the Carter era was US policy towards human 
rights and the restoration of democracy. The Carter administration had been openly critical 
of Pakistan‘s military regime for its poor human rights record and its unfulfilled promises to 
return the country to democratic rule. Arif informed Haig that ―we would not like to hear 
from you the type of government we should have.‖ Haig put to rest any fears of continued 
US criticism of Zia‘s domestic policies by reassuring his chief of staff that ―General, your 
internal situation is your problem.‖79 
Finally, Pakistan sought and received assurances from the Reagan administration that 
Islamabad, or more specifically the ISI, would continue to manage the distribution of arms, 
ammunition and equipment to the Afghan mujahidin. The role of the CIA would be 
confined to providing weapons and money, which would be routed to the Afghan fighters 
through the ISI. Zia had insisted upon this arrangement right from the outset when the 
rudiments of the multi-national arms pipeline had been put together during the latter half of 
the Carter presidency. US diplomatic staff and CIA officers were seldom allowed direct 
contact with the mujahidin; in fact, such contacts were officially proscribed by the ISI.80 
Even in the case of training on how to use new weapons, the Americans had to instruct the 
Pakistanis who in turned trained the Afghan guerrillas.81 Like Carter, Reagan was content, 
for the most part, to cede effective control over the direction of the covert war in 
Afghanistan to Zia and the ISI, a decision that would have fateful consequences in the years 
to follow. 
Having assured himself that American patronage would not be accompanied with any major 
conditionality, Zia did not deem it necessary to press for a formal treaty as he had done with 
Carter and formally tendered his provisional acceptance of the aid package, which still 
required the approval of the US Congress. In its efforts to circumvent nuclear-related 
sanctions imposed on Pakistan, the Reagan administration argued that the sanctions had not 
succeeded in deterring Pakistan from its pursuit of nuclear weapons; on the contrary, by 
forbidding the supply of conventional arms, they had actually enhanced Pakistan‘s sense of 
insecurity and made the nuclear option seem indispensable. While claiming that the 
Pakistan government ―can be in no doubt about our concerns‖ on the nuclear issue, the 
administration, sought to address ―the sense of insecurity that can only heighten 
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pressure…to develop nuclear weapons‖ by proposing the renewed supply of conventional 
weaponry.82 Congress was sufficiently swayed by the argument to grant a six-year waiver 
of the sanctions that prohibited aid to Pakistan but some lawmakers who remained sceptical 
of the wisdom of the aid package managed to secure acceptance of an amendment that 
would terminate assistance to any country that exploded a nuclear device.83 
By the end of 1981, American aid had started to flow into Pakistan once again, enabling Zia 
to reassure his core constituency, the military, of his vigilance in safeguarding its 
institutional interests. US military assistance allowed Pakistan to expand its forces in line 
with the enhanced threat on its western border. Overall troop numbers rose by around 12 
per cent to 478,000 in 1982.84 A new corps was raised in Quetta, the provincial capital of 
Baluchistan, to act as a key line of defence in the event that the Soviets chose to ―give 
Pakistan a bloody nose‖ for its support to the mujahidin.85 
Notwithstanding these measures to guard against a potential Soviet offensive, Zia never 
deemed the possibility of Soviet military intervention as a more serious threat than the 
traditional one emanating from India. Accordingly, much of the weaponry solicited and 
received from the US was meant more to redress a growing military imbalance with India 
than to guard against a Soviet invasion of Pakistan. The convergence of views between 
Washington and Islamabad with regard to covertly fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan 
merely ―cloaked‖ but ―could not eradicate‖ overall security priorities that were 
fundamentally divergent.86 As was the case in earlier periods of patron-client relations 
between the two countries, American military aid to Pakistan was provided to deter the 
threat of communism but was actually used to counter India. Even as the Reagan 
administration argued that its aid to Pakistan ―will not inject a new element of instability 
into the South Asian subcontinent,‖87 it also conceded that ―a policy designed to stabilize 
one of Pakistan‘s borders could not be guaranteed to stabilize the other.‖88 
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V. Partners in Jihad 
 
Pakistan‘s espousal of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation and its acceptance of 
some 3.5 million Afghan refugees were decisions that were driven by strategic, ideological 
and domestic considerations. Confronted by the forbidding prospect of a two-front situation 
whereby it could find itself on the receiving end of a coordinated attack by Afghan-Soviet 
forces in the west and the Indian military in the east, the most immediate objective of 
Pakistan‘s strategic planners became the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The 
loudest voice within Zia‘s coterie of military advisors in favour of covertly fighting the 
Soviets was that of Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, the Director-General 
of the ISI, who warned that if the Soviets were allowed an easy occupation of Afghanistan, 
they would be emboldened to try their luck in Pakistan as well, most likely through 
Baluchistan.89 
Zia saw the merits in Akhtar‘s argument, not only for strategic reasons but also because 
Pakistan‘s willingness to take on the might of the Soviet military would generate 
desperately needed American diplomatic, financial and military backing for his regime. 
Apart from personal considerations of prolonging his rule, Zia‘s ideological orientation 
made him feel ―morally bound to aid Islamic resurgence against an aggressive godless 
creed.‖90 By championing the jihad, Zia would be able to burnish his credentials with the 
Islamic world, and particularly the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, as the defender of Islam 
against Soviet-backed communism. Moreover, fomenting jihad in Afghanistan would fit in 
neatly with his domestic political agenda of Islamisation, which sought to lend religious 
sanction to Zia‘s military dictatorship whilst undercutting the support base of his secular 
political opposition.  
The removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was also deemed necessary for the early 
return of Afghan refugees to their own country. By 1987, Pakistan housed the world‘s 
largest refugee population, with the officially estimated figure of 3.45 million constituting 
almost 3.5 per cent of Pakistan‘s entire population.91 Although the refugees had initially 
been welcomed and provided with considerable access to local resources, a sudden influx of 
such substantial dimensions exacted a heavy toll on Pakistan‘s socio-economic fabric, 
leading in turn to a growing movement within the country calling for direct negotiations 
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with the Afghan government and for the refugees to be returned as expeditiously as 
possible.92 
Pakistan‘s final and arguably most imperative objective in backing the Afghan resistance 
was to settle the long-term future of its western neighbour in a way calculated to most 
adequately address Pakistan‘s own national security interests. Chief among them were 
preventing the revival of Afghan nationalism, securing Afghan recognition of the Durand 
Line as the international border between the two countries and gaining strategic geo-
political depth in any future war with India. For Zia and his fellow generals, such objectives 
could only be achieved through ―the creation of a post-war Afghanistan that, if not a client 
state, would, at a minimum, offer a friendly northwestern frontier.‖93 
In his opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Zia was fortunate to discover a 
kindred spirit in William Casey, Reagan‘s nominee for director of the CIA, who had 
accepted the position ―primarily to wage war against the Soviet Union.‖94 For Casey - a 
staunch Roman Catholic - Muslim allies such as Zia and the Saudi ruling family constituted 
―an important front in a worldwide struggle between communist atheism and God‘s 
community of believers.‖95 Casey‘s global crusade against communism would make 
common cause with Zia‘s local jihad in Afghanistan.  
Casey did not immediately take an interest in the Afghan jihad and, for the first two years of 
the Reagan presidency, US funding to the mujahidin remained essentially the same as was 
provided by the Carter administration, that is, $60 million annually, which in turn was 
matched by the Saudis. Neither the US nor Pakistan entertained any illusions at that point in 
time of actually defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan through their covert operations. The 
presidential finding signed by Carter in December 1979 allowing the supply of weapons to 
the mujahidin had described ―harassment‖ of Soviet forces as the rationale behind the 
policy.96 The finding was reauthorized by Reagan who, like Carter, wished to raise the costs 
of the Afghan invasion for the Soviets and deter them from similar ventures elsewhere in 
the Third World. However, this was ―not a war the CIA was expected to win outright on the 
battlefield‖ and the presidential finding emphasised that in conducting its activities, the CIA 
was to ―work through Pakistan and defer to Pakistani priorities.‖97 In other words, the terms 
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of engagement of the covert war in Afghanistan would be determined almost exclusively by 
Zia-ul-Haq, Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan and the ISI. 
In many fundamental respects, the Afghan jihad became the ISI‘s personal war, 
transforming the agency from an intelligence outfit of fairly modest means and influence 
into a national security behemoth wielding enormous control over both foreign policy as 
well as domestic politics.98 Although the US and Saudi Arabia were responsible for 
bankrolling the jihad, it was the ISI that, through its dedicated Afghan Bureau, exercised 
complete control over all operational matters concerning the resistance to the Soviets.99 
According to Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who headed the Afghan Bureau from 1983 to 
1987, the ―foremost function of the CIA‖ was to spend ―American taxpayers‘ money, 
billions of dollars of it over the years, on buying arms, ammunition and equipment‖ for the 
jihad.100 At the same time, it was a ―cardinal rule‖ of Pakistan‘s Afghan policy to prevent 
the CIA from having any influence over the distribution of money and weapons once they 
arrived in Pakistan; nor would any Americans be permitted to train the mujahidin, have 
direct contact with them or be allowed to go into Afghanistan.101 
It was the ISI, therefore, and not its American paymaster that set the quantum of arms and 
money to be provided to the main mujahidin parties headquartered in Peshawar, the 
provincial capital of the NWFP and the logistical nerve centre of the Afghan jihad. Initially, 
there had been more than 80 resistance groups operating in Peshawar but by 1982, the ISI 
had managed to whittle them down to seven principal parties.102 Four out of the seven were 
regarded as Islamic fundamentalist outfits while three were considered moderate or 
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traditionalist ones.103 All seven Peshawar-based parties were Sunni Muslim groups and, 
with the exception of the mainly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami, were primarily Pashtun in their 
ethnic composition.104 Afghan parties and commanders that were secular-nationalist in their 
orientation were effectively excluded from the Peshawar grouping, as were Shia resistance 
parties, which turned towards Iran for patronage.  
The party leaders were the political heads of their respective groups and were responsible 
for parcelling out money and weapons received from the ISI to their field commanders, who 
did the actual fighting. Initially, the ISI had supplied the commanders directly, a system that 
provided plentiful opportunities for corruption for both donors and recipients.105 Eventually, 
Zia and Akhtar discontinued the practice and replaced it with a more formal mechanism of 
disbursing supplies through the parties, ostensibly to instil more unity within the fractious 
resistance leadership and hold them directly accountable but more significantly to allow the 
ISI to decide which amongst them was worthy of the greatest support.106 In effect, the 
resistance leaders deemed most likely to advance the ideological, political and strategic 
goals of Zia and the military in Afghanistan would be made the leading recipients of the 
ISI‘s patronage. 
The balance of Pakistani support for the Afghan resistance tilted heavily in favour of the 
fundamentalist groups, which received as much as 75 per cent of the military aid provided 
to the resistance parties.107 The ISI clearly felt more comfortable working with those with 
whom it already had an existing relationship; Hekmatyar, Rabbani and Khalis all had ties 
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with Pakistani intelligence going back to the early 1970s. Sayyaf was closely aligned with 
the ISI‘s Saudi partners - whose Salafi-Wahhabi creed he espoused - and was the recipient 
of generous funding from governmental and private sources within the kingdom.108 
Amongst the fundamentalists, however, it was Hekmatyar, the most radical and ruthless of 
the lot, who was viewed by Zia and the ISI as the candidate most likely to protect their core 
strategic interests.  
Being a zealous advocate of a pure Islamic state, Hekmatyar was opposed to the secular 
nationalist agenda behind the demand for Pashtunistan and could be counted on to settle the 
border issue to Pakistan‘s satisfaction provided he was given a leading role in any post-
Soviet dispensation. Within Pakistani intelligence circles, Hekmatyar was viewed as ―an 
excellent administrator‖ and the ―toughest and most vigorous‖ of all the resistance leaders, 
although there was also an admission that he was ―ruthless, arrogant, inflexible…‖109 His 
close relationship with the Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam), Pakistan‘s main Islamist party 
and a key political ally of Zia‘s regime, also worked in his favour.110 Hekmatyar‘s limited 
base of support within Afghanistan, his reputation as - amongst other unflattering attributes 
- a bigoted fire-breathing zealot,111 and question marks about the effectiveness of his 
commanders in battle against the Soviets112 appeared of little consequence to Zia and the 
ISI. Of greater significance to them was his ruthless enforcement of party discipline, his 
―authoritarian internationalist brand of Islam,‖113 the development of a powerful corps of 
loyal and ideologically driven commanders and his skilful use of public relations to enlist 
external support for himself and his party. 
Having agreed to cede operational control of the jihad to its Pakistani client, the US was 
content, for the most part, to go along with the ISI‘s war aims. According to prominent area 
specialist Marvin Weinbaum, the CIA had no option but to allow the ISI to play the lead 
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role in Afghanistan: ―The US had nothing in common with the mujahidin groups and 
couldn‘t manage them. The ISI said it could and to some extent it did do so.‖114 Few 
policymakers in Washington saw the need to question the CIA‘s almost complete 
dependence on its Pakistani counterpart for managing the Afghan resistance. Instead, there 
was increasing satisfaction that America‘s policy towards the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan was reaping dividends. By 1983, the fundamental US objective of getting the 
Soviets bogged down in a costly war of attrition had become a reality; the mujahidin, 
although still under-equipped and weakened by internal rivalries, were destroying Soviet 
men and material worth several times more than the aid being provided to them by the 
CIA.115 
Within the CIA itself, criticism of the ISI‘s role was even more muted on account of 
Casey‘s passionate embrace of the jihad and his warm personal relationships with Zia and 
Akhtar, who convinced the CIA director that Hekmatyar was their best option amongst the 
mujahidin leaders.116 Even in its own independent estimation, the CIA regarded Hekmatyar 
as ―the most efficient at killing Soviets,‖ thereby proving him worthy of being considered 
―their most dependable and effective ally.‖117 This was in spite of the fact that Hekmatyar‘s 
scarcely concealed contempt for the US was surpassed only by his rabid hatred of the Soviet 
Union.118 Reagan‘s secretary of defence, Caspar Weinberger, claimed that the US had no 
illusions about the Afghan fundamentalist groups but had no other viable alternative: ―We 
knew they were not very nice people, that they were not all people attached to democracy. 
But we had this terrible problem of making choices.‖119 
In April 1982, Casey visited Pakistan and held the first of many meetings with Zia, who 
treated him to a standard spiel on Afghanistan that was imparted to all interested foreign 
visitors. This was done with the aid of a map on which a red celluloid template was placed 
to demonstrate how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the prelude to a further thrust in 
the direction of the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Zia claimed that the Soviets would never 
relinquish their position in Afghanistan and declared that the US had a ―moral duty‖ to 
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ensure that any potential Soviet advance further southwards was confronted. Casey 
promised to find more funding for the mujahidin and was asked by Zia to improve their 
anti-aircraft capability since ―the Pathans,‖ although ―great fighters,‖ were ―shit-scared 
when it comes to air power.‖120 
Notwithstanding his Islamist orientation and his espousal of the Afghan resistance as a 
legitimate jihad, Zia was fundamentally a hard-headed realist with a clear idea of the 
limitations both of his own country as well as of its Afghan clients in the form of the 
mujahidin. Although committed to covertly resisting the Soviet occupation, Zia was 
mindful of not fanning the flames of jihad in Afghanistan to such an extent that they ended 
up engulfing Pakistan as well. His constant refrain to the ISI was to ensure that ―the water 
in Afghanistan must boil at the right temperature‖121 and his American interlocutors were 
similarly cautioned that the shared objective of the two countries in Afghanistan must be to 
―keep the pot boiling, but not boil over.‖122 Support for the Afghan resistance had to be 
measured against the risk of provoking Soviet retribution, either on its own or in collusion 
with India.  
Right from the outset, therefore, Pakistan was anxious to limit its covert engagement in 
Afghanistan to a level that would allow it a reasonable degree of plausible deniability, 
thereby mitigating the danger of Soviet reprisals. At the same time, it participated in efforts 
to find a negotiated resolution of the conflict through international mediation. In June 1982, 
a UN intermediary conducted the first round of indirect negotiations between Pakistan and 
the Soviet-backed Afghan government in Geneva, a process that would culminate six years 
later in the formal withdrawal of Soviet occupying forces from Afghanistan. 
Pakistan‘s approach to the Afghan jihad thus constituted a tortuous balancing act whereby 
an overt policy of internationalizing the conflict and pursuing a negotiated solution to it 
resided in uneasy coexistence with covert assistance to the mujahidin. By 1983, a clear 
division had emerged between the ISI and the foreign ministry over how best to resolve the 
Afghan conflict, with General Akhtar claiming that the Soviets would never withdraw and 
the foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, declaring the Soviets to be sincere in their 
intention to exit Afghanistan provided certain conditions were met.123 For its part, the 
militantly anti-communist Reagan administration was deeply sceptical of the UN-sponsored 
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talks and Casey, in particular, regarded them as a Soviet ―propaganda ploy‖ that had to be 
countered by continuing covert support to the resistance.124 Zia himself was not willing to 
risk American opprobrium and a possible cessation of the billions in American aid that 
served as his political lifeline by cutting a deal with the Soviets. Although he kept the talks 
going, he instructed Yaqub Ali Khan to tone down his peacemaking efforts; in the 
meantime, the jihad in Afghanistan continued and would soon undergo a major 
intensification. 
The impetus for raising the temperature of the resistance eventually came not so much from 
Zia or Casey but from within the US Congress. A group of virulently anti-communist 
members across the political divide who had become staunch supporters of the jihad began 
to harangue the CIA with calls to increase the amount and quality of assistance to the 
mujahidin. Spearheading this effort was Democratic Congressman Charlie Wilson, a 
rambunctious character who had achieved considerable notoriety on account of his 
colourful private life but who would eventually attain more favourable recognition in the 
US for making the Afghan jihad his own personal anti-Soviet crusade.125 
After three trips to Pakistan between 1982 and 1983, Wilson established a warm personal 
rapport with Zia and was incensed both by the plight of the Afghan refugees as well as by 
the CIA‘s apparent reluctance to increase aid to the mujahidin. From his position as a 
member on the powerful Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House of 
Representatives‘ Committee on Appropriations, Wilson single-handedly engineered a 
dramatic expansion of the CIA‘s Afghan programme. The initial CIA request of $30 million 
for 1984-1985 was turned into a $120 million windfall. Having secured greater willingness 
on Zia‘s part for a ―sharp increase‖ in the volume of arms for the mujahidin, Casey 
embraced Wilson‘s support.126 Through Wilson‘s efforts in Congress and Casey‘s influence 
in the Reagan White House, the Afghan programme continued to expand in the succeeding 
years: $250 million in 1985, $470 million in 1986 and $630 million in 1987, all of which 
was matched equally by the Saudis.127 
Pakistan‘s initial decision to support the mujahidin had been motivated primarily by the 
need to confine the Soviet military thrust to Afghanistan and prevent it from advancing 
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further southwards. For Zia and his military advisors, the possibility of the Afghan 
resistance managing to reverse the Soviet advance on its own appeared a remote one. In 
comparison, the likelihood of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan consolidating itself into ―a 
permanent part of the security architecture‖128 of the region seemed much greater.129 Shortly 
after the invasion of Afghanistan, Zia conceded that his country would have to adapt to the 
reality of a Soviet presence next door by remarking that it was not possible to ―live in the 
sea and create enemies with whales.‖130 
By 1984, however, the Afghan resistance had demonstrated its resilience in the face of 
overwhelming odds, emboldening Zia to escalate the conflict by seeking improved 
weaponry for the mujahidin.131 His decision to make the Afghan pot boil at a higher 
temperature signified a changing of the goalposts for Pakistan from preventing Soviet 
expansionism beyond Afghanistan to securing a ―strategic realignment‖ in South Asia.132 
Imbued with religious fervour and empowered by the virtually unqualified support of the 
US for Pakistan‘s conduct of the Afghan jihad, Zia and the ISI under Akhtar increasingly 
saw the covert war as a God-given opportunity for Afghanistan and Pakistan to become part 
of an anti-India and Islamist-led regional bloc. Pakistani support for Hekmatyar stemmed 
from the perception of its strategic planners that he could be relied upon to work towards 
establishing ―a pan-Islamic entity that could stand up to India.‖133 
By the mid-1980s, Zia was entertaining dreams of a confederation between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan in the first instance which would eventually expand to include Kashmir and 
Central Asia.134 Such lofty aspirations fitted in neatly with Casey‘s proposal to Zia to target 
the ―soft underbelly‖ of the Soviet Union by initiating guerrilla attacks inside Soviet Central 
Asia.135 Between 1984 and 1987, the ISI, with the knowledge and tacit approval of the CIA, 
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conducted scores of cross-border incursions and sabotage missions and despatched 
hundreds of mujahidin up to twenty-five kilometres inside the Soviet Union. Such attacks 
were terminated only after the infuriated Soviets had pointedly threatened a direct attack on 
Pakistan in case they were allowed to continue.136 
In an interview recorded months before his death in 1988, Zia proclaimed that right from 
the outset of the covert war in Afghanistan, his goals had been to drive out the Soviet 
Union, install an Islamist government in Kabul in place of the communists, and effect a 
critical ―strategic realignment‖ in the region in Pakistan‘s favour against its Indian arch-
enemy:137 
We have earned the right to have a friendly regime there [in Afghanistan]…We took risks 
as a frontline state, and we won‘t permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet 
influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a pan-
Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union… 
It is debatable if such indeed were Zia‘s objectives all along. His initial caution with regard 
to limiting Pakistan‘s involvement in the war suggested a prudently pragmatic approach 
aimed more at damage control rather than the attainment of sweeping geo-strategic and 
ideological goals. As the war progressed, however, the tantalizing prospect of securing 
strategic depth against India by virtue of a client government in Afghanistan became a 
crucial long-term objective for Zia and the ISI and one that would remain a cardinal 
principle of Pakistan‘s Afghan policy in the decades to follow.  
By 1985, the burgeoning support for the mujahidin within the US Congress and the 
consequent spurt in funding for the Afghan jihad encouraged the Reagan administration to 
replace its policy of simply ―harassing‖ Soviet forces - a carryover from the Carter era - 
with a more aggressive and strident approach aimed at ensuring an outright Soviet defeat in 
Afghanistan. Formalized as National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 and signed 
by Reagan in March 1985, America‘s new classified policy objective in Afghanistan was to 
―push the Soviets out.‖138 Substantial amounts of sophisticated weaponry began to pour into 
Afghanistan, including heavy machine guns and surface-to-air missiles. The logistics 
pipeline was revamped and instruction imparted to the mujahidin was expanded through the 
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establishment of a massive training infrastructure managed exclusively by the ISI‘s Afghan 
Bureau.139 
From around 1984 onwards, the trainees included a growing band of volunteers from a 
number of Arab countries who had journeyed to Afghanistan to join the jihad. A leading 
participant in the Arab recruitment drive was Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi 
construction magnate with links to Saudi and Pakistani intelligence and a generous patron 
of the fundamentalist parties in the Afghan resistance, chiefly those led by Hekmatyar and 
Sayyaf.140 The CIA looked favourably on widening the base of the jihad to include 
volunteers from other parts of the Muslim world and even examined ways to increase their 
participation by cobbling some sort of an ―international brigade‖ but such plans did not 
materialise.141 
The Soviets responded to the American escalation of the covert war in Afghanistan by 
raising the intensity of their own military activities, particularly through their use of Mi-24 
Hind helicopter gunships and specialized Spetsnaz ground forces. The vulnerability of the 
mujahidin to devastating Soviet aerial power led to growing fears in the US and Pakistan 
alike that the resistance could eventually crumble unless provided with an effective counter-
weapon. In February 1986, after considerable bureaucratic wrangling in Washington, the 
US decided to supply the mujahidin with the newest and most sophisticated anti-aircraft 
weapon in its arsenal: the shoulder-fired Stinger missile, an infrared, heat-seeking projectile 
capable of engaging low-altitude, high-speed aircraft.142 The introduction of the Stinger 
proved a major turning point in the Afghan war; according to the CIA‘s estimates, a Soviet 
helicopter or airplane was brought down seven out of every ten times that a Stinger was 
fired by the mujahidin.143 
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With its military intervention turning into the proverbial albatross around the neck, the 
Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev began to explore ways of 
salvaging a face-saving exit out of the smouldering ruins of its ambitions in Afghanistan. At 
a US-Soviet summit conference in December 1987, Gorbachev publicly declared his 
intention to take Soviet troops out of Afghanistan over a twelve month period after 
agreement was reached on terminating external aid to the mujahidin. Even as the fighting 
continued, international attention began to shift increasingly towards the UN-sponsored 
negotiating process in Geneva. With an agreement now well and truly within reach, US 
interests in Afghanistan began to diverge from those of its Pakistani client. After initially 
being at best lukewarm and at worst actively hostile to the Geneva talks, the US had agreed 
in 1985 to serve as a guarantor of any agreement that ensured a Soviet withdrawal. In 
exchange for a commitment by the Soviets to take their forces out of Afghanistan within a 
stipulated period of time, the US undertook to terminate its assistance to the mujahidin.  
In February 1988, Gorbachev confirmed that Soviet troops would begin withdrawing from 
Afghanistan by the middle of May and would complete their exit over the following ten 
months. Once Moscow agreed to withdraw, Washington was satisfied that its primary 
objective in fuelling the Afghan jihad had been met. According to then US Undersecretary 
of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, ―Our main interest was getting the Russians 
out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from major US concerns.‖144 This hands-off approach 
to Afghanistan‘s future placed the US at odds with Zia and the ISI. Islamabad became 
worried at the prospect of Washington and Moscow making common cause in Geneva to 
frustrate its goal of installing the government of its choice in Kabul. According to Arnold 
Raphel, the American ambassador to Pakistan at the time, the US was focused on the Soviet 
withdrawal whereas Zia and the ISI were ―more concerned about what they called ‗strategic 
realignment‘ and about establishing a pan-Islamic confederation of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. They felt that after eight years Pakistan was entitled to run its own show in 
Kabul.‖145 
By permitting the Soviets the fig-leaf of a negotiated exit from Afghanistan whilst leaving 
its client communist regime in power, the ISI believed that the US was denying the 
mujahidin the fruits of a famous victory that, thanks to Pakistan‘s consistent support, now 
lay within its grasp. In March 1987, Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan had been promoted to the 
ceremonial position of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. His replacement as head 
of the ISI, Major General Hameed Gul, was even more implacably opposed to a political 
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compromise over Afghanistan than his predecessor,146 especially after several Soviet 
military reverses in mid-1987 had strengthened the ISI‘s conviction that the resistance could 
eventually prevail on the battlefield as long as external support continued.147 Zia essentially 
concurred with the ISI‘s assessment and publicly accused the US of colluding with the 
Soviet Union to ditch the Afghans and ―smear Pakistan in the bargain as an obstacle to 
peace.‖148 Furthermore, he threatened to withhold Pakistan‘s signature on the Geneva 
documents unless the Soviets removed their client PDPA regime led by Mohammed 
Najibullah in Kabul and agreed to an interim government chosen through processes 
dominated by the Pakistan-based and ISI-controlled mujahidin parties.149 
In what constituted an ironic reversal of positions, Pakistan was now advocating a linkage 
between a Soviet withdrawal and a political transition in Kabul that had originally been 
proposed by the Soviets themselves but which Islamabad and Washington had both 
rejected. Pakistan‘s position all along had been a willingness to sign an agreement with any 
government in Kabul once a definite timeframe for a Soviet withdrawal had been 
finalized.150 The US had gone along with the same approach and had spurned a Soviet offer 
in 1987 to collaborate in setting up an interim coalition government comprising Najibullah 
and elements of the resistance.151 The Soviet decision to discard the linkage and withdraw 
without settling Afghanistan‘s political future took Zia by surprise. He attempted to 
persuade the US to revive the proposal for a transitional government in Kabul but was told 
by US Secretary of State George Shultz that America‘s foremost priority now was to get the 
Soviets out of Afghanistan.152 The Soviet Union, in turn, made it abundantly clear to Zia 
that it had no intention of delaying its departure from Afghanistan.153 
Faced with mounting international pressure to abandon his opposition to the Geneva 
accords, a desperate Zia tried to drum up domestic support but was stymied by his own 
hand-picked prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo. In 1985, Zia had sought to assuage 
growing domestic opposition to his rule by restoring the constitution, permitting non-party 
elections and finally ending the state of martial law that had remained in force ever since his 
seizure of power in 1977. By nominating Junejo, a nondescript politician of unassuming 
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manner and docility of temperament, as prime minster, Zia thought he had put in office a 
man unlikely to challenge his authority. To the surprise of many, Junejo proved himself 
anything but a timid yes-man and gradually began to assert himself even in influencing 
Pakistan‘s foreign and defence policies.  
The domestic debate over the Afghan endgame threw up a stark divergence of views 
between Zia and Junejo, with the latter advocating a quick signing of the Geneva accords. 
After Zia threatened to block progress towards a Soviet withdrawal unless an interim 
government in Kabul was put in place, Junejo demonstrated surprising political courage by 
going over Zia‘s head to turn public opinion at home in favour of signing the accords. In 
February 1988, Junejo invited leading national newspaper editors to a briefing in which he 
explained why it was necessary for Pakistan to sign the accords. Amongst the reasons the 
prime minister put forward was that ―our American and Saudi friends would not forgive us, 
and they are reminding me of this day after day.‖154 The remark appears to suggest that the 
US might have been egging Junejo on to stand up to Zia, who reacted angrily by accusing it 
of being ―only interested in the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It doesn‘t care what happens to 
the Afghans afterwards.‖155 Isolated on the issue at home as well as internationally, Zia 
grudgingly agreed to put aside his opposition to the accords.156 
The Geneva accords, signed on April 14, 1988, by Pakistan and the PDPA regime as 
principals and the US and the Soviet Union as guarantors, essentially consisted of four 
instruments, two of which were bilateral agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan.157 
The first of these bound the two countries to a policy of non-interference in each other‘s 
internal affairs. The detailed clauses of this agreement effectively prohibited Pakistan from 
continuing its assistance to the mujahidin or allowing its territory to be used for that 
purpose. The second bilateral agreement pertained to the voluntary return of Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan to their own country. A third instrument was a Declaration on 
International Guarantees signed by the US and the Soviet Union by which they committed 
themselves to abjure interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan as well 
as to act as co-guarantors of the entire settlement. The final instrument, known as the 
Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to 
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Afghanistan, was signed by all four governments, with the US and the Soviet Union acting 
as witnesses. It committed the Soviets to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan 
within a period of nine months starting from May 15, 1988. 
The Geneva accords were almost derailed at the last instant over the question of continued 
assistance to the mujahidin once the terms of the settlement became operative. The Soviets 
had maintained all along their intention to continue providing military support to the Kabul 
regime even after their withdrawal and the accords contained no provision preventing them 
from doing so. Pakistan, on the other hand, was expressly barred by the provisions of the 
accords from continuing its assistance to the mujahidin. Moreover, the US had given an 
implicit agreement at the time it became a guarantor of the Geneva talks that it would stop 
helping the mujahidin once the Soviets agreed to withdraw. When the withdrawal became 
imminent, bipartisan Congressional supporters of the jihad put sustained pressure on the 
Reagan administration to continue assisting the mujahidin until there was overwhelming 
evidence of the Soviets having terminated aid to their client regime in Kabul.158 After some 
tough last-minute bargaining, the US and the Soviets agreed to what became known as 
―positive symmetry,‖ by which both sides could continue to assist their respective clients in 
Afghanistan even after the Soviet withdrawal.159 
The problem still remained, however, of how to keep the arms pipeline to the mujahidin 
going without Pakistan‘s participation. Under the terms of the accord, Pakistan had 
undertaken to ―prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment 
of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other 
High Contracting Party [Afghanistan], or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory 
of the other High Contracting Party…‖160 The US was worried that it had placed its 
Pakistani ally in an embarrassing and even dangerous position of violating its obligations 
under the Geneva accords. However, any concerns in that regard were settled by Zia 
himself, who called Reagan to reassure him that Pakistan would continue to serve as the 
principal conduit for US aid to the mujahidin. When Reagan asked Zia how Pakistan would 
respond to Soviet charges that it was contravening its Geneva undertakings, Zia coolly 
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replied that he would ―just lie about it. We‘ve been denying our activities there for eight 
years.‖ For good measure, he added that ―Muslims have the right to lie in a good cause.‖161 
VI. Nuclear Cat-and-Mouse 
 
It was not the Soviets alone to whom Zia had been lying for eight years. His consistent but 
false denials of Pakistani involvement in the covert war in Afghanistan were matched by his 
steadfast but equally disingenuous responses to his American patron‘s concerns about 
Pakistan‘s nuclear programme. By 1982, Pakistan was in receipt of an annual injection of 
$600 million in US military and economic assistance as wages for fighting the covert war 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Through making Pakistan the fourth largest global 
recipient of US aid at the time, the Reagan administration desired not only to ensure its 
continued cooperation in fuelling the resistance in Afghanistan but also to address its 
security concerns to an extent where it put aside, or at the very least slowed down, its plans 
to acquire nuclear weapons.  
It soon became apparent, however, that Pakistan had no intention of making any comprises 
on its nuclear programme. Zia shrewdly calculated the extent to which he could move 
forward on the nuclear front without jeopardizing his alliance with Washington. As long as 
Pakistan did not actually test a nuclear device, he was confident that Reagan and his posse 
of anti-Soviet hardliners in the administration and in Congress would put a greater premium 
on defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan than on thwarting Pakistan‘s pursuit of the bomb. 
As it turned out, Zia‘s confidence in the Reagan administration was not misplaced. 
Unwilling to jeopardize Pakistani cooperation in resisting the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, Washington made no concerted attempt to restrain Islamabad‘s march towards 
nuclear acquisition, confining itself only to expressions of concern and the occasional mild 
rebuke. This was despite the fact that by mid-1982, Reagan had informed Zia through a 
private envoy that ―intelligence of an incontrovertible nature‖ had been unearthed which 
showed that ―Pakistanis or people purporting to represent them‖ had transferred designs and 
specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries 
―for the purpose of having these nuclear weapons components fabricated for Pakistan.‖162 
In response, Zia denied any knowledge of such transfers and gave his ―word of honour as a 
soldier‖ that Pakistan ―would not embarrass the US government‖ by manufacturing a 
nuclear device. The American envoy, former deputy director of the CIA Vernon Walters, 
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went away from the meeting with the feeling that ―either he [Zia] really does not know or 
he is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.‖ Just months after receiving Zia‘s 
assurances, Walters returned to Islamabad once again, this time carrying fresh evidence 
obtained by US intelligence incriminating Pakistan of continuing its covert acquisition of 
nuclear technology. In response, Zia declared that ―nothing could be hidden‖ from the US 
intelligence community, that the CIA was ―capable of penetrating anywhere,‖ and that 
Pakistan would be ―foolish to act on any other assumption.‖ Whilst finding the American 
allegations ―difficult to deal with‖ and short on specifics, he affirmed that if anyone in 
Pakistan were found guilty of genuine wrongdoing, he would personally ―hang that chap 
upside down.‖163 Zia‘s final statement to Walters contained a request to convey to Reagan 
his ―word of honour as president of Pakistan and as a soldier that I am not and will not 
develop a nuclear device or weapon.‖164 
On a state visit to the US in December 1982, Zia was able to personally convince Reagan 
that he was ―telling us the truth‖ in declaring that Pakistan‘s nuclear programme was ―for 
peaceful purposes.‖165 In reality, the covert procurement of nuclear-related materiel and 
technology continued apace, as did the efforts to enrich uranium to bomb-grade level. By 
June 1983, a secret State Department memorandum warned that within two to three years, 
Pakistan could produce sufficient fissile material for a single nuclear device and that 
sustained operations could eventually lead to several devices every year.166 In line with his 
policy of deliberate dissimulation, however, Zia continued to reassure a host of concerned 
American interlocutors that he would never do anything to ―embarrass‖ his patrons.167 In 
November 1984, when directly asked by US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan if Pakistan 
had a bomb, Zia issued a categorical denial: ―We are nowhere near it. We have no intention 
of making such a weapon. We renounce making such a weapon.‖168 
For the most part, the Reagan administration appeared content to go along with Zia‘s 
fabricated responses; a clandestine Pakistani nuclear programme seemed a tolerable price to 
bear in exchange for making the Soviets bleed in Afghanistan. The US Congress, however, 
was much more reluctant to give Pakistan‘s nuclear programme a clean bill of health. 
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Congressional scepticism of Zia‘s assurances increased after three Pakistani nationals were 
indicted in the US in July 1984 for attempting to illicitly export equipment that could be 
used to make nuclear weapons. The indictment came shortly after two other Pakistanis had 
been convicted in Canada for trying to illegally export nuclear-related material produced in 
the US.169 Under pressure from Congress to take a tougher line with Pakistan, Reagan wrote 
to Zia in September 1984 to warn him of ―implications for our security program and 
relationship‖ should Pakistan enrich uranium beyond the five per cent level sufficient for 
nuclear fuel for power reactors but not enough for a bomb. Zia responded with a specific 
pledge to refrain from crossing the five per cent threshold.170 
In 1985, the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate approved a proposal to amend 
the Foreign Assistance Act in order to make it mandatory for the president to issue an 
annual certification that Pakistan neither possessed a nuclear device nor was in the process 
of developing it for US aid to continue. Under strong pressure from the Reagan 
administration, the Committee watered down the original proposal to a more lenient one 
requiring an annual certification that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon and that US 
assistance to it was advancing non-proliferation goals.171 US officials reassured their 
Pakistani counterparts that the Pressler amendment, as it came to be known, needed to be 
viewed ―as a way to avert more damaging legislation, not as a device for cutting off 
assistance.‖172 The Reagan administration had to accept another amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act, this time moved by Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz, which barred 
aid to any country whose government entities were found guilty of illegally importing 
nuclear technology from the US.173 Unlike the Pressler amendment, however, the Solarz 
amendment did carry an escape clause in the form of a presidential waiver.  
Secure in the knowledge that his US patron would not be willing to put Pakistani 
cooperation in Afghanistan on the line, Zia gradually became more confident in asserting 
Pakistan‘s right to pursue the nuclear option. In parleys with US officials in November 
1985, Zia issued his customary refrain that he would never ―embarrass‖ the US174 but 
dropped his usual reference to Pakistan‘s ―peaceful‖ nuclear ambitions in favour of a 
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―minimum nuclear program necessitated by its security environment.‖175 A month later, the 
US Defence Intelligence Agency had received and was verifying intelligence reports that 
Pakistan had produced an atomic weapon in October 1985 with the assistance of China.176 
In June 1986, a secret memorandum issued by the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency revealed that Zia had violated his undertaking not to enrich uranium beyond five 
per cent, with the result that Pakistan now had enough highly enriched uranium for one or 
more nuclear weapons.177 The memo affirmed that US verbal demarches and cautions had 
failed to slow down Pakistan‘s nuclear program and issued a stark warning that simply 
using ―more words, without some action to back it up, will only further reinforce Zia‘s 
belief that he can lie to us with impunity.‖  
Whilst acknowledging that taking a tougher line with Pakistan could entail risks to US 
interests in Afghanistan, the memo suggested that such risks could be mitigated if pressure 
was applied ―discriminately.‖ In this regard, it recommended an immediate review of US 
policy towards Pakistan‘s nuclear programme and called for all military assistance to be 
suspended pending the review‘s outcome. The advice went unheeded and the Reagan 
administration continued to confine itself to ineffectual calls for nuclear restraint even as it 
announced a fresh six-year $4.02 billion aid package for Pakistan. Towards the end of 1986, 
Reagan also provided the first annual certification mandated by the Pressler amendment that 
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. 
In 1987, any doubts that might have remained about the actual nature of Pakistan‘s nuclear 
programme were removed when A.Q. Khan, the country‘s chief nuclear scientist and a man 
not averse to self-projection, boasted to an Indian journalist that Pakistan had attained 
nuclear-weapon capability. ―They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb and 
doubted my capabilities,‖ said Khan, ―but they know we have done it. America knows 
it.‖178 Shortly after Khan‘s interview, further corroboration of Pakistan‘s nuclear capability 
came from no less a personage than Zia himself. In an interview to Time magazine in April 
1987, he declared: ―You can write today that Pakistan can build a [nuclear] bomb whenever 
it wishes.‖179 Pakistan‘s decision to lift its veil of nuclear ambiguity was driven by serious 
tensions with India at the time that may have necessitated recourse to nuclear deterrence to 
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ward off a possible Indian attack. While the threat of war with India did indeed recede, 
Zia‘s public assertion of Pakistan‘s nuclear capability clearly contravened his own promise 
never to ―embarrass‖ his American patron.180 
Further embarrassment, this time for both patron and client, was to follow in July 1987, 
when a Pakistani-born Canadian named Arshad Parvez was arrested in Philadelphia whilst 
attempting to purchase special purpose steel needed to make nuclear weapons. During the 
sting operation that nabbed him, Parvez had confirmed to undercover US law-enforcement 
officials that the steel was to be used in a gas centrifuge enrichment plant to make nuclear 
weapons.181 Although Pakistan denied any complicity in Parvez‘s procurement activities, 
the case led the US Congress to allow the six-year waiver of sanctions through which 
Pakistan had been receiving aid to lapse, leading to a temporary cessation of assistance.182 
However, legislators calling for punitive measures against Pakistan were outnumbered by 
those who attached greater significance to the successful prosecution of the Afghan jihad. In 
December 1987, Congress restored the waiver and Reagan issued a second certification 
under the Pressler amendment of Pakistan‘s nuclear bona fides.  
On the same day that Reagan certified for the second time that Pakistan did not have a 
nuclear device nor was in the process of developing one, a US district court found Arshad 
Parvez guilty of conspiring to ship material to Pakistan that could be used in the production 
of nuclear weapons. The conviction placed the Reagan administration in a quandary since 
the provisions of the Solarz amendment called for a suspension of aid in case of illegal 
importations of nuclear-related technology.183 Yet again, America‘s geo-political interests 
prevailed over its non-proliferation goals. Reagan used the waiver granted to him under the 
Solarz amendment to allow the continuation of aid to Pakistan, citing US national interests 
as the rationale behind his decision.184 Before exiting the White House, he gave his third 
and final annual certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. On this 
occasion, however, with the Soviets in the process of completing their withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan‘s strategic importance in decline as a consequence, Reagan did 
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point out that the status of the Pakistani nuclear programme might make another 
certification problematic.185 
VII. Zia’s Death: An Unresolved Mystery 
 
Neither Zia nor his chief associate in the Afghan jihad, Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, would 
live long enough to witness the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. On 
August 17, 1988, an American-supplied C-130 Hercules transport plane carrying Zia, 
Akhtar and eight other senior Pakistani generals crashed minutes after taking off from 
Bahawalpur, where Pakistan‘s top military brass had gone to attend test trials of a US-made 
tank. Amongst the thirty-one passengers on board the ill-fated aircraft were the American 
ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphel, and the military attaché, Brigadier General Herbert 
Wassom. After lurching in mid-air, the plane plunged to the ground and exploded upon 
impact, killing all on board including the man who had been the unchallenged arbiter of 
Pakistan‘s destinies for over a decade. 
An inquiry conducted by Pakistani air force officers with the technical assistance of their 
US counterparts found ―a criminal act or sabotage‖ as the most probable cause of the 
crash.186 On the basis of forensic evidence gathered from the plane‘s debris, the inquiry 
concluded that a highly toxic chemical agent or nerve gas had been used to incapacitate the 
flight crew and maintained that the use of such ―ultra-sophisticated techniques would 
necessitate the involvement of a specialist organization well versed with carrying out such 
tasks and possessing all the means and abilities for its execution.‖187 
Instead of pursuing the inquiry‘s findings, the US government sought to distance itself from 
them by propagating the notion that the crash occurred due to a malfunction in the plane 
and was, therefore, an accident. Moreover, both the State Department and the Pentagon, 
each of whom had lost a senior official in the crash, refused to allow the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to send its experts to Pakistan,188 even though US legislation mandated 
the FBI to investigate terrorist incidents abroad in which American nationals had been 
assaulted or murdered.189 
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By excluding the FBI from the investigation, the US government ensured that American 
participation was confined to the air force accident investigators and did not include any 
criminal, anti-terrorist or sabotage experts. It was only owing to Congressional pressure and 
criticism of what appeared to be a government cover-up that an FBI team was eventually 
sent out to Pakistan ten months after the crash, by which time the trail had gone cold. 
Astonishingly, Arnold Raphel‘s replacement as US ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, 
revealed before Congress in June 1989 that he and other top officials met at the White 
House on the day of the crash but ―it didn‘t occur to anyone‖ to send criminal investigators 
to the crash site.190 
For their part, Pakistan‘s military authorities did not seem any more inclined than the US 
government to get to the bottom of the matter. Despite the fact that the crash had wiped out 
virtually the entire top echelon of the army, the official investigation was handed over not to 
the ISI or Military Intelligence but to a civilian bureaucrat, who would be unlikely to rock 
the boat by asserting himself against an all-powerful military establishment. No autopsies 
were ever performed on the bodies of the flight crew which might have provided evidence 
of the use of an incapacitating chemical agent or nerve gas. The official reason given was 
that Islamic law mandated burial within twenty four hours of death but in actual fact, 
Pakistani military protocols did not follow that rule and autopsies in cases of air crash 
fatalities were routinely performed.191 
The investigation of those with access to the plane at the airport and who were involved in 
its security was perfunctory and there was no attempt to methodically interrogate suspects 
or follow up on possible leads. Telephone records of calls made to Zia and Akhtar prior to 
the crash were destroyed.192 In the immediate aftermath of Zia‘s death, his successor as 
army chief, General Aslam Beg, had declared the crash a ―conspiracy‖ whose perpetrators 
would be found and brought to justice. It soon became apparent, however, that the army 
was content to sweep the probable assassination of their chief under the carpet, a sentiment 
shared by Washington, despite the fact that two senior American officials had also plunged 
to their deaths alongside Zia. To date, the US National Archives have not declassified some 
250 pages related to the crash.193 
The fact that Zia had no dearth of enemies, both domestic and foreign, who might wish to 
eliminate him led to feverish speculation in Pakistan - a country known to be ―a Petri dish 
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for conspiracy theories‖ - about the identity of his putative assassins.194 The most obvious 
suspects were the Soviets, either acting alone or in collusion with their Afghan allies. The 
involvement of arch-foe India could not be ruled out, nor indeed could that of Zia‘s partner 
in the Afghan jihad, the US, which had become wary of his Islamist agenda in Afghanistan 
and his continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons. Within Pakistan, Zia‘s domestic political 
opponents, chief amongst them the exiled sons of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had already 
attempted to assassinate him in the past and could conceivably have tried again, this time 
with much greater success.195 Zia‘s aggressive espousal of a puritanical form of Sunni Islam 
and his proximity to Saudi Arabia had alarmed Pakistan‘s Shia minority, which might have 
plotted his removal. Finally, Zia might have outlived his utility for his primary 
constituency, the army.  
So who did kill General Zia-ul-Haq? The CIA and the Soviet KGB both possessed the 
―ultra-sophisticated techniques‖ that the inquiry report suggested had been used to bring 
about the crash. Afghan and Indian intelligence could have obtained access to the chemical 
agents purportedly used to disable the crew through their KGB partners. However, planting 
the gas on board the plane, keeping track of Zia‘s itinerary, preventing the performance of 
autopsies on the dead bodies and getting rid of Zia‘s telephone records could not have been 
done by any foreign intelligence agency; the collaboration of locals, especially from within 
the Pakistani military and its intelligence apparatus, would have to be assured.  
The US insistence that the crash was due to a malfunctioning aircraft rather than sabotage 
could have been motivated by a desire to prevent a breakdown of relations with the Soviets 
in case they were found responsible for the crime. Evidence of Soviet and/or Afghan 
involvement in the deaths of not only the president of Pakistan but also two senior 
American officials would inevitably have led to heightened tensions between the US and 
the USSR and would in all likelihood have scuttled the Geneva accords. If proof of Indian 
involvement was unearthed, it would be equally fraught with danger since it could 
precipitate another war between two countries both suspected of having nuclear weapons. 
Finally, the US may also have wanted to spare Pakistan, and particularly the army, the 
embarrassment of discovering that elements from within the military might have been 
involved in the plot to kill Zia.  
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Another possibility is that the US itself decided to eliminate a once close ally whose 
increasing recalcitrance was becoming an impediment to its evolving geo-political interests 
in the region. Even though Zia had been pressurised into signing the Geneva accords, he 
continued to adhere to the conviction that they had been a setback for Pakistan and the 
mujahidin and made no secret of his disdain for the non-interference provisions of the 
accords to which Pakistan had become a signatory. Less than two months before he died, 
Zia had declared that the sacrifices of the mujahidin would not be allowed to go 
unrewarded: ―We will either throw Najib out of Kabul or establish a provisional 
government inside Afghanistan first and then throw him out.‖196 For Zia, the dream of a 
Pakistan-Afghanistan confederation as the cornerstone of a pan-Islamic bloc that would 
incorporate the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia - ―who knows…perhaps even Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan, you will see‖ - was well and truly alive.197 
For the US, on the other hand, the prospect of an Islamist takeover in Southwest Asia, 
coming less than a decade after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, was a deeply worrying one. 
In April 1987, William Casey had died of a brain tumour, depriving Zia of his closest and 
most influential ally within the Reagan administration and the mujahidin of one of the most 
ardent American supporters of their jihad. Following Casey‘s death, the CIA-ISI partnership 
came under greater scrutiny in Washington, with questions being raised in Congress and by 
the American media about the wisdom of toeing the ISI‘s line in Afghanistan.  
Increasing criticism began to be directed at the policy of showering millions of American 
taxpayers‘ dollars on Gulbuddin Hekmatyar even though he had refused to visit the White 
House in 1985 to shake hands with Reagan. However, Zia and the ISI continued to prop up 
Hekmatyar as the man most likely to implement their pan-Islamic regional goals. General 
Hamid Gul, who headed the ISI at the time of Zia‘s death and was well known both for his 
Islamist inclinations as well as his criticism of US policies in the region, had no doubt in his 
mind about the culprits: ―The Americans knocked off his plane because they could not 
abide an Islamic system being promulgated in Afghanistan and Pakistan.‖198 
Zia‘s continuing support to anti-US elements in the Afghan resistance, his opposition to the 
Geneva accords and his cloak-and-dagger pursuit of nuclear weapons might have convinced 
his American patrons that their once indispensable client had become a dangerous liability. 
Even if the US did not eliminate Zia itself, the possibility cannot be discounted of a tacit 
agreement between Washington and Moscow that the KGB and/or its Afghan proxies 
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would assassinate Zia, and the US would ensure a whitewashing of the subsequent 
investigation. An even more intriguing explanation was propounded by none other than the 
US ambassador to India at the time, John Gunther Dean, who saw in the plot to kill Zia ―the 
hallmarks of Israel, or specifically the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad.‖199 Dean tried to 
take up his theory in Washington but was deemed medically incompetent, stripped of his 
security clearance and eventually made to retire from the State Department.200 Even if Dean 
was correct in his suspicions about Mossad, it is difficult to believe that Israel removed Zia 
without the prior approval, and possibly the complicity, of the US.  
In the absence of conclusive evidence linking a particular suspect to the crash that killed 
Zia, any assigning of guilt in that regard can only be speculative, not to mention 
irresponsible. What appears irrefutable, however, is that there was a significant cover-up 
operation by the US government and elements of the Pakistani military in the aftermath of 
the crash that blighted efforts to determine its true causes and consigned it to the realm of 
conspiracy theories, innuendoes and rumours. 
Conclusion 
 
General Zia-ul-Haq‘s adroit manipulation of the US serves as a fascinating example of how 
a client state can influence its patron‘s policies to its own advantage. Zia‘s failings as a ruler 
were many, not least of them being his use of Islam as a legitimizing cover for his 
repressive internal policies. However, in terms of protecting his own self-interest, the 
corporate interests of the institution that he represented, and the core national security 
interests of the country as he saw them, Zia could justifiably be regarded as Pakistan‘s most 
successful ruler thus far. The fact that his eleven-year rule remains the longest period in 
office of any Pakistani leader, military or civilian, testifies to the remarkable native cunning 
that allowed him to weather many a domestic and external storm and keep his grip on the 
country intact.  
The longevity of Zia‘s rule becomes all the more impressive in view of the fact that during 
his period in power, Pakistan had to confront formidable security challenges that would 
have sorely tested the ability of those more formally trained in diplomacy and statecraft 
than a career army officer of very humble origins. While acutely conscious of Pakistan‘s 
security predicament, especially in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Zia was 
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shrewd enough to realize that every challenge also presented an opportunity, not only to 
ensure his own survival but also to advance Pakistan‘s strategic interests.  
From a US perspective, Zia‘s vision of spearheading an Islamic bloc in the region should 
have been a cause for serious concern and should have led to a major re-examination of 
existing US policies regarding the covert war in Afghanistan. At the very least, there could 
have been more of an effort to break the ISI‘s stranglehold over the conduct of the jihad. 
Towards the mid-1980s, the CIA did take tentative steps towards reaching out directly to 
elements of the mujahidin not on the ISI‘s payroll, most notably through secretly providing 
some cash and arms to Ahmed Shah Massoud, widely regarded as the most celebrated 
mujahidin commander against the Soviet occupation and a bitter rival of the ISI‘s preferred 
option, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.201 For the most part, however, the Reagan administration 
and the CIA remained firmly in step with Pakistan‘s policies. Attempts to bypass the ISI 
were made fairly late in the game when Pakistan‘s control over the jihad was too well-
entrenched to be significantly curtailed.202 
For his supporters in Washington - of which there was no dearth - Zia‘s image as ―our 
staunch Asian anti-Communist hero‖203 and ―someone we could work with‖204 outweighed 
the more objectionable aspects of his conduct, most notably his persistent lies about the 
nature and extent of Pakistan‘s nuclear programme. According to a leading American South 
Asia expert, Zia ―played the clod‖ but was actually ―a very shrewd guy‖ who knew ―both 
that we [the US] could be fooled and that we wanted to be fooled.‖205 Other analysts 
disagree that the US desired to be fooled and argue that it had to reluctantly accept Zia‘s lies 
in the greater interest of ensuring Pakistan‘s vital cooperation in Afghanistan. Former US 
ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley is of the opinion that the US did not see through 
Zia‘s dissimulation from the outset but eventually did realize that it was being lied to. 
However, the situation in Afghanistan and the reluctance of President Reagan - ―a very 
trusting man‖ - to ask serious questions of a close ally dissuaded the US from living up to 
its own non-proliferation goals.206 
There appears to be a much greater consensus amongst informed observers of US-Pakistan 
relations, however, on Zia‘s remarkably deft management of his leverage over the US to 
extract the maximum possible concessions for Pakistan. A former head of the ISI recalled 
Zia‘s adept handling of his relationship with the US: ―He would never take dictation from 
                                                          
201
 See Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, 202; and Coll, Ghost Wars, 124.  
202
 Interview with Shuja Nawaz, Washington, D.C., November 7, 2013. 
203
 Interview with Stephen P. Cohen, Washington, D.C., October 28, 2013. 
204
 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum. 
205
 Interview with Stephen P. Cohen. 
206
 Interview with Robert B. Oakley, Washington, D.C., November 26, 2013. 
129 
 
the Americans, who ended up pandering to him. In a very soft way, he would invariably 
carry his view.‖207 A former US ambassador to Pakistan is fulsome in his praise of Zia: 
―Brilliant, focused, dynamic…an exceptional human being who had a cause and pursued it 
intelligently and successfully.‖208 According to a leading Pakistani military historian, Zia 
was ―not an intellectual giant‖ but still ―played his hand brilliantly‖ with the US. What 
distinguished him from his military and civilian predecessors was that ―they took whatever 
the US was willing to give them and then asked for more; Zia, on the other hand, turned 
down what the Americans had to offer and compelled them to replace it with an aid package 
that measured up to his own expectations of what Pakistan deserved to receive for its 
services to the US.‖209 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A PARTING OF THE WAYS - US-PAKISTAN 
RELATIONS DURING THE 1990s 
 
 
If the 1950s and, to a greater extent, the 1980s, represented the high-water marks in the US-
Pakistan relationship, then the 1990s were a period when it plumbed its very depths. To 
paraphrase William Shakespeare, the last decade of the twentieth century constituted a long 
and often frigid winter of mutual discontent for the two countries which neither was able to 
turn into glorious summer. With the Cold War having been won, the US found little to 
engage its interest in South Asia other than building a closer relationship with India. The 
drift away from Pakistan, a frontline American ally during the Cold War, towards India, 
which had been a firm friend of the Soviet Union during that conflict, gained increasing 
momentum under President Clinton. Throughout Clinton‘s presidency, Pakistan was viewed 
through a narrow security-centred prism that necessitated engagement with the country only 
to the extent of addressing important American national security concerns such as nuclear 
proliferation and international terrorism. Heavy sticks were wielded in the form of sanctions 
but were matched with precious few carrots, thereby depriving Pakistan‘s fledgling 
democracy of the international support it required so desperately to assert itself against the 
military, which continued to maintain complete control over issues of national security. 
I. Transitioning to Democracy 
 
General Zia-ul-Haq‘s eleven-year dictatorship - the longest continuous stretch of military 
rule in Pakistan‘s history - was succeeded by a decade-long experiment in limited 
parliamentary democracy in which the military remained the ultimate arbiter of the fate of a 
series of short-lived elected governments. Following Zia‘s death, his successor as army 
chief, General Aslam Beg, declined to impose a fresh round of martial law and instead 
expressed his intention to restore democracy in Pakistan through elections. Beg realized that 
eleven long years of a heavy-handed and deeply polarizing dictatorship had bred 
considerable popular resentment, leaving little domestic appetite for continued overt 
military rule. Moreover, Pakistan‘s chief external patron, having achieved its goal of 
securing a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, now began to press for a quick return to 
democracy. According to the US ambassador to Pakistan at the time, America continued to 
have a major stake in Pakistan even after Zia‘s death, both because of Afghanistan and 
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because Zia had promised to hold elections, which the ambassador claimed ―we wanted to 
take place very badly.‖1 
Although General Beg promised free and fair polls, he had no intention of abdicating the 
military‘s preeminent position amongst Pakistan‘s organs of state to the victor of the 
elections, widely expected to be the Pakistan Peoples‘ Party (PPP) of the executed Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto, now led by his daughter Benazir. Both Beg and the ISI, still commanded by the 
hawkish Hamid Gul, suspected Benazir Bhutto of seeking revenge against the army for 
eliminating her father. Moreover, they were concerned that her pro-US inclinations could 
push her towards making compromises both on the nuclear programme as well as on the 
continuation of support to the ISI‘s preferred mujahidin proxies in Afghanistan.  
In the lead up to the elections, the ISI masterminded a campaign aimed at preventing a 
widely anticipated PPP landslide. The military‘s premier intelligence agency had by then 
become firmly established in the business of domestic political engineering, a direct 
consequence of the expanded powers and resources that it had secured during the Zia era.2 
Impressed by its management of the Afghan jihad, Zia had decided to concurrently employ 
the ISI against his domestic political opposition and the agency quickly developed a 
reputation for being ―omnipotent, taping every phone call, with informants in every village, 
city block, and public space.‖3 Hamid Gul made full use of the ISI‘s influence and resources 
to cobble together an anti-PPP coalition consisting of conservative politicians and Islamist 
parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami. 
In spite of its best efforts, the ISI could not prevent Bhutto from winning the largest number 
of electoral seats; however, it ensured that her main rival, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan 
Muslim League (PML), won provincial elections in Punjab, the country‘s largest and most 
powerful province. Sharif was a protégé of Zia, who had handpicked him as chief minister 
of Punjab in 1985. He owed his rise to the army and the ISI and could therefore be safely 
relied upon to exert constant political pressure on Bhutto. Through fostering a permanent 
state of confrontation and hostility amongst the country‘s political elite, the military wished 
to ensure that its domestic rivals for power were far too busy squabbling amongst 
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themselves to mount a determined challenge to its institutional interests and control over 
state policies. 
Even though Bhutto had won the election, the civil-military bureaucratic establishment 
ruling Pakistan dragged its heels in letting her assume the prime ministerial office and 
grudgingly relented only after being nudged in that direction by Washington. The outgoing 
Reagan administration was favourably impressed by the Western-educated, pro-American 
leader of Pakistan‘s largest political party. Upon seeing signs of procrastination on the part 
of the military in respecting the outcome of the elections, the US sent a two-member team 
of senior officials from the State Department and the Pentagon to coax President Ghulam 
Ishaq Khan - a retired senior civil servant who had served Zia faithfully - and General Beg 
to share power with Bhutto.4 They agreed to do so on the condition that Bhutto would not 
encroach upon the military‘s turf. The US-brokered deal mandated that the incoming prime 
minister would have no say in the armed forces‘ internal matters, especially with respect to 
the promotions of senior officers and the preparation of military budgets; nor would she be 
allowed to influence policy formulation on core strategic issues such as Pakistan‘s nuclear 
programme, relations with India and the continuing conflict in Afghanistan.5 
Just days before the elections in Pakistan, voters in the US had gone to the polls to elect a 
successor to Ronald Reagan. Their choice was the incumbent vice-president, George H.W. 
Bush, a pragmatic practitioner of old-school real politik diplomacy who had previously 
served as ambassador to the United Nations and head of the CIA. Bush‘s arrival in office 
coincided with a dramatic drawing down of the Cold War. On February 15, 1989, the Soviet 
Union finally completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan and between July and December 
of the same year, a number of countries in Eastern Europe overthrew their communist 
dictators and replaced them with governments committed in varying measure to democracy 
and the free market. With the Cold War rapidly approaching its culmination, the glue that 
had bound Pakistan to the United States for much of the last decade, and indeed during 
earlier periods in their relationship, was wearing thin and a marriage of convenience that 
had weathered many a storm was heading inexorably towards a messy divorce. 
                                                          
4
 Ghulam Ishaq Khan had occupied important administrative positions in the governments of Ayub Khan, 
Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but it was during Zia‘s period that he attained real prominence, first 
as a powerful minister of finance and later as chairman of the Senate, the upper chamber of the Pakistani 
parliament. Upon Zia‘s death, Khan assumed the office of acting president of Pakistan as per 
constitutional provisions directing the Senate chairman to occupy the presidency in case of the 
incumbent‘s death, resignation or removal. 
5
 Interview with Robert B. Oakley. Additionally, Benazir agreed to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 
presidential elections to be held soon, allow Beg to complete his stipulated three-year term and retain 
Zia‘s foreign minister, Yaqub Ali Khan. The army was given a say in the appointment of the new defence 
minister and a senior civil servant close to Ishaq Khan was allowed to continue as the new government‘s 
principal economic advisor. 
133 
 
II. Stresses and Strains 
 
US-Pakistan relations during the 1990s revolved principally around three factors: Pakistan‘s 
nuclear programme, its growing tensions with India over Kashmir, and its role in the 
continuing conflict in Afghanistan. Prior to his departure from the White House, Ronald 
Reagan had issued a final certification under the Pressler Amendment but had ―put the 
Pakistanis on notice‖ that they were lurching on the precipice of nuclear sanctions.6 His 
successor, although favourably impressed by Pakistan‘s young, articulate and very pro-US 
new female prime minister, made it clear to his Pakistani interlocutors very early on in his 
presidency that the Reagan-era policy of overlooking Islamabad‘s nuclear indiscretions was 
no longer tenable. Although desirous of maintaining the close security partnership of the 
1980s, the Bush administration warned Pakistan that with the Soviets withdrawing from 
Afghanistan and the Cold War drawing to a close, pressure from within the US Congress to 
take a tougher line on Pakistan‘s nuclear-related activities would become much greater. In 
other words, the continuation of US military and economic aid was now made contingent on 
Pakistan‘s agreement to freeze its nuclear programme.  
The hardening of US policy on the nuclear issue had an immediate impact. Pakistan halted 
its production of weapons-grade uranium and, whilst addressing a joint session of the US 
Congress in June 1989, Prime Minister Bhutto declared that ―we do not possess, nor do we 
intend to make, a nuclear device. This is our policy.‖7 Having confirmed through US 
intelligence sources that Pakistan had indeed suspended its nuclear programme, Bush issued 
another certification under the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
weapon, thereby clearing the way for the sale of an additional sixty F-16 fighter jets and the 
continuation of an annual military and economic aid package to the tune of $576 million for 
1989.8 
While a major rupture between the US and Pakistan was temporarily averted, the bilateral 
relationship was soon subjected to another critical test with the looming possibility of 
another India-Pakistan war. Around the same time that the jihad against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan was tapering off, the banner of another jihad was about to be unfurled in 
Kashmir. Decades of oppressive centralized control by India had stifled democratic 
development in the part of the disputed region that it administered and had bred simmering 
resentment among the overwhelmingly Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley, whose 
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patience finally ran out in 1987 after state elections that year were massively rigged by New 
Delhi.9 By 1989, Kashmir was in the throes of a spontaneous mass uprising aimed at 
securing freedom from Indian rule. Led primarily by young Kashmiri activists of the pro-
independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the insurgency rapidly 
acquired enough momentum to rock the foundations of Indian control over Kashmir. 
With Kashmir sinking into almost complete anarchy, India imposed direct central rule and 
attempted to stamp out the rebellion through brute force but only managed to further 
radicalize the insurgents and build greater support for the freedom movement.10 Frustrated 
by its failure to put down the uprising, India began to accuse Pakistan of fomenting a 
guerrilla war by providing arms and training to the insurgents, whom New Delhi denounced 
as ―terrorists‖ but who were hailed by Islamabad as ―freedom fighters.‖11 Pakistan publicly 
insisted that it provided only moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris‘ indigenously 
driven struggle for self-determination, but while that may have been the case in the 
immediate aftermath of the uprising, it was not long before the Pakistani army and the ISI 
began to exploit the insurgency in Kashmir in pursuit of their own strategic interests.  
Emboldened by its successful use of unconventional warfare against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, the ISI sought to replicate the same model in Kashmir. A dedicated Kashmir 
cell within the ISI was set up along the lines of the Afghan Bureau to coordinate the 
recruitment and training of Kashmiri militants who had crossed over into Pakistan-
administered Kashmir (referred to by Pakistan as Azad (free) Kashmir).12 Training was 
imparted not only at newly built camps in Azad Kashmir but also at pre-existing ones in 
Afghanistan where, after receiving training alongside Arab jihadists, the Kashmiri guerrillas 
were sent back to fight the Indians equipped with weapons diverted from the Afghan arms 
pipeline.13 After initially training and arming secular nationalist outfits like the JKLF, the 
ISI gradually sidelined them in favour of Kashmiri Islamist groups that had links with 
Pakistan‘s own Islamist parties and could be relied upon to pursue Kashmir‘s accession to 
Pakistan rather than independence from both Pakistan and India.14 Moreover, it began to 
infiltrate increasing numbers of Pakistani and foreign veterans of the Afghan jihad into 
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Kashmir, thereby transforming it into ―an arena for global jihad instead of merely an 
indigenous insurgency.‖15 
Notwithstanding Pakistan‘s growing involvement in the insurgency, the underlying causes 
of Kashmiri alienation were internal and stemmed from legitimate grievances against the 
oppressive policies of a succession of Indian governments.16 Instead of addressing those 
grievances, India found a ―convenient scapegoat‖ in Pakistan upon which to shift blame for 
the ―internal trauma‖ in Kashmir.17 By early 1990, the two countries had dramatically 
increased their military deployments on either side of the Line of Control, the dividing line 
between their respective portions of Kashmir, and intense artillery and mortar exchanges 
became frequent occurrences. Prime Minister Bhutto, under sustained pressure from the 
army and Islamist parties to take a more aggressive line on the insurgency, publicly 
promised a ―thousand-year war‖ in support of the militants‘ struggle for ―self-
determination.‖18 Bhutto‘s Indian counterpart, V.P Singh, responded by calling on his 
compatriots to be ―psychologically prepared‖ for war and admonished Pakistan that ―those 
who talk about 1,000 years of war should examine whether they last 1,000 hours of war.‖ 
Singh issued a further warning that a Pakistani deployment of nuclear weapons would 
compel India to follow suit.19 
Alarmed at the possibility of a war breaking out between two potentially nuclear-armed 
countries, President Bush despatched his deputy national security advisor, Robert Gates, to 
the subcontinent in May 1990 to conduct ―preventive diplomacy‖ aimed at defusing the 
crisis.20 In Islamabad, Gates delivered a blunt message to the Pakistani civilian and military 
leadership that the US had ―war-gamed every conceivable scenario between you and the 
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Indians, and there isn‘t a single way you win.‖21 Moreover, in the event that a war between 
the two countries was instigated by Pakistan, Gates made it clear that Washington would 
terminate all military aid to Islamabad and called upon his Pakistani interlocutors to stop 
supporting the insurgency in Kashmir.22 Finally, he maintained that the US had concrete 
evidence that Pakistan had crossed the nuclear red line by machining uranium metal into 
bomb cores and warned that unless those cores were melted, Bush would no longer be able 
to shield Pakistan from sanctions under the Pressler Amendment.23 Pakistan predictably 
responded to Gates‘ allegations by denying them all. However, the American envoy was 
able to extract an undertaking that the training camps operated by the ISI for the Kashmiri 
insurgents would be shut down.24 
Within two weeks of the Gates mission, the crisis had passed and India and Pakistan agreed 
to undertake a series of confidence-building measures aimed at lowering tensions. For 
Pakistan‘s rulers, however, the import of Gates‘ message was unmistakeable; as far as 
Washington was concerned, Islamabad no longer carried the same strategic utility that it did 
for much of the 1980s. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan ―cut the legs out from under the 
U.S.-Pakistani strategic partnership, allowing submerged policy differences to resurface.‖25 
At the same time, with the Soviet Union in a state of terminal decline and the Cold War 
approaching its end, the US saw great potential for building up closer relations with India, 
which in turn was seeking new alignments in a post-Soviet world.26 For much of the 1990s, 
therefore, Pakistan would find its core national security objectives consistently at odds with 
the regional interests of its traditional patron.  
The growing gulf between the US and Pakistan also began to manifest itself in Afghanistan, 
which had been the bedrock of the patron-client state relationship sustained over the course 
of the previous decade. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, cooperation 
between the two primary instigators of the Afghan jihad, the ISI and the CIA, remained 
steady but there were increasing doubts within the State Department about the advisability 
of continuing to follow the ISI‘s lead in Afghanistan.27 Such doubts became even more 
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pronounced after an ISI-planned and CIA-supported mujahidin offensive on the 
strategically important Afghan town of Jalalabad in March 1989 ended in disaster.28 
At a high-level national security meeting where the decision to mount the Jalalabad 
offensive was taken, ISI chief Hamid Gul informed prime minister Bhutto that Jalalabad 
would fall within a week if she was ―prepared to allow for a certain degree of bloodshed.‖29 
Instead, the Afghan government forces, bolstered by massive Soviet military assistance, 
held on and inflicted heavy casualties on the mujahidin, who found themselves unable to 
make a sudden transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare and who were, in any case, 
far too disunited to mount a cohesive campaign. The fighting continued for several months 
and ended with Afghan government forces retaining their control over Jalalabad30 and 
Hamid Gul being removed by Bhutto from his position as head of the ISI.31 
Shortly before the commencement of the ill-fated Jalalabad offensive, the Bush 
administration had signed off on a continuation of covert assistance to the mujahidin in the 
stated interests of guaranteeing ―self-determination‖ for the Afghan people.32 In pursuit of 
that goal, the CIA sought a quick overthrow by the mujahidin of the communist government 
left behind by the Soviets in Kabul and expected Afghan President Najibullah to capitulate 
quickly. Defying all predictions of his imminent demise, however, Najibullah doggedly 
clung on to power, in part due to continued Soviet military support but also owing to 
widening divisions within the mujahidin leadership, whose personal ambitions and mutual 
distrust made it very difficult to mount a coordinated and sustained challenge to the regime. 
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With the Soviets gone, the jihad degenerated into a bloody civil war, not only between the 
communists and the mujahidin but increasingly amongst the mujahidin themselves. At the 
core of this internal conflict resided the bitter personal rivalry between Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar - still the ISI‘s favoured candidate - and Ahmed Shah Massoud.33 
With the war in Afghanistan drifting along inconclusively, American interest in the conflict 
began to wane; funding for the covert programme declined from a high of $630 million in 
1987 to $350 million in 1989, $300 million in 1990 and $250 million in 1991.34 Differences 
within the Bush administration on Afghanistan became more pronounced and prevented the 
implementation of a coherent policy towards what was becoming an increasingly intractable 
problem. The State Department began reaching out with diplomatic and material support to 
―moderate‖ resistance leaders who favoured a negotiated settlement; at the same time, it 
also began to push for a broad-based political settlement which would exclude not only 
communist ―extremes‖ such as Najibullah but also Islamist ―extremes‖ such as Hekmatyar 
and Sayyaf.35 The CIA, on the other hand, continued its collaboration with the ISI and the 
Saudis to promote the hardline Islamist elements within the mujahidin36 even though it also 
did maintain a secret unilateral network of individual commanders on its payroll, which 
included Massoud.37 
In the absence of a unified mujahidin challenge to his regime, Najibullah managed to cling 
on to power. In the meantime, Afghanistan continued a precipitous slide down the Bush 
administration‘s list of major foreign policy priorities. In September 1991, after twelve 
years of playing out their superpower rivalry on the forbidding terrain of the ―graveyard of 
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empires,‖ the US and the Soviet Union formally agreed to terminate all military assistance 
to their respective feuding proxies in Afghanistan. With this action, the US ―effectively 
washed its hands‖38 of a country on whose soil the CIA had mounted the largest covert 
operation in its history and whose ―courageous struggle‖ against the invading Soviet 
behemoth had been hailed by President Reagan as ―one of the epics of our time.‖39 After the 
Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991, Washington promptly consigned the Afghan 
―epic‖ to the dust-heap of Cold War history. 
The Bush administration‘s dwindling interest in Afghanistan meant that Pakistan lost much 
of the strategic significance that it had carried for the US during the Reagan era. In October 
1990, American economic and military aid to Pakistan worth almost $600 million annually 
was frozen after Bush failed to certify under the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not 
possess a nuclear weapon. The sanctions came at a time when Pakistan was the third largest 
recipient of US aid in the world. Although aid had also been cut off twice by President 
Carter, the decision by Bush ―hurt much more and had substantially greater impact,‖ 
especially on Pakistan‘s defence establishment which lost out on around $300 million a year 
in arms, spare parts and military-related equipment.40 Pakistani public opinion regarded the 
suspension of aid as a cruel betrayal by the US, which had swept the nuclear issue under the 
carpet when it needed Pakistan‘s help in Afghanistan but ―hypocritically applied the 
sanctions‖ once that help was no longer required.41 What was even more infuriating for 
Pakistan was that its arch-rival India, which had actually tested a nuclear device almost two 
decades ago, was not similarly punished by the US. 
Shortly after the Pressler sanctions came into force, Pakistan went to the polls for the 
second time in two years. In August 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had dismissed 
Benazir Bhutto‘s government on charges of corruption, governmental mismanagement and 
nepotism.42 On this occasion, the army and the ISI managed to ensure a victory for their 
preferred candidate, Nawaz Sharif, who assumed the prime ministerial office in the midst of 
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two ongoing jihads and a sharp downturn in relations with the US.43 The new government 
in Islamabad was warned by Washington that Pakistan‘s nuclear programme was in 
contravention of US laws and that ―we can‘t change our policies. You have to change 
yours.‖44 Moreover, Pakistan was put on notice that its continuing support to the insurgency 
in Kashmir carried the risk of the country being officially declared a state-sponsor of 
terrorism.45 
In Afghanistan, in the meantime, the US left Pakistan to deal with the fallout of a brutal 
civil war.46 The Najibullah regime did not long outlive its Soviet patron; within months of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Najibullah agreed to step down and Kabul finally fell to 
the mujahidin in April 1992. However, a victory that had been sought for so long and for 
which so much in blood and wealth had been expended, turned out to be a Pyrrhic one with 
―ugly, internecine violence‖ quickly breaking out among the major contenders for power 
from within the mujahidin.47 Pakistani attempts to broker power-sharing agreements 
between the feuding parties - especially between its favourite Pashtun candidate, Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, and the allied Tajik duo of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud - 
ended in failure and Afghanistan descended into a period of vicious ethno-political 
fragmentation.48 Frustrated by its inability to win the peace in Kabul after having won the 
war in Afghanistan, Pakistan for a time slowed down its efforts to determine the fate of its 
western neighbour, even though the ISI continued to develop linkages with the powerful 
warlords that now held sway over most of the country.49 
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With the Cold War at an end and Afghanistan no longer a major area of converging 
interests, Pakistan‘s relationship with the US began to fall apart. By the end of the George 
H.W. Bush presidency in 1993, Pakistan was viewed by the US as having ―not only lost 
strategic importance‖ but also as being a ―nuclear troublemaker and a source of regional 
instability.‖50 The election of Bush‘s successor, Bill Clinton, a Democrat with no foreign 
policy experience who set great store by non-proliferation and human rights and whose 
―fascination with India‖ extended back to his student days, gave Pakistan scant hope for an 
improvement in bilateral relations.51 
The new administration in Washington reiterated the warning issued to Islamabad by its 
predecessor that Pakistan ―stood on the brink‖ of being declared a state sponsor of terrorism 
for its training and infiltration of militants into Kashmir.52 Nawaz Sharif was sufficiently 
worried by the American threat to initiate a crackdown on Arab extremists within 
Pakistan.53 Moreover, he replaced his hand-picked head of the ISI, Lieutenant General 
Javed Nasir, a firebrand Muslim zealot passionately committed to the jihadist cause not 
only in Afghanistan and Kashmir but across the world.54Mollified by Sharif‘s attempts at 
damage control, the US refrained from affixing the label of ―terrorist state‖ to Pakistan. 
However, the ISI‘s policy of sustaining militancy in Kashmir, although somewhat modified 
on account of American pressure, remained fundamentally unchanged.55 
By mid-1993, Sharif‘s attempts to assert himself against President Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
prompted the latter to dismiss a second elected prime minister within less than three years. 
As was the case with his predecessor, Sharif was removed on charges of corruption and 
maladministration; on this occasion, however, the Supreme Court overturned the president‘s 
decision and restored Sharif to the premiership. With president and prime minister now 
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locked in a state of open conflict, it was left to the army to step in as the final arbiter. Both 
protagonists were compelled to resign from their respective offices and a caretaker 
administration was put in place to run the country until fresh elections were held in October 
1993. Those elections, Pakistan‘s third in five years, brought Benazir Bhutto back into 
power with enough of a majority to ensure that one of her leading party stalwarts, Farooq 
Leghari, became president. 
During Bhutto‘s second stint as prime minister, there was partial improvement in Pakistan‘s 
relations with the US. The Clinton administration supported a Congressional amendment to 
take some of the sting out of the Pressler sanctions through the resumption of economic 
assistance. Moreover, Clinton approved the provision of military equipment paid for by 
Pakistan but frozen in the US due to the sanctions and permitted the reinstitution of training 
programmes for Pakistani military personnel.56 The prohibition on fresh weapons sales, 
however, remained intact and differences between the two countries persisted on Pakistan‘s 
continued backing of the Kashmir insurgency, its suspected receipt of nuclear and missile 
technology from China, and its failure to curb the production and trafficking of narcotics. 
Of comparatively less concern to Washington at the time was Islamabad‘s cultivation of a 
new group of ultra-conservative Islamic zealots thrown up by the maelstrom of 
Afghanistan‘s lingering civil war.  
III. The Rise of the Taliban 
 
By 1994, Afghanistan was teetering on the brink of disintegration. While Hekmatyar and 
Massoud continued to battle it out for control over Kabul, much of the country was carved 
up among a number of powerful warlords, each possessing his own militia and generating 
revenue through taxes and transit fees.57 The Tajik duumvirate of Rabbani as president and 
Massoud as defence minister controlled Kabul and its surroundings as well as parts of the 
north-east of the country; Hekmatyar was confined to a small region south and east of 
Kabul; in western Afghanistan, Ismael Khan, a Tajik mujahidin commander affiliated with 
Rabbani‘s Jamiat-i-Islami party ruled over the Afghan cultural heartland of Herat; in the 
eastern provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika that bordered Pakistan‘s Pashtun tribal belt, 
the Pashtun mujahidin commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, a recipient of ISI and Saudi 
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patronage, held sway; the Hazaras, the third largest ethnic grouping in Afghanistan after the 
Pashtuns and the Tajiks, controlled a portion of central Afghanistan; and much of the 
northern part of the country was under the rule of the Uzbek strongman Abdul Rashid 
Dostum. Each of these warlords ―fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering 
array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed.‖58 
The only region of consequence not controlled by a powerful warlord was the Pashtun 
heartland of Kandahar bordering the Pakistani province of Balochistan. Much of southern 
Afghanistan including Kandahar was ruled by an unsavoury assortment of low-ranking 
former mujahidin commanders who subsisted on extortion, primarily by levying heavy tolls 
on goods passing through their respective areas to and from Pakistan.59 These warlords felt 
no compunction in plundering and brutalizing their own populations, including by seizing 
their properties, robbing merchants in the marketplaces and kidnapping and sexually 
abusing young girls and boys.60 
In reaction to this state of pervasive lawlessness, a new force dramatically emerged out of 
Kandahar in the summer of 1994 pledging to end the much loathed rule of the local 
commanders and bring peace and order to the region. Known as the Taliban (the plural form 
of the Arabic word talib, meaning ‗student‘), the group consisted primarily of young 
Afghan refugees - predominantly Pashtun in ethnicity - who had grown up in camps across 
the border in Pakistan and had been schooled in the hundreds of madrassas or Islamic 
seminaries that had sprung up in Pakistan‘s tribal areas in the wake of the Soviet invasion.61 
The Afghan jihad against the Soviets and Zia‘s own domestic policies of Islamisation led to 
a dramatic surge in new madrassas in Pakistan with funding from both external sources 
such as Saudi Arabia and its fellow Gulf monarchies as well as through domestic fund-
raising by Pakistani religious parties patronized by the Zia regime.62 Espousing a staunchly 
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puritanical interpretation of Islam imbibed from their madrassa education in Pakistan, the 
Taliban, led by an obscure veteran of the anti-Soviet jihad named Mullah Mohammed 
Omar, vowed to restore order in Afghanistan through the enforcement of the shariah, or 
Islamic law.63 
The Taliban‘s first victory was the takeover of Spin Boldak in October 1994, followed a 
month later by the much more significant capture of Kandahar, Afghanistan‘s second 
largest city. By January 1995, their ranks had been swelled by some 12,000 Afghan and 
Pakistani madrassa students eager to join the battle for the rest of Afghanistan.64 In March, 
they made their first advance on Kabul, prompting Hekmatyar, who was still besieging the 
capital, to flee eastwards before their arrival. In Kabul, the Taliban met their first serious 
defeat when they were pushed back by Massoud‘s forces. Quickly shaking off the setback, 
they turned their attention westwards towards Herat and were at first similarly repulsed 
before capturing the city in September.  
By April 1996, with the star of the Taliban clearly in the ascendant, 1,200 Pashtun religious 
notables from southern, central and western Afghanistan assembled in Kandahar to 
proclaim Mullah Omar Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful), an Islamic title 
whose conferment made the poorly educated village cleric of nondescript origins the 
―undisputed leader of the jihad and the Emir of Afghanistan.‖65 Just months afterwards, 
Kabul finally fell to the Taliban66 and, despite the occasional military reverse, further 
territorial gains followed over the next two years, leaving them in control of 80 per cent of 
Afghanistan by the end of 1998.67 
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For a population devastated by over a decade and a half of relentless warfare and 
destruction, first at the hands of a brutal occupying power and then by the selfish power 
struggles of its own leaders, the Taliban takeover of substantial swathes of the country was 
not a wholly unwelcome development, especially in Kabul and Kandahar, which had 
become particularly strife-ridden.68 True to their initial commitment, the Taliban were 
largely successful in enforcing order, disarming the population and providing physical and 
material security. However, such successes were attained not through establishing the rule 
of law via a modern and efficient criminal justice apparatus but rather by instilling fear 
through the institution of what the Taliban saw as punishments mandated by Islam, 
including the amputation of hands for theft, lashes for the consumption of alcohol and 
stoning to death for adultery.69 
Militantly opposed to modernity and wedded to an extremely narrow, literalist 
interpretation of Islam that stemmed from a very limited understanding of the Quran, 
Islamic history and jurisprudence, the Taliban subjected the areas under their control to ―the 
strictest Islamic system in place anywhere in the world.‖70 Women were prohibited from 
working and girls‘ schools and colleges were shut down. Television, videos, satellite dishes, 
music and all games including chess, football and even kite-flying were banned. Strict dress 
codes were laid down for women, who had to wear the burqa, the head-to-toe version of the 
veil, in order to appear in public. Although women had to suffer the brunt of the Taliban‘s 
draconian social reengineering, men were not spared either. All adult males were required 
to grow full beards which could not be trimmed shorter than a man‘s fist, wear their 
shalwars (native baggy pantaloons worn by men in Afghanistan and Pakistan) above the 
ankle and congregate in the mosque to offer the five daily obligatory prayers. A special 
religious police was set up to ruthlessly enforce the Taliban‘s code of morality.71 At the 
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same time, the Taliban saw opium production and drug trafficking as neither immoral nor 
criminal and allowed both to flourish since they were major sources of revenue for their 
military expansion.72 
For Pakistan, the sudden emergence of the Taliban came at a time when its Afghan policy 
appeared to be going nowhere. Islamabad‘s quest to acquire ‗strategic depth‘73 against India 
by installing a client regime in Kabul had been stymied by the dismal performance of its 
preferred candidate, Hekmatyar, who had failed to dislodge Rabbani and Massoud from 
Kabul.74 Moreover, the unending political volatility and pervasive insecurity inside 
Afghanistan was holding Pakistan back from opening up lucrative trading routes with the 
energy-rich republics of Central Asia, which had become independent after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Benazir Bhutto‘s interior minister Naseerullah Babar, an ethnic 
Pashtun and a retired army general who had been a key member of the Afghan cell set up 
during the mid-1970s to nurture Islamist dissidents such as Hekmatyar, Massoud and 
Rabbani, was particularly captivated by the dream of establishing trade linkages with 
Central Asia. In the Taliban, Babar saw a force equipped with the discipline and military 
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potential to make that dream a reality, especially after the new movement demonstrated its 
mettle very early on by freeing a Pakistani goods caravan held hostage by Kandahari 
warlords, followed days thereafter by their remarkably easy takeover of Kandahar itself.75 
The initial Pakistani support to the Taliban came from the interior ministry under Babar and 
the powerful trucking mafia operating out of Quetta and Kandahar which desired to open 
new routes to transport smuggled goods between Pakistan, Iran and the newly independent 
Central Asian republic of Turkmenistan but found it impossible to conduct business in view 
of the excessive tolls imposed by warlords and rogue commanders along the way.76 Within 
Pakistan, the Taliban also derived strong support from one of the country‘s main religious 
parties, the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) or Party of Islamic Scholars, in whose madrassas 
the majority of the Taliban‘s foot soldiers and even some senior leaders had been educated77 
and to whose sternly puritanical Deobandi ideology they subscribed.78 One faction of the 
JUI,79 headed by a Pashtun cleric named Maulana Fazlur Rahman, formed part of the ruling 
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coalition with Benazir Bhutto‘s PPP; as a political ally of the prime minister, Rahman used 
his access to the government, the army and the ISI to drum up official support for the 
Taliban. He also used his appointment by Bhutto as chairman of the National Assembly‘s 
Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs80 to enlist Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states on the 
Taliban‘s behalf whilst also lobbying for them on his frequent visits to Western capitals.81 
Although Pakistan‘s decision to throw its weight behind the Taliban was undoubtedly a 
major explanatory factor behind its rapid expansion, it should not necessarily be construed 
as evidence that the militia were a Pakistani creation or a brainchild of the ISI. In fact, the 
Taliban were ―a phenomenon waiting to happen‖82 in a country ravaged by war and 
amongst a people cruelly betrayed by the incessant squabbling of their own leaders, thereby 
making it ―ripe for the emergence of a new and purer movement.‖83 Moreover, the extreme 
ideology preached and implemented by the Taliban purportedly in the name of Islam was a 
direct consequence of a policy of radical religious indoctrination in which not only Pakistan 
but the US, Saudi Arabia and other supporters of the Afghan jihad were all complicit. 
Although Naseerullah Babar reportedly referred to the Taliban as ―our boys‖ and both the 
Pakistan government and the JUI publicly acclaimed their early victories, the Taliban 
demonstrated from the outset that they were ―nobody‘s puppet.‖84 Soon after taking 
Kandahar, they issued Pakistan a warning not to make deals on its own with individual 
warlords and disallowed goods bound for Afghanistan to be transported by Pakistani 
trucks.85 
In view of its later extensive patronage of the Taliban, it is ironic that the ISI initially 
viewed the radical new movement with a measure of scepticism.86 When the Taliban first 
appeared on the scene, the ISI was still wedded to its policy of supporting Hekmatyar; in 
any case, it was more focused at the time on running its other jihad in Kashmir than on 
exploring new options in Afghanistan and had by and large resigned itself to an indefinite 
continuation of that country‘s intractable civil war. It was actually Benazir Bhutto and 
particularly Naseerullah Babar who saw in the emergence of the Taliban not only a chance 
to finally establish trade routes to Central Asia but also an opportunity to wrest control over 
                                                          
80
 The National Assembly is the popularly elected lower house of the bicameral Pakistani parliament; the 
indirectly elected Senate serves as the upper house. 
81
 Rashid, Taliban, 90. 
82
 Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 56. 
83
 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 110. 
84
 Rashid, Taliban, 29. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Even greater scepticism, if not outright denunciation of the Taliban, was voiced by the Jamaat-i-Islami, 
for long the ISI‘s partner in Afghanistan and a key supporter of Hekmatyar. A publication backed by the 
party alleged that the Taliban were a creation of the CIA and British intelligence. See Rafique Afghan, 
Weekly Takbeer, March 2, 1995. 
149 
 
Afghan policy from the ISI.87 Thus, the early patron of the Taliban was principally the 
civilian government of Pakistan and not the ISI.88 However, the Taliban‘s speedy 
acquisition of more and more territory, coupled with Hekmatyar‘s continuing failure to take 
Kabul, compelled the ISI to take notice, leading to an internal debate within the agency as 
well as within the top military hierarchy in general about supporting the extremist militia.  
By the summer of 1995, the Pashtun network within the army and the Pashtun Islamist 
supporters of the Taliban within the ISI had prevailed over those who advocated a more 
cautious approach so as not to damage relations with Central Asia and Iran.89 With Rabbani 
and Massoud looking increasingly towards Pakistan‘s main regional rivals - Iran, India and 
Russia - for diplomatic and material support,90 the military decided to fully back the Taliban 
as the ―only possible alternative for Pakistan‘s own strategic interests in Afghanistan.‖91 
Sensing her Afghan policy slipping into the hands of the military, Benazir Bhutto tried to 
argue against facilitating the Taliban to mount an offensive on Kabul and instead urged that 
their growing strength be used only to negotiate for a broad-based Afghan government. 
Under sustained pressure from the ISI, however, she eventually capitulated to its ―persistent 
requests for unlimited covert aid to the Islamic militia.‖92 
Since Pakistan‘s own economy, crippled by a combination of corruption, poor management 
and US sanctions, could not possibly sustain such an enterprise on its own, the ISI solicited 
assistance from a familiar source: Saudi Arabia. Engaged in their own proxy war with Iran 
in Afghanistan, the Saudis needed little persuasion to switch their support from the 
ineffective Hekmatyar to the much more promising Taliban, who had impressed Riyadh as 
much by their martial prowess as by their extreme Deobandi ideology, which closely 
                                                          
87
 Rashid, Taliban, 184. 
88
 While the ISI played its waiting game, Babar forged ahead with civilian assistance to the Taliban by 
setting up an Afghan Trade Development Cell within the interior ministry, which ostensibly aimed to 
coordinate the work of ministries in opening up trade routes to Central Asia but actually served to provide 
logistical support to the Taliban from the budgets of those ministries. Kandahar was connected to 
Pakistan‘s telephone grid and Pakistani engineers repaired roads and provided electricity to the city. The 
paramilitary Frontier Corps, directly under Babar‘s control, helped the Taliban set up an internal wireless 
network for their commanders. For details of further assistance between 1995 and 1996, see Rashid, 
Taliban, 184-185. 
89
 Rashid, ―Pakistan and the Taliban,‖ 86. Both the army chief at the time, General Abdul Waheed Kakar, 
and the head of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, were Pashtuns, as were 
all operational ISI field officers involved with the Taliban. 
90
 Declassified State Department documents indicate that as of October 1995, the ISI‘s aid to the Taliban 
was ―pervasive‖ but also ―modest‖ and included only limited ―lethal assistance.‖ In contrast, Iran was 
―pouring large amounts of money and materiel into Afghanistan‖ in support of the Rabbani government 
and was ―recruiting, arming and training several thousand anti-Taliban Afghan refugees‖ in camps inside 
Iran along the border with Afghanistan. See ―Afghanistan: Russian Embassy Official Claims Iran 
Interfering more than Pakistan,‖ U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, November 30, 1995, DNSA, accessed 
July 20, 2015, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/6.pdf 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Coll, Ghost Wars, 331. 
150 
 
resembled the Saudis‘ own official creed of Wahhabism.93 Generous contributions by Saudi 
intelligence as well as private sources within the kingdom both facilitated the expansion of 
the Taliban as well as ―buoyed the treasuries‖ of the Pakistan army and the ISI during the 
―lean years of American economic sanctions.‖94 
IV. Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
 
By 1996, in addition to their patrons within the Saudi ruling establishment, the Taliban had 
found another generous Saudi benefactor in the shape of Osama bin Laden, a member of the 
kingdom‘s leading construction firm who relocated to Peshawar during the 1980s and 
contributed generously from his substantial coffers to fund a range of logistical services for 
the mujahidin.95 In 1986, he had set up his own training camps for Arab recruits, several 
thousand of whom fought the Soviets from bases in a number of provinces in Afghanistan 
but whose ―extreme Wahhabi practices made them intensely disliked by the majority of 
Afghans.‖96 Towards the end of the Afghan jihad, bin Laden set up an organization called 
al-Qaeda (meaning ‗the base‘ or ‗the foundation‘ in Arabic) ostensibly as a documentation 
bureau to record the names of the Arab Afghans and inform the families of those missing or 
slain. Its actual purposes were much more ambitious, including carrying the impetus for the 
―nascent worldwide Islamist movement into the post-Afghan jihad era‖ through the 
provision of ―a base from which the ummah-wide Islamist movement and potential 
adherents could be organized, trained, paid, and generally inspired.‖97 
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned home to Saudi 
Arabia and became a bitter opponent of the Saudi regime after it allowed in US troops to 
defend the kingdom against Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.98 His criticism became 
even more strident after some 20,000 American troops remained stationed in Saudi Arabia 
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even after Iraq‘s defeat and Kuwait‘s liberation. The Saudi government confiscated his 
passport but he used his powerful connections to flee his native country, initially to 
Afghanistan, where he made a failed attempt to mediate between the warring mujahidin 
groups, and then to Sudan, where a friendly Islamist regime welcomed the wealthy fugitive 
with open arms. It was out of his new base in Khartoum that bin Laden launched al-Qaeda‘s 
first military attacks against the US.99 In the meantime, his continuing criticism of the Saudi 
ruling family led to his citizenship being revoked. Under intense pressure from the US and 
the Saudis, the Sudanese government eventually asked bin Laden to leave and in May 1996, 
he fled once more to the familiar surroundings of Afghanistan.100 
Upon his return to Afghanistan, bin Laden issued his first declaration of jihad against 
America from his new base in the city of Jalalabad, which fell shortly thereafter to the 
Taliban, who assured him of continued refuge in recognition of his services during the anti-
Soviet jihad. Bin Laden struck up a close friendship with Mullah Omar, who convinced him 
to relocate to Kandahar, where he built a house for the Taliban leader‘s family and made 
other significant financial contributions to the new regime‘s treasury.101 Moreover, he 
despatched several hundred Arab Afghans to fight alongside the Taliban in their offensives 
against the Northern Alliance, a military coalition consisting primarily of non-Pashtun 
forces that had coalesced under Massoud‘s leadership following the Taliban‘s takeover of 
Kabul in 1996.102 The increasingly strong nexus between the Taliban and al-Qaeda could 
not possibly have occurred without the knowledge, and even active encouragement, of the 
ISI, which wanted to use bin Laden‘s financial resources and his cohort of battle-hardened 
Arab Afghans both to train Kashmiri militants as well as in support of the Taliban‘s efforts 
to take over all of Afghanistan. 
V. War by Proxy 
 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were not the only ones captivated by the Taliban‘s perceived 
potential to stabilise Afghanistan. The militia‘s rapid initial expansion clearly made a 
favourable impression upon the Clinton administration, which regarded it as a more than 
useful instrument for the attainment of a number of key US regional interests, including 
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containing Iran and cracking down on Afghanistan‘s booming production and trafficking of 
opium.103 Towards the end of 1995, the Taliban‘s strategic appeal for Washington was 
augmented by the latter‘s quest to secure access for American oil companies to the 
potentially enormous energy deposits of Central Asia through pipelines that would have to 
traverse Afghanistan. For such plans to attain fruition, a stable Afghanistan would be an 
essential prerequisite, one that the US believed the Taliban could deliver. Between 1995 and 
1997, as the Taliban extended their rule across large portions of the country, the Clinton 
administration chose to disregard their repressive religious and social policies and their 
blatant violations of elementary human rights. Of far greater importance to Washington at 
the time was a proposal by an American oil company, Unocal, to build a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Pakistan running through Afghanistan, thereby bypassing Iran.104 
Thus, at a time when the Taliban were busy holding public executions and floggings and 
banning women from offices and schools, the US outlined its Afghan policy to a closed 
gathering of the UN Security Council by declaring that the Taliban had ―demonstrated their 
staying power‖ and that it was ―not in the interests of Afghanistan or any of us here‖ that 
they be diplomatically isolated.105 Although there is no evidence to suggest that it provided 
direct material support to the Taliban, the initially favourable response by the US to the 
expansion of Taliban control, its tacit approval of Pakistani and Saudi support to the Taliban 
and its firm backing of Unocal‘s pipeline plans were viewed with deep suspicion by 
regional rivals such as Russia and Iran, who reacted by stepping up their aid to the anti-
Taliban Northern Alliance. By the end of 1996, after Kabul had fallen to the Taliban, battle-
lines in Afghanistan‘s new proxy war appeared to have been firmly drawn between 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the US on the side of the Taliban and Iran, Russia, India and the 
Central Asian Republics on the side of the Northern Alliance. 
Less than a month after the Taliban entered Kabul in triumph, their original Pakistani 
patron, the civilian government of Benazir Bhutto, was dismissed two years before the 
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completion of its constitutionally mandated five-year term on the by now familiar charges 
of corruption, inability to maintain law and order and general mismanagement of the 
economy and state institutions.106 In the farcical game of musical chairs into which 
Pakistani politics had by then degenerated, fresh elections in February 1997 brought Nawaz 
Sharif back to power for a second time, this time in a landslide. Sharif‘s return to the 
premiership coincided with the commencement of Clinton‘s second presidential term, 
which was accompanied by a change of guard at the State Department where Madeleine 
Albright took over from Warren Christopher as Secretary of State.107 There would be no 
real change, however, in Clinton‘s overall policy on South Asia; nuclear sanctions on 
Islamabad remained in place and Washington continued to place a greater premium on 
expanding ties with New Delhi. Moreover, differences persisted on Pakistan‘s persistent use 
of jihadist proxies in Kashmir108 and elsewhere,109 as well as on its acquisition of ballistic 
missile technology from China and North Korea.  
Fairly early into Clinton‘s second term, Afghanistan too joined the list of major irritants in 
the US-Pakistan relationship. The change of government in Pakistan brought no shift in the 
ISI‘s Afghan policy; if anything, the agency intensified its support to the Taliban and, in the 
wake of their capture of the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif in May 1997, convinced not 
only Nawaz Sharif but also Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to formally 
recognise the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. All other countries, 
including the US, opted to withhold recognition.110 In Washington‘s case, the initial 
flirtation with the misogynistic Taliban was being increasingly questioned by women‘s 
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rights supporters at home, including powerful female figures within the administration such 
as first lady Hillary Clinton and Secretary of State Albright.  
On a trip to Pakistan in November 1997, Albright declared unequivocally - doubtless to the 
consternation of her hosts - that the US decision not to recognise the Taliban was because of 
―their approach to human rights, their despicable treatment of women and children, and 
their general lack of respect for human dignity…‖111 She also made it clear that the US did 
not deem the Taliban to be in a position to occupy the whole of Afghanistan, affirmed that 
―other parties‖ in the Afghan conflict needed to be recognised and urged Pakistan to use its 
influence with the Taliban to push them towards negotiating with their opponents.112 Such 
criticism fell on deaf ears; the military and the ISI, and indeed the Sharif government, 
continued to back the Taliban on the flawed assumption that complete Taliban control over 
all of Afghanistan would be accepted by the world as a fait accompli. Their irrational 
pursuit of ‗strategic depth‘ against India through the installation of a client Pashtun Islamist 
government in Afghanistan blinded them both to Pakistan‘s increasing isolation from the 
world on account of its backing of the Taliban as well as to the growing impact of the 
Taliban‘s warped ideology upon Pakistan‘s own socio-political landscape.113 
Already encumbered by growing differences on a range of major bilateral policy areas, the 
US-Pakistan relationship was put to another stiff test in May 1998 when both India and 
Pakistan became overt nuclear-weapon states. New Delhi‘s decision to conduct five nuclear 
tests on 11 May was bettered by Islamabad later that month when it conducted six tests of 
its own. During the brief intervening period between these momentous events, the Clinton 
administration, which had been taken by surprise by the Indian tests, tried its utmost to coax 
Pakistan not to go down the same road by offering a string of incentives, including the 
resumption of economic and military aid, international recognition and a state visit for 
Nawaz Sharif to the White House ―with all the panoply possible.‖114 
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Caught between vociferous domestic public opinion in favour of giving a matching 
response to India on the one hand and sustained American pressure not to do so on the 
other, an ―anguished‖ Sharif sought a security guarantee from Clinton against India as the 
price for not testing.115 When such a guarantee was not forthcoming, he gave his scientists 
the go-ahead to test, following which the US immediately imposed further sanctions, an 
eventuality of which Clinton had given Sharif notice in their final conversation before the 
tests. The episode demonstrated yet again that when it came to what were perceived as its 
core national interests, Pakistan would resist American pressure, be it in the form of 
inducements or threats, to abandon them, even if they were in conflict with America‘s own 
declared interests.  
The US had hardly had time to come to terms with South Asia‘s dramatically transformed 
security architecture following the India-Pakistan nuclear tests when its attention in the 
region was again transferred to Afghanistan. In August 1998, twin suicide bombing strikes 
on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that claimed more than two hundred lives 
were traced by American intelligence to the al-Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden, still 
residing in Afghanistan as a guest of the Taliban. Just months prior to the bombings, bin 
Laden and his deputy, the firebrand Egyptian Islamist Ayman al-Zawahiri, had launched the 
World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders with the avowed aim of 
targeting Americans and their allies - both civilian and military - all over the world.116 
Following that declaration, the US had engaged in its first direct high-level engagement 
with the Taliban to convince them to extradite bin Laden to Saudi Arabia to stand trial but 
to no avail.117 
After concluding that there was sufficient evidence of bin Laden‘s culpability in the attacks 
in Africa, the US fired around 75 Tomahawk cruise missiles on suspected bin Laden 
hideouts in Afghanistan which did not locate their principal target but instead killed at least 
twenty Kashmiri militants receiving instruction in guerrilla warfare at one of bin Laden‘s 
training camps, thereby disproving Pakistan‘s repeated denials that it provided only moral 
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and diplomatic support to the Kashmir insurgency.118 Even though the missiles had to fly 
through Pakistan‘s airspace on their way to Afghanistan, the US did not deem it expedient 
to provide advance notice to the relevant Pakistani authorities out of concern that details of 
the operation would be leaked to the Taliban and bin Laden.119 
Having failed to kill bin Laden, the US worked through the medium of UN resolutions to 
put pressure on the Taliban to hand him over to a country where he could legitimately be 
put on trial.120 Those resolutions also called on all countries to push the Taliban in that 
direction, an obvious reference to Pakistan, which by that time was providing all sorts of 
assistance to the Taliban, including paying the salaries of Taliban government employees 
out of its own depleted budget.121 Previous attempts by the US to enlist Pakistan‘s help in 
getting hold of bin Laden had failed to elicit the required cooperation. The ISI was reluctant 
to close down an important source of funding and training for Kashmiri militants and was 
wary of triggering a militant backlash at home for collaborating with the US against bin 
Laden, whose anti-Americanism had struck a powerful chord with Islamist groups within 
Pakistan. It also did not wish to jeopardize its Afghan policy by antagonising the Taliban, 
who had declared bin Laden their guest whose safety and well-being was mandated both by 
Pashtun culture as well as Islamic social mores. Nevertheless, under sustained American 
pressure, both Nawaz Sharif and the ISI eventually agreed to set up a 60-person commando 
team trained and funded by the US to capture bin Laden.122 
The Taliban‘s other external champion, Saudi Arabia, also came under increased US 
pressure after the bombings in Africa to secure bin Laden‘s arrest and extradition. When 
they had first come into contact with bin Laden after capturing Jalalabad, the Taliban had 
sent a message to Riyadh seeking guidance on whether to keep him there or hand him over 
to the Saudis. They were instructed to keep bin Laden where he was but to ensure that he 
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did not speak or work against the interests of Saudi Arabia.123 The kingdom‘s rulers clearly 
preferred to have bin Laden at liberty in Afghanistan than incarcerated in Saudi Arabia, 
where he might become ―a magnet for anti-royal dissent.‖124 Moreover, the close relations 
that bin Laden still maintained with sympathetic members of the Saudi ruling elite and 
elements within Saudi intelligence could prove devastating for Saudi Arabia in case they 
were brought to light in an open court. The Saudis preferred bin Laden to be either dead or 
in the custody of the Taliban; what they clearly did not desire was for him to be captured 
and tried by the Americans.125 
Despite bin Laden‘s continuing fulminations against the Saudi ruling family, the kingdom 
maintained its support to his Afghan hosts in line with its overarching goal of countering 
Iranian influence in the region. In the months preceding the attacks in Africa, the Saudis 
financed the Taliban‘s offensives in northern Afghanistan and were silent on the question of 
bin Laden‘s extradition.126 Following the Africa bombings, however, both Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan found themselves under enormous American pressure to persuade the Taliban to 
hand him over. Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal travelled to Kandahar with 
his Pakistani counterpart to convince Mullah Omar that bin Laden had to be surrendered. 
While there are varied accounts of the meeting‘s specifics, they are all agreed on the 
outcome, which was that the Taliban leader refused to comply with his visitors‘ demand.127 
His defiance led Saudi Arabia to break off diplomatic ties with the Taliban, followed soon 
thereafter by the UAE.128 By 1999, Pakistan stood alone as the only country in the world to 
maintain full diplomatic relations with the Taliban129 and refused to distance itself from 
them even after the US had officially declared them a state sponsor of terrorism.130 
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VI. Returning to Square One 
 
In order to mitigate Pakistan‘s growing diplomatic isolation in the wake of the nuclear tests 
and its continued support to the Taliban, Nawaz Sharif launched a peace initiative with 
India in February 1999 that appeared to show considerable early promise of a genuine 
improvement in relations between the two countries.131 However, such efforts came to 
naught soon thereafter when the Pakistani army launched a poorly planned incursion into 
the strategically situated town of Kargil in Kashmir. Although taken completely by surprise 
by Pakistan‘s initial offensive, which consisted of infiltrating both regular troops and 
Kashmiri militants to occupy high-altitude positions abandoned by the Indians during the 
forbidding Kashmiri winter, the Indians responded with full force by deploying both their 
army and air force against the intruders.132 With losses mounting on both sides, 
international concerns intensified that India would seek to broaden the theatre of operations 
by crossing over into Pakistan, leading to an escalation in violence that could potentially 
spark a catastrophic nuclear exchange.133 
Pakistan‘s official stance throughout the Kargil conflict that the men occupying the 
positions were indigenous Kashmiri mujahidin and not regular Pakistani army personnel 
could not overcome the incredulity of the international community. Washington held 
Islamabad exclusively responsible for instigating the crisis and pressed it to withdraw its 
forces from Kashmir. For the first time ever in an India-Pakistan conflict, the US was 
―unequivocally and publicly siding with India,‖ and by doing so left Islamabad 
―devastated.‖134 Such was the extent of Pakistan‘s diplomatic isolation on the issue that it 
failed to garner the support of even its closest ally, China, which also urged it to withdraw 
unilaterally.  
With his government completely bereft of international support and with India threatening 
to expand the war, Sharif attempted to cut his losses by pleading with the US for a face-
saving exit. Clinton consented to Sharif‘s request for a meeting but made it conditional on 
Pakistan agreeing to announce a unilateral withdrawal from Kargil. In case Islamabad 
backed out of doing so, the US would hold it responsible for starting a war that might end in 
a nuclear disaster. Following their meeting in Washington on July 4, 1999, during which an 
                                                          
131
 In February 1999, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to Lahore on the inaugural run 
of a bus service launched between the two countries. During his visit, he concluded an agreement with 
Sharif to begin a dialogue on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.  
132
 For more on the military dimensions of the Kargil conflict, see Peter Lavoy, ed., Asymmetric Warfare 
in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); and Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 507-519.  
133
 Stephen Kinzer, ―The World Takes Notice: Kashmir Gets Scarier,‖ New York Times, June 20, 1999; 
and ―Ever More Dangerous in Kashmir,‖ Economist, June 19, 1999, 66-67. 
134
 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon, 132. 
159 
 
angry Clinton berated his visitor for the irresponsibility of Pakistan‘s actions and threatened 
to label it a supporter of terrorism in Afghanistan and Kashmir if it did not pull back its 
troops from Kargil, Sharif agreed to a unilateral withdrawal. The only concession that he 
was able to extract from Clinton in exchange was a vague undertaking to take a personal 
interest in encouraging a speedy resumption of the peace process between India and 
Pakistan that had been interrupted by the hostilities in Kashmir.135 
The Kargil debacle led to a rapid breakdown in relations between Nawaz Sharif and the 
main architect of the ill-fated intrusion in Kashmir, army chief General Pervez 
Musharraf.136 In October 1998, Sharif had handpicked Musharraf over two more senior 
generals to replace General Jehangir Karamat, whom Sharif had compelled to resign for 
exceeding his mandate by publicly recommending an institutionalised role for the military 
in the formulation of Pakistan‘s national security policies.137 Having successfully gotten rid 
of one army chief, Sharif attempted a repeat performance but on this occasion, it was he 
who ended up being removed from office. In a dramatic sequence of events worthy of a 
Hollywood action movie, Sharif dismissed Musharraf from office while the latter was still 
airborne on the way back from an official trip to Sri Lanka. The commercial plane carrying 
Musharraf was not allowed to land at its original destination of Karachi but was instead 
diverted elsewhere. By that time, however, Musharraf‘s senior generals had got wind of the 
game that was afoot and moved quickly to arrest Sharif and his associates, following which 
Musharraf‘s plane was able to land safely. Within little more than a decade of Zia‘s death 
and for the fourth time in its brief history, Pakistan yet again fell under direct military rule. 
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Conclusion 
 
At the dawn of a new millennium, US-Pakistan ties appeared to be in worse shape than at 
any previous period in the chequered relationship between the two countries. Washington‘s 
disillusionment with Islamabad‘s utility as a strategic client was matched by Islamabad‘s 
feelings of having been betrayed by its patron, leading to a spurt in anti-American sentiment 
across the country. The drying up of US aid and the imposition of nuclear-related sanctions 
during the 1990s was severely resented by Pakistanis in general but was a particularly bitter 
pill to swallow for the military establishment, which depended primarily on American 
weaponry and spare parts to meet its conventional defence needs vis-à-vis India. No longer 
in a position to mount a credible conventional deterrent to India, the Pakistani military, 
operating through the ISI, increasingly turned to the use of militant proxies to defend its 
strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir, especially since Washington had by then 
washed its hands off the former and was not inclined to imperil its growing rapprochement 
with New Delhi by attempting to mediate a solution to the latter.  
The decision by the US to disengage from Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal instead 
of pursuing a long-term peace settlement was fatally flawed. Washington then attempted a 
brief flirtation of its own with the Taliban before realising the impracticality of doing 
business with them. It subsequently became openly critical of both the Taliban and their 
Pakistani patrons, whilst also maintaining its opposition to Islamabad‘s proxy war in 
Kashmir. Although it did force a Pakistani retreat from Kargil, the US failed to prevent 
Islamabad from propping up the Taliban, conducting nuclear tests and using militants 
against India. Deprived of the mutually advantageous bonds inherent in relationships of 
patronage and cliency, US-Pakistan relations during the 1990s became trapped in a vicious 
circle of acrimony and mistrust. It would take the seminal event of the new millennium‘s 
first decade to bring about another dramatic convergence of strategic interests between 
Washington and Islamabad. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: BACK TO THE FRONTLINE - BUSH, 
MUSHARRAF AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
 
 
In several crucial respects, US-Pakistan relations during the Musharraf period mirrored 
those that prevailed during the 1980s. Both Zia and Musharraf were treated as international 
outcasts after their respective coups against democratically elected governments but both 
had their sins washed away after aligning themselves with America‘s strategic interests in 
Afghanistan and received substantial material rewards from the US for their services. 
Although one a devout Islamist and the other a self-proclaimed ―enlightened moderate,‖ 
both used Islam for political ends. Zia did so by attempting to Islamise the Pakistani state 
and waging jihad in Afghanistan while Musharraf did so by trying to come across as a 
moderate and largely secular Muslim before his Western audiences but ensuring that the 
army‘s jihadist proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir were not abandoned.  
Both Zia and Musharraf pursued policy objectives diametrically opposed to those of their 
American benefactors and both were able to get away with doing so because Washington‘s 
need for their sustained cooperation outweighed its frustration at their continued defiance. 
In the final analysis, therefore, during both periods, it was frequently the case that the tail 
wagged the dog; in other words, the client played as much of a role as the patron in defining 
the relationship, even to the extent of consistently flouting the patron‘s interests when it 
perceived them to be in conflict with its own. 
I. Musharraf and the US: The Pre-9/11 Phase 
 
There were very few within Pakistan who publicly mourned the premature termination of 
the Nawaz Sharif government, which had frittered away much of the goodwill and support 
that had given it a landslide electoral victory in 1997 by failing to reverse Pakistan‘s 
economic decline and improve public sector delivery on key areas of governance. As was 
the case in the initial aftermath of earlier coups, there was a general hope within Pakistan on 
this occasion too that the military would succeed where the civilians had failed. In a 
departure from his predecessors, General Musharraf did not impose martial law and 
bestowed on himself the relatively innocuous sounding title of ―chief executive‖ rather than 
the more forbidding one of ―chief martial law administrator.‖ He also initially did not 
assume the presidency and allowed Sharif‘s appointee to continue in that position. Political 
parties were not banned and nor was press censorship instituted; at the same time, however, 
162 
 
Musharraf did follow earlier instances of military rule by compelling senior judges to take 
an oath of allegiance to his regime, with those who refused to do so compulsorily retired. 
Musharraf‘s attempt to soften the hard edge of his military rule was directed at assuaging 
widespread international condemnation of his seizure of power by portraying himself as a 
reluctant coup-maker with no personal ambitions but instead motivated only by an interest 
in reforming the country. Despite such efforts, however, which included the announcement 
of an ambitious seven-point reform agenda soon after taking over the country, the overall 
international reaction to the coup was predominantly adverse.1 The Clinton administration, 
although under no illusions about the failings of the Sharif government, condemned the 
coup and immediately imposed sanctions which, under existing US legislation, were 
automatically triggered in the event of the overthrow of a democratically elected 
government. With the Pressler sanctions and those imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests 
already in place, Pakistan‘s transition from America‘s ―most allied ally‖ to its ―most 
sanctioned ally‖ was now complete.2 
Just as Zia had failed to secure American support for his dictatorship in the years preceding 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Musharraf too found himself ―in Washington‘s 
doghouse‖ during the first two years of his military rule.3 The American lack of favour 
stemmed partly from Musharraf‘s upending of democracy and his reluctance to provide a 
timetable for its return but more so from a growing recognition that he had no intention of 
complementing his proposed domestic reform agenda with a similarly transformed foreign 
policy.4 Musharraf was as committed to maintaining ‗strategic depth‘ in Afghanistan as all 
previous Pakistani army chiefs over the last two decades. On India, meanwhile, and more 
specifically with respect to Pakistan‘s Kashmir policy, he had already given sufficient 
evidence of his hawkish inclinations through his instigation of the Kargil incursion. 
Musharraf‘s appointment of Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed - one of the leading 
architects of Kargil, a central player in the execution of the October coup and an 
enthusiastic supporter of the Taliban - as head of the ISI was a clear indicator that there 
would be no let-up in the policy of using militant proxies for the attainment of the military‘s 
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core strategic objectives. Just months after Ahmed took over the ISI, an Indian commercial 
aircraft travelling from Kathmandu to New Delhi was hijacked by militants believed to be 
from the Harakatul Mujahidin, a Kashmiri militant group backed not only by the ISI but 
also funded and trained in Afghanistan at Osama bin Laden‘s camps.5 The plane was 
diverted to Kandahar, where the Indian government eventually negotiated the release of the 
passengers taken hostage by freeing three senior Kashmiri militant leaders incarcerated in 
Indian jails. Although there was no direct evidence linking the ISI to the hijacking, the 
released men soon made their way to Pakistan where they were allowed to operate with 
impunity, even to the extent of one of them announcing the formation of a new militant 
outfit, the Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad), to continue the jihad in Kashmir. 
In January 2000, with concern mounting in Washington about increased India-Pakistan 
tensions following the hijacking incident, the Clinton administration despatched its first 
official delegation to Islamabad to meet Pakistan‘s new military ruler. Led by Assistant 
Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, the delegation pressed Musharraf and the ISI to assist in 
capturing a Saudi al-Qaeda operative named Abu Zubaydah, suspected of involvement in 
terrorist plots in Jordan and the US and allegedly working out of a secure base in Peshawar. 
In response, the ISI claimed to have no knowledge of Abu Zubaydah‘s whereabouts even 
though he was assisting the agency to recruit and vet Kashmiri militants that were then sent 
to al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.6 The US delegation also urged Musharraf to 
revisit the policy of fomenting militancy and terrorism in Kashmir, to which the latter 
responded by implicitly admitting his country‘s culpability after offering to use Pakistan‘s 
―influence‖ in Kashmir to lower tensions provided India reduced its growing troop numbers 
along the border.7 Musharraf did appear to show a greater willingness to move against bin 
Laden, however, and undertook to meet Mullah Omar in that context as soon as possible.8 
The lack of progress on major areas of concern to the US such as terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, democracy and human rights sparked a contentious debate within the Clinton 
administration on the advisability of including Pakistan in the itinerary for the president‘s 
proposed trip to South Asia in March 2000. Those advocating that Clinton give Pakistan a 
miss pointed to major security concerns arising out of the presence of al-Qaeda in 
neighbouring Afghanistan and cautioned that a meeting with Musharraf would be 
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interpreted as putting the ―presidential stamp of approval‖ on his military regime.9 They 
also maintained that Musharraf had done nothing on the al-Qaeda front or in reducing 
tensions with India to be rewarded with a presidential visit.10 On the other hand, those in 
favour of Clinton going to Pakistan argued that it was essential for Washington to maintain 
its channels of communication with Islamabad in order to have any possibility of 
influencing the latter‘s conduct, particularly in case India-Pakistan tensions continued to 
rise. By the winter of 1999-2000, US intelligence estimates had concluded that the chance 
of a full-scale war between India and Pakistan had increased after the nuclear tests and the 
Kargil conflict.11 
In the end, Clinton decided that there was enough at stake in Pakistan to override Secret 
Service warnings of probable assassination plots.12 His decision not to exclude Pakistan 
from his travel plans was driven by a number of considerations including lowering tensions 
over Kashmir; pushing for an early return to democratic rule; urging Musharraf not to 
execute Nawaz Sharif, who at the time was on trial for his life;13 and pressing for greater 
Pakistani cooperation against bin Laden.14 Although eventually deciding in favour of 
visiting Pakistan, Clinton left his Pakistani hosts in no doubt about their country‘s 
diminished status when it came to America‘s strategic preferences in the region. While the 
US president would spend a full five days in India, he allocated a mere five hours to his trip 
to Pakistan.15 
Bill Clinton‘s South Asian journey of March 2000 unambiguously showcased America‘s 
dramatic post-Cold War strategic realignment in the region. Clinton had already attained 
considerable popularity within India for his steadfast support of New Delhi‘s position 
during the Kargil conflict and earned particular approbation for virtually browbeating 
Pakistan into bringing that clash to an end. In the months preceding his visit to the 
subcontinent, he had earned further Indian goodwill by waiving a significant number of 
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nuclear-related sanctions on India whilst declining to do the same with respect to Pakistan.16 
Over the course of his five days in India - the first visit by an American president in twenty-
two years - Clinton received rapturous welcomes wherever he went, especially when he 
declared to his Indian audiences that their country was ―a leader, a great nation, which by 
virtue of its size, its achievements and its example, has the ability to shape the character of 
our time.‖17 Moreover, he affirmed that the US shared the Indian government‘s concerns 
about ―the course Pakistan is taking‖ and empathised with India‘s difficulties as ―a 
democracy bordered by nations whose governments reject democracy.‖18 
A senior State Department official in the Clinton administration described the president‘s 
visit to India as ―by any standard and in almost every respect, one of the most successful 
such trips ever.‖19 On the other hand, Clinton‘s subsequent stopover in Pakistan, the first 
trip by an American president in over thirty years, has justifiably been termed ―one of the 
strangest in presidential history.‖20 In marked contrast to India, where Clinton had at times 
broken security cordons to mingle and even dance with the locals, his short stay in Pakistan 
was governed by extreme security precautions that, coupled with the paucity of time 
available, precluded any meaningful interaction with ordinary citizens.21 In order to thwart 
possible terrorist attempts to attack Clinton‘s plane with surface-to-air missiles, a decoy 
plane with official markings painted on it arrived first carrying a presidential double. 
Clinton himself arrived behind the first plane in an unmarked aircraft and immediately left 
for his meeting with Musharraf. His motorcade travelled along deserted roads from which 
the public had been kept away; thus the only Pakistanis that the president saw were the 
masses of security personnel lining his route.22 
With Pakistani cooperation no longer a strategic imperative for the US, Clinton found 
himself at liberty to confront Musharraf over a range of contentious issues but placing 
particular focus on Pakistan‘s continuing links with the Taliban and al-Qaeda and its 
sponsorship of militancy in Kashmir. Once again, he urged Musharraf to use his influence 
with the Taliban to secure bin Laden‘s arrest. Although Musharraf agreed to cooperate with 
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covert intelligence operations against bin Laden,23 he emphasised his reluctance to do 
anything that might alienate the Taliban and stressed how difficult it was to negotiate with 
―people who believe that God is on their side.‖24 Musharraf also expressed a willingness to 
de-escalate tensions with India over Kashmir but ruled out any unilateral steps by Pakistan 
in that context. In response to Clinton‘s queries about a return to democracy, Musharraf 
declined to provide a definite timetable, arguing that if he did nominate an exact date, his 
political opponents would scuttle his reform agenda by simply waiting him out.25 
Following his inconclusive meeting with Musharraf, Clinton addressed the Pakistani people 
directly through the medium of a televised speech shown live across the country. Anxious 
not to jeopardise a visit that would lend a desperately needed measure of international 
legitimacy to his military rule, Musharraf had given in to the American president‘s 
unprecedented demand for a televised address. He probably regretted doing so after Clinton 
used his speech to convey a series of blunt messages to the military regime. Whilst sharing 
the disappointment of the Pakistani people in the failings of their previous democratic 
governments, Clinton pointed out that ―the answer to flawed democracy is not to end 
democracy, but to improve it.‖ He called upon Pakistan to intensify its efforts to defeat 
those inflicting terror, including by targeting embassies, an obvious reference to al-Qaeda 
and an implicit reminder to the military that it had not done enough to capture bin Laden. 
On the nuclear issue, Clinton urged Pakistan to be ―a leader for non-proliferation‖ by 
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996.  
Finally, and perhaps most significantly of all, Clinton unequivocally informed his Pakistani 
audience that Kashmir could not be resolved militarily and that ―no matter how great the 
grievance,‖ attacks on civilians across the border with India could not be tolerated. He also 
maintained that America ―cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir,‖ 
which could only be settled by Pakistan and India through dialogue, an unambiguous 
endorsement of India‘s traditional position on Kashmir that it was a bilateral issue and, ipso 
facto, an equally clear negation of Pakistan‘s projection of Kashmir as an internationally 
acknowledged dispute whose settlement was mandated by UN resolutions. Clinton‘s speech 
held out the promise of America‘s ―full economic and political partnership‖ if Pakistan 
overcame the ―difficult challenges‖ that he had outlined but issued a stark warning that a 
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continuing failure to meet those challenges carried the danger that Pakistan ―may grow even 
more isolated…moving even closer to a conflict no one can win.‖26 
In the aftermath of Clinton‘s visit, the US kept up its pressure on Pakistan to urgently revisit 
its Afghan policy. On a visit to Washington in April 2000, ISI head General Mahmud 
Ahmed was handed a verbal dressing down by Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering 
after unsuccessfully trying to convince him that bin Laden‘s status as an honoured guest of 
the Taliban made it very difficult for Pakistan to move against him. Pickering‘s brusque 
response was that the people who harboured those who killed Americans were ―our 
enemies‖ and that ―people who support those people will also be treated as our enemies‖ 
before ending with a warning to Pakistan ―not to put itself in that position.‖27 The threat was 
deemed serious enough by Ahmed to warn Mullah Omar in a subsequent visit to Kandahar 
that the bin Laden issue had to be resolved ―before it is too late‖ but there was no actual 
progress in that regard.28 Despite that, Pakistani support to the Taliban continued and, 
according to US government sources, attained an ―unprecedented‖ magnitude during the 
Taliban‘s summer offensive that year.29 
Notwithstanding its periodic issuance of threats and warnings, the Clinton administration‘s 
overall policies on Pakistan, the Taliban and al-Qaeda had little clarity of purpose, were 
plagued by indecisiveness and were consistently rendered ineffective by the divergent 
policy priorities of concerned US government departments. Clinton‘s failure to influence 
Pakistani behaviour on major US policy concerns stemmed primarily from the fact that, 
while wielding plenty of sticks, he had little to offer in the form of carrots. During his 
presidency, Pakistan became one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world and 
Clinton‘s inability or unwillingness to ease Congressional pressure on Islamabad meant that 
there was no real incentive for it to be more receptive to US demands.  
In his second term, in particular, Clinton failed to get the State Department and the CIA to 
pursue a coordinated approach to the region by putting aside their separate policy agendas. 
Whereas the State Department prioritised India-Pakistan relations and nuclear non-
proliferation, the CIA focused on bin Laden and al-Qaeda.30 At the same time, however, the 
CIA refused to back the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which it viewed with suspicion as 
an instrument of Russia and Iran. Thus, at the same time that the US warned Pakistan that a 
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complete Taliban takeover of Afghanistan would not serve Islamabad‘s interests, it also 
reassured its Pakistani interlocutors that it did not regard Massoud as a viable alternative 
and acknowledged that the Taliban were ―a feature of the Afghan political landscape‖ that 
would be ―part of any political settlement.‖31 
In October 2000, less than a month before presidential elections in the US, a suicide 
bombing attack on a US naval destroyer docked in the Yemeni port city of Aden killed 
seventeen American sailors. Although the US never directly blamed bin Laden for the 
attack, the attack was widely believed to be a macabre parting gift by bin Laden to Clinton 
as he stood on the cusp of completing his final term in office. On this occasion, however, 
Clinton decided against using retaliatory missile strikes, leaving it to the incoming 
Republican administration of George W. Bush to fashion an appropriate response. Before 
leaving office, however, Clinton did manage to get the UN to impose a fresh round of 
sanctions on the Taliban, including a complete arms embargo.32 His administration also 
conveyed its final recriminations to Pakistan, the Taliban‘s lone international supporter, that 
it was not doing enough on bin Laden and warned that the US would ―have to make some 
hard decisions‖ about Pakistan if it did not change course in Afghanistan.33 
Undeterred by the nebulous threats of an administration on its way out, Pakistan continued 
to provide substantial support to the Taliban, a policy that Musharraf justified as being ―in 
accordance with Pakistan‘s national interest,‖ which necessitated Afghanistan‘s Pashtun 
majority being kept ―on our side.‖34 Such comments further inflamed the sentiments of the 
Afghans, especially all those in opposition to the Taliban, including many Pashtuns 
themselves.35 Musharraf did, however, make one concession to Clinton, albeit on a different 
matter. Following months of behind-the-scenes diplomacy between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia 
and the US,36 former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who had been sentenced to life 
imprisonment after being found guilty on hijacking and terrorism charges, was granted a 
pardon and exiled to Saudi Arabia in December 2000 after forfeiting much of his 
considerable wealth and undertaking not to participate in politics for 21 years.37 
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Clinton‘s failure to get Musharraf to move decisively against bin Laden rested on the 
presumption that Pakistan exercised enough influence over the Taliban to bring about his 
arrest or at the very least his expulsion from Afghanistan. Yet, the Taliban, although clearly 
dependent on Pakistan‘s assistance and ever hungry to secure as much of it as possible, 
were anything but obedient clients of their patron. Ironically for Pakistan, the Taliban 
proved to be a more difficult client to manage than Pakistan itself had traditionally been for 
the US. Their consistent refusal to compromise over bin Laden was by no means the only 
instance of defiance not only of Pakistani directives but also those of their other patron, 
Saudi Arabia. Throughout their period in power, the Taliban declined to recognise the 
Durand Line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan and refused to 
abjure Afghan claims to portions of north-western Pakistan. Moreover, instead of curbing 
Pashtun nationalism, as the Pakistani military and the ISI had hoped, the Taliban sharpened 
it by giving it an Islamic character that began to exert a powerful impact on Pakistan‘s own 
Pashtuns.38 
In his memoirs, Musharraf maintained that, while there had been ―nothing wrong‖ with 
Pakistan‘s intentions in backing the Taliban against the ―anti-Pakistan‖ Northern Alliance, 
Islamabad failed to realise that ―once the Taliban had used us to get to power, we would 
lose influence over them.‖39 He acknowledged that Pakistan‘s relations with the Taliban 
were ―never smooth‖ and actually ―quite uncomfortable.‖40 Testifying to Pakistan‘s lack of 
control over the Taliban, he claimed that despite being their chief patron, Pakistan ―could 
only watch in horror‖ as the Taliban ―unleashed the worst abuses of human rights…under 
the cloak of their own peculiar interpretation of Islam…‖41 Yet, in spite of the many 
iniquities committed by the Taliban in the name of Islam and their frequent and often 
contemptuous dismissal of Pakistani attempts to moderate their behaviour, Musharraf and 
the ISI continued to provide them crucial support, even at great cost to Pakistan‘s own 
standing in the region as well as more generally within the international community.  
Although Musharraf himself was Westernised and secular in his upbringing and 
temperament and had no ideological affinity with the Taliban, he subscribed firmly to the 
notion that they remained Pakistan‘s best chance of attaining ‗strategic depth‘ in 
Afghanistan and, as a consequence, were deserving of continued support no matter how 
unpalatable their domestic policies might be. This reasoning placed the military and the ISI 
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at odds with the largely sidelined Foreign Office, which issued prescient warnings that by 
―riding the [Taliban] tiger,‖ Pakistan was pursuing policies that ―we know are never going 
to deliver and the eventual costs of which we also know will be overwhelming.‖42 Such 
cautions were dismissed by the ISI and its allies amongst Pakistan‘s Islamist parties, whose 
perception of the Taliban was ―grounded in religious naïveté‖ that saw them as devout, 
well-intentioned, and dedicated Islamic warriors imbued with the desire to bring peace to 
Afghanistan.43 
Even those within the military establishment with more realistic views about Afghanistan 
were generally supportive of the Taliban and argued that once they had settled into 
complete control over Afghanistan, they would be ―ripe to undergo an internal 
metamorphosis towards moderation.‖44 This reasoning was consistently employed with 
Western audiences in order to justify Pakistan‘s continued patronage of the Taliban but was 
found increasingly specious as the Taliban‘s policies made them the object of worldwide 
revulsion.45 However, the military and the ISI remained impervious not only to the force of 
global public opinion but also to Afghan voices raised against the Taliban, both within 
Afghanistan as well as abroad by the large Afghan diaspora. Thus, much of the goodwill 
that Pakistan had earned from ordinary Afghans for its resistance to the Soviet occupation 
and its housing of millions of refugees was frittered away. That goodwill should have been 
Pakistan‘s real measure of ‗strategic depth‘ in Afghanistan. By throwing its weight behind 
the Taliban, however, it ended up becoming the victim ―not only of its strategic vision, but 
of its own intelligence agencies.‖46 
II. Partners in Arms 
 
In view of the Pakistani military‘s historically better relations with Republican 
administrations in Washington, particularly during earlier instances of military rule, 
Musharraf and his coterie of generals would in all likelihood have regarded George W. 
Bush‘s controversial victory in the 2000 presidential election with a degree of optimism. 
However, such optimism would no doubt have also been tempered with a good deal of 
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caution. In stark contrast to his father George H.W. Bush, who was widely regarded as an 
expert on international issues, the younger Bush was an almost total neophyte when it came 
to foreign policy. During the election campaign, his frequent gaffes when confronted with 
questions involving international affairs had already made him the object of widespread and 
often amusing popular ridicule. Musharraf could not have failed to notice that when asked 
by an interviewer if he could name the man in charge of Pakistan, the best that Bush could 
come up with was ―General.‖47 Even more worrying than his ignorance about Pakistan, 
however, was the fact that his campaign had raised massive donations from well-heeled 
Indian-American businessmen, who were now likely to nudge him firmly in India‘s 
direction, even to the extent of forming a strategic partnership with New Delhi against a fast 
rising China.48 
The Bush administration‘s opening parleys with its Pakistani counterpart focused primarily 
on the issue of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Soon after Bush took office, Musharraf 
wrote him a confidential letter of congratulations that also attempted to make the case for 
improved ties between their two countries. In his response, Bush expressed a similar desire 
for better relations but linked them with greater Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan 
against bin Laden, whom he referred to as a ―direct threat to the United States‖ and urged 
Musharraf to ―use your influence with the Taliban‖ to bring the al-Qaeda leader ―to justice‖ 
as well as close down his network.49 At the same time, however, senior officials in the Bush 
administration such as Secretary of State Colin Powell realised that with a virtual plethora 
of sanctions still in place and no realistic chance of obtaining Congressional relief, inducing 
Pakistan to change its Afghan policy would be a very difficult task.50 
It is at least arguable if, by this stage, Pakistan even had sufficient influence over the 
Taliban to make them bend on the bin Laden issue. By refusing to surrender bin Laden after 
the Africa bombings in 1998, Mullah Omar had defied both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, his 
two leading patrons. Since then, the Taliban had become an international pariah and had 
been subjected to crippling sanctions. Instead of pushing them towards more moderate 
behaviour, however, such ostracism produced the opposite effect of making them even 
more bigoted and reactionary and enveloped them more closely in al-Qaeda‘s embrace. 
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Mullah Omar‘s relations with bin Laden had not always been cordial51 and at least until 
1998, he had seen the fugitive terrorist as a useful bargaining chip that could be employed 
to secure American recognition for his regime.52 However, the imposition of sanctions and 
the increasingly vociferous and sustained international criticism of the Taliban‘s domestic 
policies made Omar and other senior Taliban leaders more receptive to the puritanically 
dogmatic Salafi-Wahhabi ideology of bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs.53 
Bin Laden, in turn, openly encouraged the Taliban to be more extreme in their policies, 
since the more isolated they were, the greater would be their dependence on him. Al-
Qaeda‘s growing influence over the Taliban was clearly visible in Mullah Omar‘s decision 
in March 2001 to ignore impassioned pleas from countries across the world not to destroy 
two giant images of Buddha carved out of a cliff face in the city of Bamiyan, in central 
Afghanistan. Under pressure from the international community to intervene in the matter, 
Musharraf sent his interior minister to meet Mullah Omar and try to reason with him 
through recourse to verses from the Quran and instances from Islamic history that 
emphasised tolerance for other faiths.54 The Taliban leader ignored the entreaties of his 
Pakistani patron and went ahead with the demolition.55 
After investing so heavily in the Taliban and having closed its doors to all other options in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to fight a losing battle on their behalf internationally in 
trying to convince the world that their barbarous domestic policies were a transient 
aberration and that greater engagement with them on the part of the international 
community would inevitably moderate their conduct. Pakistani foreign minister Abdul 
Sattar peddled this argument in a meeting in Washington with Bush‘s national security 
advisor, Condoleezza Rice, in June 2001, just as twenty thousand Taliban troops including 
thousands of Pakistani militants were mounting yet another offensive against the Northern 
Alliance.56 Rice delivered a blunt rejoinder to Sattar that the US could not ignore the reality 
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that Pakistan was ―in bed with our enemies‖ and that it ―must drop the Taliban.‖57 Her 
―very tough message‖ was met with ―a rote, expressionless response.‖58 
On the whole, however, the Bush administration‘s overall approach towards Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attacks was hardly an improvement over its 
predecessor‘s and was characterised by a similar lack of urgency and the absence of a clear 
direction.59 For almost six months after Bush took office, the South Asia bureau of the State 
Department did not have a permanent head. Proposals coming from various directions about 
a transformed South Asia policy, including from the CIA‘s Counterterrorism Centre about 
the possibility of assisting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, piled up but were not 
acted upon.60 Also disregarded was a recommendation by the National Counterterrorism 
Coordinator, Richard Clarke, to split off all other issues in the bilateral relationship with 
Pakistan and focus exclusively on demanding that Pakistan ―move vigorously against 
terrorism‖ or, in other words, ―to push the Pakistanis to do before an al Qaeda attack what 
Washington would demand that they do after.‖61 
By the summer of 2001, as increasing evidence came to light of Pakistan‘s continued 
violation of UN resolutions prohibiting arms supplies and other material assistance to the 
Taliban62 and US intelligence issued numerous warnings of a potentially imminent al-Qaeda 
attack,63 Bush wrote again to Musharraf to solicit Pakistan‘s assistance against bin Laden. 
Since the missive contained no incentives that could ―open up diplomatic possibilities,‖ it 
merely became yet another futile attempt aimed by the US at ―registering its concerns,‖ to 
which Pakistan once again paid no heed.64 Contemptuous of UN sanctions against the 
Taliban, whom he proclaimed ―the dominant reality in Afghanistan,‖ Musharraf declared 
that the arms embargo on the Taliban was ―unjustified, discriminatory and will further 
escalate the war.‖65 Faced with continued Pakistani intransigence on the issue, the 
ponderously moving Bush administration finally decided to adopt a new policy direction in 
Afghanistan based on providing $125-200 million a year to arm the Northern Alliance 
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against the Taliban.66 However, the ―all-important issue‖ of how to handle Pakistan once 
aid starting flowing to the Taliban‘s opponents was left unresolved.67 
On September 9, 2001, just five days after the US had taken a policy decision to start 
arming the Northern Alliance in a bid to eventually topple the Taliban, Ahmed Shah 
Massoud was assassinated in a suicide attack conducted by two Tunisian al-Qaeda 
operatives posing as journalists who had waited for several days before finally being 
granted an interview with their quarry.68 Two days later came the devastating terrorist 
strikes in New York and Washington, the catalyst for what Bush would soon declare a 
global ―war on terrorism.‖ The Taliban might have controlled most of Afghanistan but 
Massoud‘s opposition to their rule had not flagged in the face of adversity and he continued 
to symbolise the last bastion of resistance to a complete Taliban takeover. His removal was 
clearly a central component of the 9/11 plot; bereft of Massoud‘s inspirational leadership, 
the Northern Alliance would be highly unlikely to withstand another Taliban offensive, 
thereby making it very difficult for the US to find allies in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11. 
In his memoirs, Musharraf has dedicated a whole chapter to the immediate aftermath of 
9/11 entitled ―One Day that Changed the World.‖69 While there is much debate over the 
degree to which the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, could truly be regarded as 
transformational on a global scale,70 what is beyond dispute is that those events triggered a 
fundamental turnaround in US-Pakistan relations and provided Musharraf a much needed 
―external circuit-breaker‖ in terms of arresting Pakistan‘s protracted economic decline as 
well as his own diplomatic isolation.71 With American strategic interests once again 
necessitating Pakistan‘s services, over a decade of estrangement ended virtually overnight 
to be replaced by mutual expressions of solidarity and cooperation in the pursuit of a shared 
objective of fighting terrorism. As they did in the 1980s, ―Afghanistan‘s tragedies‖ again 
became ―a boon for Pakistani dictatorships.‖72 Like Zia before him, who used the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan to transform himself from an international pariah to a frontline 
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ally against Communism, Musharraf seized the opportunity thrown up by 9/11 to again 
make America ―fall in love with a man in uniform‖ in Pakistan.73 
The Bush administration did not take long to assign guilt for what was the largest ever 
foreign attack on American soil, claiming almost 3,000 lives and, according to one estimate, 
inflicting long-term financial losses to the tune of $3.3 trillion.74 Just a day after the attacks, 
CIA director George Tenet informed Bush that the evidence against bin Laden and al-Qaeda 
was ―conclusive‖ and obtained presidential sanction for a massive covert action plan in 
Afghanistan worth $1 billion.75 In an address to the nation delivered in Congress a few days 
later, Bush confirmed that bin Laden was responsible for 9/11 and issued a series of non-
negotiable demands to the Taliban, chief amongst them being the surrendering of the al-
Qaeda leadership to the US and the closing down of all terrorist training facilities. A failure 
to comply, Bush warned, would cause the Taliban to share the fate of the terrorists. 
Moreover, in what was now proclaimed an open-ended ―war on terrorism,‖ Bush presented 
the world with a stark choice: ―Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. 
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.‖76 His message was not lost on 
Musharraf, who by that time had already made up his mind to ditch the Taliban and thrown 
in his lot with the US. 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Secretary of State Colin Powell informed Bush that 
whatever retaliatory action he took in Afghanistan would rest on Pakistani support. Upon 
being told by Bush to ―do what you have to do‖ in that regard, Powell and his deputy 
Richard Armitage drew up a list containing the following seven demands that Pakistan 
would have to meet:77 
 To stop al-Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for 
bin Laden; 
 To give the US blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary 
military and intelligence operations; 
 To provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other 
personnel to conduct operations against al-Qaeda; 
 To provide the US with intelligence information; 
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 To continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts; 
 To cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going 
to Afghanistan; and 
 If the evidence implicated bin Laden and al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
continued to harbour them, to break relations with the Taliban government.  
By chance, ISI chief General Mahmud Ahmed was in Washington on an official visit when 
the 9/11 attacks occurred. In a meeting with CIA director George Tenet just two days 
earlier, he had enthusiastically defended Mullah Omar as a man who desired only the best 
for the Afghan people. Moreover, he had recommended that the US try to bribe key Taliban 
officials into handing over bin Laden but, at the same time, made it clear that neither he nor 
the ISI would provide any assistance in that regard. Tenet found his Pakistani counterpart 
―immovable‖ when it came to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.78 The day after the attacks, General 
Ahmed was summoned to the State Department by Richard Armitage and given a stark 
ultimatum that Pakistan had to decide whether it was with the US or against it; this was a 
―black-and-white choice, with no grey.‖79 The threat was sufficiently menacing for 
Mahmud to immediately assure Armitage on Musharraf‘s behalf of Pakistan‘s ―unqualified 
support.‖80 
The US kept up the pressure on Pakistan through another blunt message, this time delivered 
directly to Musharraf by the American ambassador in Islamabad, Wendy Chamberlin, that 
the US-Pakistan relationship was ―at a turning point‖ after 9/11 and that Pakistan would 
have to discard ―diplo-speak‖ and decide once and for all if it was ―either with us or not 
with us.‖81 The ambassador ruled out dialogue with the Taliban and informed the ―visibly 
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taken aback‖ Pakistani president82 that ―action is now the only language that matters.‖ 
Musharraf saw the writing on the wall and quickly assured Chamberlin that ―we are with 
you in your action plan in Afghanistan.‖ The American action plan was revealed to Pakistan 
later that day during a follow-up meeting between Armitage and Mahmud. The ISI head 
was formally handed over the list of afore mentioned non-negotiable demands, which he 
then conveyed to Musharraf.83 
Just hours later, Powell called Musharraf to inform him - ―as one general to another‖ - that 
―the American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in this fight with the United 
States.‖84 In view of the Pakistani military‘s long-standing links with the Taliban, Powell 
had expected some resistance from his fellow general to the demand that those links now be 
severed. To his surprise, however, Musharraf immediately accepted all seven demands that 
had been presented to him.85 Following a subsequent meeting with his top military 
commanders, he gave the US ambassador further confirmation that both he and they 
unconditionally accepted America‘s diktat. At the same time, he did not omit to point out 
that his decision to align himself with the US would carry a substantial price domestically 
and that in order to ―counterbalance‖ it, he ―needed to show that Pakistan was benefitting 
from its decisions.‖86 
In other words, Pakistan needed assurance that its services in America‘s ―war on terror‖ 
would carry commensurate material rewards. The ambassador accordingly advised the State 
Department that Pakistan ―will need full US support as it proceeds with us.‖87 Even as it 
was issuing thinly veiled warnings of dire consequences if Pakistan did not side with the US 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the Bush administration had held out the assurance that 
―the right choice by Pakistan in this matter‖ could lead to ―bright prospects for a positive 
relationship with the US.‖88 Once Musharraf decided to make ―the right choice,‖ the stage 
was set for America and Pakistan to become patron and client once more.89 This was to be 
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an association spawned - as it was in the 1980s - by the march of events in Afghanistan, on 
whose war-ridden landscape the two countries would forge a symbiotic yet tempestuous 
relationship in which a shared strategic need would often exist uncomfortably with 
divergent strategic interests and endemic mutual mistrust.  
The swiftness with which Musharraf submitted to American pressure indicated his mortal 
fear, and indeed that of the military as a whole, that India would take advantage of the 
situation to have Pakistan declared a state sponsor of terrorism. Suspicions to that effect had 
been aroused in Islamabad after the Indians pre-empted their rivals by offering Washington 
bases and logistical support. For Musharraf, any reluctance on Pakistan‘s part to join the 
―war on terrorism‖ on America‘s side would inevitably lead to India being asked to perform 
the same role. The resultant Indo-US nexus would allow New Delhi a ―golden opportunity‖ 
to transform the existing situation in Kashmir, either by launching a war or by swinging 
international opinion in its favour.90 An even worse prospect for Pakistan in case it did not 
abandon its support to the Taliban was that the US would seek to destroy its nuclear 
weapons, a task in which, in Musharraf‘s estimation, India ―would have loved to assist the 
United States to the hilt.‖  
Anxious to prevent the US from turning towards India but also reluctant to abandon 
Pakistan‘s ‗strategic depth‘ against its arch-rival in Afghanistan, Musharraf found himself 
on the horns of a dilemma, one that he attempted to resolve through a two-pronged 
approach. His willingness to make Pakistan ―a frontline state again‖ in the service of US 
foreign policy objectives did not preclude him from launching a frantic, last-ditch effort to 
keep the Taliban in power.91 On his own initiative, he despatched ISI chief General 
Mahmud to Kandahar to warn Mullah Omar that he faced a stark choice between ―one man 
and his safe haven versus the well-being of 25 million citizens of Afghanistan.‖92 Mahmud 
subsequently informed Richard Armitage that he laid down a set of conditions before Omar, 
including the expulsion or extradition of bin Laden and thirteen of his top associates; the 
closing down of all terrorist training camps; and the opening up of suspected terrorist 
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training sites to international inspection. Mahmud claimed that the Taliban reaction was 
―not negative on all these points‖ and that their top leaders were engaged in ―deep 
introspection.‖93 Before leaving for a second meeting with the Taliban, he implored the US 
―not to act in anger‖ and advised that ―real victory will come in negotiations.‖94 The 
Taliban‘s elimination, Mahmud argued, would only cause Afghanistan to revert to 
warlordism. At the same time, however, he promised his American interlocutors that no 
matter what the outcome of his parleys with the Taliban, Pakistan ―stands behind you‖ and 
―will not flinch from a military effort.‖  
Mahmud‘s second meeting with Mullah Omar, in which he took with him a delegation of 
Pakistani clerics, was also inconclusive and before the end of September, Pakistan had 
withdrawn all diplomatic staff from Afghanistan.95 There was much speculation, however, 
about whether Mahmud, whose strong pro-Taliban sentiments were an open secret, had 
indeed warned Omar to accept the inevitable or whether he had instead encouraged him to 
remain defiant or, at the very least, been disinclined to apply much pressure. Mahmud‘s 
own testimony appears to suggest that his ―heart was not in the mission.‖96 In an interview 
given to the writer Shuja Nawaz, he maintained that he ―didn‘t try to persuade‖ Omar to act 
contrary to his convictions since, as a Muslim himself, he did not see the need to ―go 
against another Muslim.‖97 Moreover, the clerics sent ostensibly to put pressure on the 
Taliban included several at whose madrassas many of the senior Taliban leaders had been 
educated. According to details of the meeting leaked to the CIA, instead of making the 
Taliban see reason, the clerics ended up expressing solidarity with them.98 
In the lead up to Operation Enduring Freedom, the name given by the Bush administration 
to its impending military offensive against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the ISI under General 
Mahmud attempted to salvage some measure of its fast departing ‗strategic depth‘ in 
Afghanistan through pursuit of a double game in which cooperation with the US in some 
areas was balanced with continuing assistance to the Taliban. ISI fuel tankers and supply 
trucks continued to make their way into Afghanistan in violation of UN resolutions as well 
as Musharraf‘s own commitment to the Americans.99 Thousands of Pakistani volunteers, 
many of them seminary students, were allowed to cross over into Afghanistan to join the 
Taliban in yet another jihad. Furthermore, dozens of ISI officers and hundreds of Pakistani 
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paramilitary troops stayed inside Afghanistan to help the Taliban fortify their defences 
before the start of the American bombing campaign. A small team of serving and retired ISI 
officers was sent in to lend their advisory expertise to the Taliban just days before the start 
of the war and in violation of Musharraf‘s own orders.100 
In a bid to consolidate his own hold over the army as well as in response to increasing 
American pressure to rein in the ISI, Musharraf removed Mahmud and two other senior 
generals known for their Islamist sympathies and their opposition to the post-9/11 
alignment with the US. Ironically, all three men had been instrumental in effecting the coup 
that had brought Musharraf to power.101 Their sacking was confirmed just hours after 
Operation Enduring Freedom went into effect on October 7, 2001, and earned Musharraf 
the immediate approval of the US, which saw the removal of Mahmud, in particular, as ―a 
final measure‖ of Musharraf‘s ―determination to aid America in rooting out al Qaeda.‖102 
Mahmud‘s replacement, Lieutenant General Ehsan-ul-Haq, had previously served as the 
head of Military Intelligence and was regarded as a close confidant of Musharraf, who now 
tasked him to terminate, or at least drastically reduce, ISI support to the Taliban. Ehsan 
responded by disbanding two major units of the ISI with long-standing links to Islamist 
militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.103 For an organization that had been heavily involved 
with such elements for decades, the limited purge ordered by Musharraf was not sufficient 
to bring about a complete change of mindset and some ISI officers with strong religious 
convictions and powerful anti-American sentiments continued to view themselves as ―more 
Taliban than the Taliban.‖104 At the same time, however, Musharraf‘s removal of Mahmud 
and his subsequent efforts to sideline Taliban sympathisers within the ISI‘s rank-and-file 
were critical steps in terms of convincing the Americans of his bona fides in the war on 
terrorism.  
Having strengthened his position within the military by removing those likely to obstruct 
his new pro-US agenda and heartened by the absence of large-scale and sustained protests 
against his U-turn at home, Musharraf proceeded to lend valuable and substantial support 
towards the success of Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistan made two-thirds of its 
airspace available for the US and its coalition partners and provided five airbases/airfields 
whilst agreeing, at the same time, to let coalition planes land anywhere in an emergency. In 
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the year following the commencement of the war, a total of 57,800 sorties were launched 
from or through Pakistan, which provided fuel amounting to 400,000 litres a day for 
coalition aircraft and other US forces operating from Pakistani bases. The US was also 
permitted to install extensive radar facilities at three Pakistani airfields, allowing for 
coverage of the entire Pakistani airspace.105 
Although it declined to provide ground troops to support the American-led invasion, 
Pakistan initially deputed 115,000 regular and paramilitary troops along its borders with 
Afghanistan and Iran to capture fleeing members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Moreover, it 
allowed the US to station some 1,100 US forces on its soil for the duration of the war, 
including US Special Ops and CIA paramilitary teams.106 The Pakistani air force and navy 
did not lag behind the army in providing support to their US counterparts; while the former 
provided its airfields and bases and deployed radars, the latter facilitated the ―largest 
amphibious operations in size, duration and depth‖ conducted by the US Marine Corps 
since the Korean War.107 
In total, the US made 2,160 requests to Pakistan in connection with Afghanistan-related 
operations between September 2001 and October 2002 of which action was completed on 
2,008 and was in progress on the remainder. The cost to Pakistan‘s economy for 
multifarious services in the ―war against terrorism‖ was estimated at $10 billion.108 
Musharraf did not immediately put a price tag on those services and, indeed, for several 
months after the commencement of the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan provided its 
substantial support ―without any established repayment mechanism [author‘s italics].‖109 
Such apparent self-abnegation stemmed from recognition by Pakistani decision-makers that 
any tough bargaining by them ―at a time of extraordinary gravity‖ would ―detract from the 
quality of a gesture that was considered both inevitable and in Pakistan‘s national 
interest.‖110 
Pakistan‘s reluctance to seek material rewards for its role in facilitating the US invasion of 
Afghanistan did not dissuade the Bush administration from unilaterally extending concrete 
expressions of its appreciation. Nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan were lifted within 
days of 9/11 on the grounds that their continuation ―would not be in the national security 
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interests of the United States.‖111 This was followed by the passage of a new law that 
allowed the president to waive the remaining sanctions on Pakistan provided he could 
certify that ―making foreign assistance available facilitates democratization in that country 
and helps the United States in its battle against international terrorism.‖112 
The path was now cleared for Bush to provide a $1 billion package of direct budgetary and 
balance of payments support, including a $673 million grant.113 The US also agreed to 
reschedule $379 million out of a total bilateral debt of $2.7 billion, thereby preventing 
Pakistan from falling in arrears in terms of debt servicing, a key requirement for further 
assistance.114 In addition, Washington helped Islamabad secure similar debt rescheduling 
agreements with other major lenders such as Japan and the European Union and supported 
the approval of fresh loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.115 
The lifting of sanctions and resumption of American economic aid provided much needed 
breathing room to Pakistan‘s listless economy, which at the time was averaging only 2.5 per 
cent annual growth and, moreover, was left with a mere $1.5 billion in foreign exchange 
reserves.116 Apart from the fiscal benefits accruing from American economic assistance, 
Musharraf saw the extension of such patronage as evidence that his regime was no longer 
regarded as an international pariah. High-level officials from the US and other major 
international players dutifully made their way to Islamabad in the months preceding 9/11 to 
commend Musharraf for his decision to stand in the frontline of the ―war against terrorism.‖  
Whilst such developments were no doubt welcome ones for Musharraf, what he was really 
looking for from the US was a ―strategic tradeoff‖ whereby in exchange for aligning itself 
with Washington‘s global anti-terror coalition, Islamabad would secure American backing 
for the protection of its core strategic interests.117 For Musharraf, those interests included 
the installation of a new government in Kabul that was friendly to Pakistan and accurately 
reflected Afghanistan‘s ethnic composition; in other words, the majority Pashtuns should 
have representation in proportion to their numbers. Another major strategic concern for 
Pakistan was to prevent its support to militancy in Kashmir from being tarred with the 
increasingly broad sweep of America‘s anti-terror brush. Put more simply, Musharraf 
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wanted the US to exclude the Kashmiri ―freedom struggle‖ from its ―crackdown on regional 
terrorism,‖ thereby allowing Pakistan to continue pursuing jihad in Kashmir even as it 
undertook to discontinue jihad in Afghanistan.118 A final strategic interest for Pakistan was 
to block any international effort directed against its nuclear programme or its growing 
arsenal of ballistic missiles.119 
As American bombs with devastating payloads began to rain down on the poorly fortified 
positions of the Taliban, Musharraf desperately tried to secure Washington‘s support for 
Pakistan‘s attempts to shape a post-Taliban Afghanistan. At the very least, in exchange for 
the support he was providing, he demanded to be involved in any future US policymaking 
concerning Afghanistan and wrote to Bush to warn him that Pakistan would not accept a 
Northern Alliance government in Kabul and that Pashtuns needed to be fully represented.120 
In line with that argument, he began to push the notion of splitting off ―moderate‖ Taliban 
from the hardliners and making them an integral part of any future power-sharing 
arrangement. For a time, the Bush administration appeared to buy Musharraf‘s argument 
that there were ―many moderate elements within the Taliban community.‖121 At a press 
conference in Islamabad shortly after the start of the war, Colin Powell opined that to the 
extent the Taliban were ―willing to participate in the development of a new Afghanistan 
with everybody being represented,‖ then the US would ―have to listen to them or at least 
take them into account.‖122 
With the world‘s most powerful country attacking one of its weakest, the short-term 
outcome of Operation Enduring Freedom was never really in doubt, even though an initial 
delay in dislodging the Taliban had led to speculation that the US might have another 
Vietnam-like ―quagmire‖ on its hands.123 Facing relentless American aerial bombardment, 
deprived of Pakistan‘s logistical support and harried by an increasingly assertive Northern 
Alliance suddenly awash in CIA dollars, the Taliban resistance collapsed in several key 
cities in northern and central Afghanistan and retreated to its native Pashtun strongholds in 
the south. For the US, the speedy collapse of the Taliban obviated the need to determine 
whether or not moderate elements existed within them who would be amenable to parting 
ways with Mullah Omar and other hardliners. Instead, the focus was now on ensuring a 
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complete Taliban defeat through efforts by the CIA to activate anti-Taliban Pashtun 
warlords in the south.124 
In his first meeting with Bush at a time when the Taliban were on the run, Musharraf 
labelled the Northern Alliance ―a bunch of tribal thugs‖ who wanted to capture all of 
Afghanistan. He also voiced a ―deep fear‖ that America would once again abandon Pakistan 
once its interests in the ―war on terrorism‖ had been secured.125 In response, Bush claimed 
that he fully understood Pakistan‘s concerns about the Northern Alliance and, on the 
question of abandoning Pakistan, asked Musharraf to inform his countrymen that ―the 
president of the United States looked you in the eye and told you we wouldn‘t do that.‖126 
Finally, regarding Musharraf‘s demand that the rapidly advancing Northern Alliance forces 
not be allowed to enter Kabul, Bush undertook to ―encourage our friends to head 
south…but not into the city of Kabul.‖127 Just two days later, however, Northern Alliance 
troops under the command of General Mohammad Fahim, a key lieutenant of Ahmed Shah 
Massoud, entered Kabul after massive American aerial bombardment on the Taliban‘s 
defensive positions outside the city had prompted them to abandon it without putting up a 
fight.  
The impassioned cries of ―death to Pakistan‖128 issuing from jubilant crowds in Kabul 
celebrating the fall of the Taliban were grim reminders to Musharraf and the ISI that with 
the Northern Alliance now in control of the capital, their ―worst nightmare‖129 had come 
true. What made the fall of Kabul even harder to swallow for Pakistan was that the US 
allowed it to happen despite Musharraf having received assurances from Bush to the 
contrary. In fact, following the triumphant entry of the Northern Alliance into the city, 
unnamed Pakistani military sources issued bitter complaints through the local media that 
US special forces had been directing the offensive on Kabul and that American military 
power had ―handed Afghanistan to Pakistan‘s worst enemies in that country.‖130 
Bush‘s volte face on the issue of handing over Kabul to the Northern Alliance was a clear 
indicator to Musharraf and the ISI that the post-9/11 situation would not be a repeat of the 
1980s. On this occasion, Washington would not defer to Islamabad on all matters affecting 
Afghanistan and nor would it necessarily operate through the ISI to attain its objectives in 
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that country. At the same time, however, Washington was not prepared to disregard 
Pakistan‘s interests in Afghanistan to an extent where it might imperil Musharraf‘s 
domestic survival and, by extension, jeopardise the continuation of Islamabad‘s services in 
the ―war on terrorism.‖ Thus, even as it permitted the Northern Alliance to take Kabul, the 
Bush administration allowed Pakistani planes to airlift to safety hundreds of ISI personnel, 
paramilitary forces and Pakistani volunteers holed up with Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in 
the northern town of Kunduz, which had been besieged by the Northern Alliance and was 
under massive American bombardment.  
In response to a personal request by Musharraf, who warned that the potential killing of 
hundreds and possibly thousands of captured Pakistani military operatives would bring 
about his own downfall, Bush agreed to secretly allow an air corridor through which 
Pakistani air force planes operated multiple flights over several days.131 An unspecified 
number of people, allegedly including high-ranking Taliban and al-Qaeda members, were 
evacuated to Pakistan. The Kunduz airlift gave Musharraf and the ISI the impression that 
the US, although clearly not as indulgent of Pakistan as it was during the anti-Soviet jihad, 
nevertheless placed enough of a premium on its post-9/11 strategic importance to discreetly 
look the other way as it pursued a double game in Afghanistan and concurrently continued 
its jihad in Kashmir. 
With the Taliban in disarray, the US gave the United Nations the go-ahead to convene an 
international conference in Bonn to choose a provisional government for Afghanistan. All 
major Afghan factions except the Taliban were invited to participate in the Bonn 
deliberations.132 After several days of hard bargaining, an agreement was hammered out by 
which Hamid Karzai, an anti-Taliban Pashtun tribal notable from Kandahar, was chosen as 
chairman of an interim administration.133 Shortly thereafter, the Taliban surrendered 
Kandahar to local tribal leaders including Karzai, heralding the end of a remarkably 
expeditious campaign in which the US had managed in less than three months to remove the 
Taliban from power. At the same time, however, Washington‘s failure to capture or kill the 
top Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership left a major question mark on the actual extent and 
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durability of its apparent victory in Afghanistan. Mullah Omar and his senior associates 
lived to fight another day by fleeing across the border into Pakistan. Similarly, Osama bin 
Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri were also able to evade their American and Afghan pursuers 
from their hideout in the Tora Bora mountains near Jalalabad and find refuge in Pakistan‘s 
tribal belt adjoining Afghanistan.134 
Around the same time that the US was mounting its failed attempt to finish off bin Laden 
and al-Qaeda in the Battle of Tora Bora, it had to simultaneously contend with an alarming 
spike in tensions between India and Pakistan following a major terrorist attack on the Indian 
parliament in New Delhi. India immediately placed responsibility for the attack on two 
Pakistan-based, Kashmir-centric extremist groups, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (Militia of the 
Pure) and the Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad). Moreover, it directly blamed the 
ISI for sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir and ordered a massive mobilisation of some 
800,000 troops along the border with Pakistan.135 Much to the chagrin of the US, Musharraf 
diverted most of the troops deployed along the western border with Afghanistan towards the 
east in order to ward off a potential Indian attack, leaving behind only 6,000 regular army 
personnel along with 40,000 paramilitary forces.136 Most US policymakers at the time 
believed that the Pakistani redeployment ―undercut whatever possibility existed of halting 
the passage of fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives.‖137 
Through his dramatic U-turn against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Musharraf had hoped to 
earn enough American gratitude to be allowed to continue supporting militancy in Kashmir, 
just as Zia-ul-Haq had cashed in on his alignment with US interests in Afghanistan during 
the 1980s to expand Pakistan‘s nuclear programme. On this occasion, however, Musharraf 
failed to comprehend the global paradigm shift that had occurred after 9/11 whereby the 
international community in general and the US in particular now claimed to have ―zero 
tolerance‖ for all manifestations of Islamist extremism and expected Pakistan to abandon its 
militant proxies, be they in Afghanistan or Kashmir.138 Shortly after the attack on the Indian 
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parliament, Bush urged Musharraf to act against the alleged perpetrators by closing down 
their camps, freezing their assets and arresting their leaders.139 
Under sustained American pressure, Musharraf executed another seemingly momentous U-
turn. In a televised address to the nation on January 12, 2002, he banned five extremist 
outfits including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Muhammad and declared that no 
organisation would henceforth be allowed to ―indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir,‖ 
even though he also affirmed that ―Kashmir runs in our blood‖ and that ―no Pakistani can 
afford to sever links‖ with it.140 Washington welcomed Musharraf‘s pledge and Bush 
invited his Pakistani counterpart to the White House the following month to applaud the 
―great courage and vision‖ that had enabled Musharraf to realise that ―his nation cannot 
grow peacefully if terrorists are tolerated or ignored in his country, in his region, or in the 
world.‖141 As an immediate reward, the US announced $300 million as compensation for 
Pakistan‘s role in facilitating US military operations in Afghanistan142 and another $220 
million in debt relief.143 
In his meeting with Musharraf, Bush had hailed the former‘s commitment to ―banning the 
groups that practice terror, closing their offices and arresting the terrorists themselves.‖144 
However, it soon became clear that Musharraf had no intention of fulfilling that 
commitment in letter and spirit. Scores of Kashmir-centred militants rounded up in the 
immediate aftermath of Musharraf‘s speech were quietly released just weeks later and the 
terrorist outfits that had been proscribed continued to operate freely after simply changing 
their names.145 Indian and Pakistani forces remained mobilised and the clouds of war again 
descended over the subcontinent in May after another deadly terrorist attack in Kashmir by 
Pakistan-based militants.  
Deeply concerned by the increasingly likely prospect of a war between two nuclear-armed 
states, the Bush administration embarked upon a process of crisis management that placed 
pressure on both sides to de-escalate the crisis. The turning point came in the form of a 
pledge secured by Richard Armitage from Musharraf that he would do his utmost to 
                                                          
139
 Dov S. Zakheim, A Vulcan’s Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of 
Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 114. 
140
 ―In Musharraf‘s Words: ‗A Day of Reckoning,‘‖ New York Times, January 12, 2002. 
141
 ―The President‘s News Conference With President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, February 13, 2002,‖ 
The American Presidency Project, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63820 
142
 Zakheim, A Vulcan’s Tale, 117. 
143
 ―US praises Musharraf‘s stance,‖ BBC, February 15, 2002, accessed July 19, 2015, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1821866.stm 
144
 ―The President‘s News Conference With President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan.‖ 
145
 Seth Mydans, ―Musharraf Treading Gently Against Pakistani Militants,‖ New York Times, April, 28, 
2002. 
188 
 
―permanently‖ interdict infiltration across the Line of Control.146 In October 2002, after ten 
months of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation involving up to a million troops, the crisis ended 
after India called off its military operation in Kashmir.147 
III. Musharraf’s Double Game 
 
Even though the US had placed pressure on Pakistan to end its support to militancy in 
Kashmir, Musharraf was aware that for the US, the fight against al-Qaeda outweighed all 
other concerns. To that end, Washington required extensive and prolonged military and 
intelligence cooperation from Islamabad since at least a few thousand al-Qaeda operatives 
including its top leadership had obtained sanctuary in Pakistan, partly in the lawless tribal 
areas bordering Afghanistan but also in a number of major urban centres. In the estimation 
of the Bush administration, therefore, it was Pakistan, and not Afghanistan, that was the 
new frontline in its ―war against terrorism.‖ Musharraf and his military planners decided to 
exploit the salience placed by Washington on confronting al-Qaeda by adopting a dual 
policy whereby they would reap the material benefits of targeting al-Qaeda and its local 
affiliates, whom they now regarded as a major threat to the Pakistani state, but would 
concurrently maintain their links with the Taliban and the Kashmir-centric militant groups.  
In the first few years after 9/11, Pakistani security agencies collaborated closely with their 
American counterparts in rounding up hundreds of al-Qaeda members, including the alleged 
mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and prominent operatives such 
as Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Abu Faraj al-Libi. The bulk of the arrests took 
place in major cities including Faisalabad, Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, forcing al-
Qaeda in turn to abandon their urban hideouts and fall back to their original base within the 
forbidding environs of Pakistan‘s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, where they had first 
sought refuge after the fall of the Taliban. Musharraf also submitted to US demands to 
investigate and crack down on links between al-Qaeda and two Pakistani nuclear scientists 
with whom it had been engaged in the early stages of planning for manufacturing a nuclear 
device.148 
While willing to go after al-Qaeda in Pakistan‘s cities, Musharraf was reluctant to target its 
much stronger presence in the largely autonomous and predominantly Pashtun tribal belt 
bordering Afghanistan, where the writ of the Pakistani state had always been very 
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limited.149 Referred to as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the highly 
weaponised and militantly conservative border region had formed the frontline in the joint 
CIA-ISI covert war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.150 In an ironic twist, it 
had now become the principal theatre of a global conflict between the US and many of the 
same elements that Washington had sent into battle against the Soviets in the 1980s. With 
much of Pakistan‘s regular army stationed on the eastern front during the standoff with 
India, thousands of foreign militants from a wide range of ethnicities - Arabs, Chechens, 
Uighurs, Uzbeks and others - found easy access to the poorly governed FATA, where they 
were welcomed and provided sanctuary on the bases of Pashtun tribal customs, a shared 
goal of defeating the US in Afghanistan and, at least in some cases, substantial financial 
inducements.151 
FATA also became a haven for operatives of Pakistani sectarian and militant groups 
outlawed by Musharraf in 2002. Despite the ban, the military establishment continued to 
view retention of proxies as an essential condition for the fulfilment of Pakistan‘s 
preeminent strategic objective of countering India‘s conventional military superiority and 
preventing it from becoming a regional hegemon. Thus the ISI had facilitated the re-
emergence of most of the proscribed groups under new names.152 At the same time, 
however, a noticeable improvement in relations with India, marked by the inauguration in 
early 2004 of a formal peace process and the launch of regular back-channel bilateral 
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negotiations, prompted Musharraf to restrain home-grown militant groups, most of which 
were operating in Kashmir. Cross-border infiltration by militants into Kashmir declined 
appreciably by 2006-7 but instead of completely dismantling the militant architecture, the 
ISI effectively purchased their quiescence by providing them food and lodging and even 
keeping some on a regular retainer.153 Thus the aim was to ―rein in, not dismantle, militant 
groups,‖ which were kept in reserve to either be ―demobilized or reengaged‖ based on 
regional security imperatives.154 A sizeable number of Kashmir-centred Pakistani militants, 
however, predominantly from Punjab and referred to as the Punjabi Taliban, refused to hang 
up their boots and drifted off to FATA where some joined the Taliban insurgency in 
Afghanistan while others teamed up with al-Qaeda and its tribal and foreign allies holed up 
in the tribal belt to train their guns on the Pakistani state.155 
Even as al-Qaeda set up its new headquarters in FATA‘s South Waziristan agency, 
Musharraf resisted calls by the US to send in ground forces to crush it, fearing that any 
incursion by the Pakistani army into a region where it had not had a major presence for over 
five decades would spark a rebellion by heavily armed tribals with potentially devastating 
consequences for the military as well as his own regime.156 However, under intense 
American pressure to go after al-Qaeda‘s top leaders and its affiliated militants engaged in 
mounting cross-border attacks on US forces in Afghanistan, Musharraf eventually gave in 
and in early 2002, sent the Pakistan army into FATA to prevent the ingress of al-Qaeda 
operatives and their local and foreign allies escaping US operations across the border in 
Afghanistan. However, major ―search-and destroy‖ operations were launched only in the 
spring of 2004, after continuing attacks on US forces in Afghanistan had prompted 
Washington to threaten to send in its own troops into FATA if Pakistan did not move more 
proactively against the militants.157 Although the US did not carry out that threat, it did 
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commence missile strikes on militant targets in FATA by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), commonly known as drones.158 
By this time, Musharraf was already less inclined towards further foot-dragging on the 
issue. In December 2003, he survived two assassination attempts within less than a 
fortnight, the second of which was a suicide attack carried out by two bombers who had 
both been trained in al-Qaeda-run camps in South Waziristan.159 The attacks arrived on the 
heels of a fatwa or religious edict passed by Ayman al Zawahiri calling for Musharraf‘s 
ouster160 and provided the Pakistani ruler with graphic evidence of the terrorist backlash 
that he now confronted.161 His response was to send in an army trained to fight a 
conventional war with India into the uncharted waters of a counter-insurgency campaign 
against a battle-hardened, well-resourced and ideologically motivated foe. Between 2004 
and 2006, the Pakistani army mounted a series of operations in the two Waziristan agencies 
in which it encountered fierce resistance and sustained heavy losses. It retaliated through 
indiscriminate and excessive force, including the use of heavy artillery and helicopter 
gunships. Since these were far from precision strikes, they caused significant collateral 
damage and, combined with arbitrary arrests and intrusive search operations, only served to 
inflame local sentiments against the government and provide a powerful recruiting tool to 
the militants.162 
With the conflict gaining in intensity and the morale of his troops sagging under the weight 
of growing casualties, Musharraf sought to appease the militants through a succession of 
peace deals with an assortment of militant leaders in both agencies of Waziristan. However, 
the carrot-and-stick policy of heavy-handed military operations interspersed with short-
lived negotiated settlements invariably based on humiliating concessions by the government 
was neither able to pacify the region nor establish the government‘s writ within it. Instead, 
                                                          
158
 The first known US drone strike in FATA occurred in June 2004 and took out Nek Muhammad, a 
prominent militant leader from South Waziristan with whom the Pakistan military made the first of its 
several ill-fated peace deals. Such strikes, which were never officially acknowledged by Washington, 
were used sparingly primarily because Bush wished to avoid embarrassing his Pakistani counterpart who, 
notwithstanding frequent public denunciations of the strikes as a violation of national sovereignty, was 
secretly coordinating them with Washington. See Jon Boone and Peter Beaumont, ―Pervez Musharraf 
admits permitting ―a few‖ US drone strikes in Pakistan,‖ Guardian, April 12, 2013. 
159
 The attacks were committed by two different cells belonging to the same terrorist group. Although 
headed by senior al-Qaeda planners and manned primarily by members of the banned Jaish-e-
Muhammad, its rank-and-file also included serving Pakistani army and air force personnel deeply 
resentful of Musharraf‘s pro-US policies. See Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 245-263. 
160
 Peter Bergen, ―War of Error,‖ New Republic, October 15, 2007, accessed July 19, 2015, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/war-error 
161
 Although the first attack, which involved a remote-controlled bombing of a bridge upon which 
Musharraf‘s cavalcade was passing, did not result in any fatalities, the twin suicide bombing claimed 
fourteen lives, injured forty-six people and caused widespread destruction of infrastructure in the vicinity. 
Salman Masood, ―Pakistani Leader Escapes Attempt at Assassination,‖ New York Times, December 26, 
2003. 
162
 International Crisis Group Asia Report N°125, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. 
192 
 
it contributed in widening the scale of the insurgency and making much of FATA a hotbed 
of violent extremism wherein the tribal militants providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda and the 
Afghan Taliban became a powerful force in their own right, one that sought to replicate in 
Pakistan the policies enforced by the Taliban in Afghanistan during their period in power.  
By 2006, the Talibanisation of FATA was well under way, with what were by then known 
as the Pakistani Taliban effectively running a parallel government in the two Waziristans 
and expanding their presence not only in other agencies in FATA but also in the settled 
districts of the NWFP.163 Each successive peace accord with the government gave the 
militants increasing political space to implement ―Taliban-style administrative and judicial 
structures‖ in FATA.164 The traditional dispute mechanism institution of the jirga (assembly 
of tribal notables) was formally banned and pro-government tribal elders were killed or 
forced to flee.165 Aggrieved parties had to seek relief from the Taliban representative in 
their village, who ―performed the functions of police officer, administrator, and judge.‖166 
Reminiscent of the anachronistic rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the militants attacked 
music, video and CD stores, closed down barbershops and destroyed schools, especially 
those for girls.167 Even as Musharraf denied Pakistan‘s alarming slide towards 
Talibanisation before his American interlocutors,168 his own security agencies issued grave 
warnings of a dramatic surge in militant influence not only in FATA but increasingly in 
NWFP‘s settled areas and urged ―swift and decisive action‖ to confront the ―parallel 
authority‖ enjoyed by the Pakistani Taliban.169 
Through his peace deals with the militants, Musharraf had hoped to ward off a domestic 
terrorist backlash by diverting their attention exclusively towards combating US forces and 
their coalition partners in Afghanistan. From 2006 onwards, FATA indeed became a crucial 
base for the Afghan Taliban from which to plan their insurgent attacks inside Afghanistan 
and in which to seek refuge after executing them. In the wake of the Miramshah peace 
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agreement of September 2006 in North Waziristan between the Musharraf regime and the 
Taliban, cross-border infiltration of militants into Afghanistan increased by 300 per cent.170 
However, a fundamentally contradictory policy based on a deeply flawed distinction 
between ―good Taliban‖ and ―bad Taliban‖ could not possibly prevent FATA-based 
extremism from spreading its tentacles into Pakistan proper.171 Musharraf and the ISI clung 
to the misplaced conviction that they could manipulate militant outfits by promising 
incentives or threatening reprisals and ―never really grasped the extent to which the 
militancy in FATA had turned inward against the Pakistani state.‖172 In the meantime, 
FATA became the epicentre of global terrorism with several major post-9/11 terror plots 
around the world either planned or inspired by al-Qaeda having some connection with 
Pakistan‘s lawless tribal wasteland.173 
Musharraf‘s last two years in office saw Pakistan engulfed in the flames of a vicious 
terrorist onslaught which claimed thousands of lives and made suicide bombings an 
everyday occurrence in a country with barely any experience of them before 9/11.174 
Terrorist attacks around the country increased by an astronomical 746 per cent between 
2005 and 2008, Musharraf‘s last year in office.175 Similarly, suicide attacks jumped from 7 
in 2006 to 56 in 2007 and 63 in 2008.176 Militants who had for long been nurtured by the 
military as strategic assets now turned upon their benefactors, who appeared to have no 
answer to the jihadist genie that they had themselves spawned. Baitullah Mehsud, a militant 
leader from South Waziristan with close ties to al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, became 
the Pakistani military‘s chief terrorist bugbear. In February 2005, the army had concluded a 
peace deal with Mehsud that effectively left him in control of parts of South Waziristan 
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occupied by his fighters without requiring him to surrender foreign militants or to explicitly 
renounce cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan.177 By 2007, he had broadened his 
support base to the extent of carving out a virtual ―independent Taliban mini-state‖ in South 
Waziristan, from which he would soon unleash terrorist mayhem throughout Pakistan.178 
Right from the outset of Pakistan‘s enlistment as a frontline American ally in the ―war 
against terrorism,‖ Musharraf‘s relative willingness to go after al-Qaeda stood in stark 
contrast to his consistent reluctance to target its Taliban comrades. While the crackdown on 
al-Qaeda netted a significant number of major operatives, not a single important member of 
the Taliban hierarchy was captured and handed over to the US.179 Instead, Mullah Omar and 
thousands of his followers were allowed safe entry into Pakistan, not just to lick their 
wounds but to have a base from which to regain their strength and plot their return. 
Although they had received a fearful pounding that had left them demoralised and 
dispirited, they had by no means been vanquished and were fortunate in that their senior 
leadership had come out of the war almost completely intact and with a secure sanctuary in 
Pakistan.180 
Mullah Omar himself was widely believed to have been resettled by the ISI in the city of 
Quetta in Balochistan, where he soon put together a new Taliban shura or consultative body 
to reorganise the resistance to the American occupation, starting off with the four southern 
Afghan provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul.181 In eastern Afghanistan and 
in Pakistan‘s adjoining tribal areas, the reorganization was carried out by groups allied to 
the Taliban, most notably the network headed by Jalaluddin Haqqani, the formidable 
veteran mujahidin commander who had later thrown in his lot with the Taliban, serving as a 
minister in their cabinet as well as overall military commander of Taliban forces against the 
American invasion in 2001. Still close to the ISI as well as al-Qaeda, Haqqani relocated his 
network to the Pakistan tribal agency of North Waziristan from where he began to oversee 
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operations but also, on account of age and physical infirmities, increasingly making way for 
his son Sirajuddin to take over the group‘s day-to-day management.182 
By early 2002, the Taliban could also count on the support of their old foe Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, whose forces they had routed in 1996, forcing him into exile in Iran. Hekmatyar 
had been a vocal critic of the American invasion as well as of the Karzai regime that the US 
installed and his verbal broadsides against the new dispensation in Kabul led to his 
expulsion from Iran.183 After secret talks with his former ISI patrons in Dubai,184 he 
returned to the familiar surrounds of Peshawar to make common cause with the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda against the Kabul government and the forces of its international allies, although he 
never formally merged his own party, the Hizb-i-Islami, with either.185 The CIA made an 
attempt to assassinate its one-time favourite mujahidin leader through a missile strike on a 
suspected hideout but Hekmatyar survived and coordinated strikes inside Afghanistan with 
the Taliban from his base in a large refugee camp on the outskirts of Peshawar.186 Even 
after the US State Department designated Hekmatyar a ―global terrorist‖ in Febraury 2003, 
the ISI made no move against him or his fighters. 
The Taliban received another fillip in October 2002 when their main supporters amongst 
Pakistan‘s Islamist parties won elections in Balochistan and the NWFP, the two provinces 
that bordered Afghanistan, and subsequently formed governments that were openly 
sympathetic to the Taliban and played a major role in facilitating their resurgence. The 
Islamists contested the elections on the platform of a six-party alliance called the Muttahida 
Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) meaning United Assembly for Action. Their victory - with the bulk 
of the seats going to the JUI, which had the closest links with the Taliban - was made 
possible primarily through heavy electoral rigging by the ISI against mainstream parties in 
opposition to Musharraf‘s dictatorship, most notably Benazir Bhutto‘s PPP and Nawaz 
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Sharif‘s PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz).187 At the same time, the MMA also 
managed to cash in on increasing anti-American sentiment in the areas most directly 
affected by the conflict in Afghanistan, where opposition to the American invasion and 
support for the Taliban were strongest.  
The MMA‘s rise to power served a number of purposes for Musharraf and the military. The 
religious parties in Pakistan had historically been allies of the military establishment against 
its secular democratic opponents and could once again be counted on not to meaningfully 
oppose Musharraf‘s thinly veiled authoritarian rule nor challenge the military‘s core 
strategic interests.188 In fact, in terms of the military‘s desire to keep alive the option of 
using the Taliban as a proxy in Afghanistan, the MMA‘s facilitative role would be crucial. 
At the same time, the MMA‘s strident anti-Americanism, its support of the Taliban and its 
control over two provinces that represented the heartland of the Taliban‘s presence in 
Pakistan gave Musharraf a powerful card to play in his dealings with the US by portraying 
himself as the last line of defence against a complete takeover of nuclear-armed Pakistan by 
radical Islamists allied with America‘s enemies in Afghanistan.  
With support from the ISI and the MMA-led provincial governments in Balochistan and the 
NWFP, the Taliban did not take long to regroup and revive their resistance in Afghanistan. 
Parts of Quetta, in particular, were virtually handed over to thousands of ―long-haired, kohl-
eyed, black-turbaned Taliban.‖189 From Quetta to the town of Chaman on the Afghan 
border, the JUI operated more than fifty madrassas where young militants were brought in 
for several weeks of religious instruction before being despatched to the frontlines by 
Taliban recruiters, who were often accompanied by ISI officers.190 In order to conceal its 
role in the Taliban insurgency from the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, the 
ISI set up a clandestine unit consisting of former Taliban handlers and retired Pashtun army 
officers working undercover through an ―untraceable system of command and control.‖191 
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In 2003, the Taliban declared a jihad to reclaim Afghanistan192 and Mullah Omar appointed 
a new ten-man ruling council to execute it.193 The opening gambits of the jihad involved 
guerrilla attacks on US-led coalition forces as well as foreign aid workers.194 As the 
insurgency expanded in its scope and intensity during 2004, American military and 
intelligence sources, according to a well-known Pakistani expert on the subject, began to 
see increasing evidence of ―a systematic and pervasive system‖ of ISI complicity in the 
resurgence of the Taliban:195 
By 2004, they [US and NATO intelligence officers in Afghanistan] had confirmed reports 
of the ISI running training camps for Taliban recruits north of Quetta, funds and arms 
shipments arriving from the Gulf countries, and shopping sprees in Quetta and Karachi in 
which the Taliban bought hundreds of motorbikes, pickup trucks, and satellite phones. In 
2003 and 2004, American soldiers at firebases along the border in eastern Afghanistan and 
U.S. drones in the skies watched as army trucks delivered Taliban fighters to the border at 
night to infiltrate Afghanistan and then recovered them on their return a few days later. 
Pakistani artillery gave covering fire to Taliban infiltrators crossing into Afghanistan, and 
medical facilities were set up close to the border by the army for wounded Taliban. Most 
damning of all was the extensive monitoring at the U.S. base at Bagram of wireless 
communications between Taliban commanders and Pakistan army officers on the border. 
Pakistan‘s fateful decision to encourage the revival of the Taliban stemmed primarily from 
the military‘s traditional paranoia regarding an India-Afghanistan nexus that could 
potentially put Pakistan in the untenable position of fighting a two-front war. Long-standing 
fears of Indian encirclement became especially pronounced after the Northern Alliance 
swept to power in Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban. For Pakistan, the new 
political dispensation in Kabul was a bitter pill to swallow. The ISI had advised Musharraf 
that the Taliban would be able to withstand the American onslaught until the spring of 2002 
and would then mount an open-ended guerrilla war but they capitulated in just eight 
weeks.196 
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In the end, Musharraf was left with little choice but to accept the decisions arrived at in 
Bonn. However, both he and the ISI were deeply concerned by the dominance of the non-
Pashtun Northern Alliance in Afghanistan‘s new configuration of power, with the crucial 
portfolios of defence, interior, intelligence and foreign affairs all ending up in the hands of 
fellow Panjshiri Tajiks and close associates of Ahmed Shah Massoud.197 Three out of five 
positions of vice-chairman in the interim administration also went to the Northern Alliance, 
whose dramatic ascendancy was perceived with considerable trepidation in Pakistan on 
account of the pro-India inclinations of many of its senior leaders.198 New Delhi‘s own 
aggressive push to re-establish itself in post-Taliban Afghanistan only served to heighten 
Islamabad‘s fear of encirclement.199 Deeply worried about losing out not only to India but 
to other regional competitors such as Iran and Russia, Musharraf and the military turned 
towards the Taliban as their only hope of regaining influence in Afghanistan. 
America‘s own policies in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and after the 
fall of the Taliban did little to assuage the security concerns of its Pakistani client. The Bush 
administration was determined to maintain a ―light footprint‖ in Afghanistan, both in the 
fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda as well as in terms of rebuilding a country devastated 
by twenty-two years of almost continuous war.200 In fact, Afghanistan was intended to be 
merely a curtain raiser for the subsequent invasion of Iraq.201 Instead of deploying ground 
forces in sufficient numbers, the US subcontracted security duties to warlords from the 
Northern Alliance and from the Pashtun areas in the south and the east.202 During the first 
year of the occupation, US troops numbered a mere 5,000 while the ratio of International 
                                                          
197
 Massoud hailed from the Tajik-majority province of Panjshir in Afghanistan‘s northeast. 
198
 Aly Zaman, ―India‘s Increased Involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Implications for 
Pakistan,‖ Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal 3, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 69-97. 
199
 A particularly unpalatable development for the Pakistani military was India‘s decision to reopen 
consulates in eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan that bordered Pakistan, a move that Islamabad 
regarded as a hostile act aimed at destabilizing Pakistan by fomenting sabotage, sedition and terrorism out 
of ostensibly diplomatic offices. See, for instance, Scott Baldauf, ―India-Pakistan rivalry reaches into 
Afghanistan,‖ Christian Science Monitor, September 12, 2003, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0912/p07s01-wosc.html 
200
 Michael E. O‘Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it out in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 2010), 22-23. The desire for a ―light footprint‖ was driven in part by the Bush 
administration‘s opposition to nation-building; in part by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld‘s espousal 
of a new type of cost-effective warfare that minimised the use of ground forces; and in part by the need to 
save resources for Iraq. The US was clearly more interested in ―opposing and tearing things that it did not 
like‖ in Afghanistan than in ―building up anything viable‖ to replace them. 
201
 Even before the Taliban had been removed, Bush had instructed Defence Secretary Rumsfeld to draw 
up secret plans for potential military operations against Iraq. See Joseph J. Collins, Choosing War: The 
Decision to Invade Iraq and its Aftermath (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2008), 
6.  
202
 A number of these warlords were the same drug smugglers, extortionists, murderers and rapists who 
had carved up their own individual fiefdoms during the early 1990s before being swept away by the 
Taliban, whose initial popularity amongst significant segments of the Afghan people stemmed primarily 
from their success in defeating the widely despised warlords. 
199 
 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeepers203 to population was only 0.18 foreign 
military personnel to 1,000 people.204 
As the Iraq invasion drew closer, increasing amounts of military and intelligence resources 
were diverted away from Afghanistan to facilitate regime change in Iraq.205 In the 
meantime, the authority of the government in Kabul installed by the US continued to be 
seriously undermined by Washington‘s propensity to empower the warlords in pursuit of its 
minimalist agenda of defeating al-Qaeda.206 While significant chunks of the CIA‘s $1 
billion war-chest went into purchasing the services of a collection of largely disreputable 
regional strongmen,207 the cash-strapped Afghan government was struggling to make ends 
meet and to extend its writ beyond the capital, leading to derisive descriptions of Karzai as 
the ―mayor of Kabul‖208 rather than the president of Afghanistan.209 
The absence of a long-term American commitment to Afghanistan‘s rebuilding and security 
convinced Musharraf and his fellow generals that the US would wash its hands off 
Afghanistan in much the same way as it had done after the Soviets pulled out in 1989, and 
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that Pakistan would again be left to handle the fallout on its own. That fallout appeared 
particularly bleak to Islamabad on account of the fact that its enemies from the Northern 
Alliance now dominated the government in Kabul and ran Afghanistan‘s internal security 
apparatus. Had the US opted for a larger military footprint in Afghanistan and ensured a 
more inclusive government in Kabul, it might have been able to settle Pakistan‘s fears of 
being elbowed out of Afghanistan by India and its Northern Alliance proxies. However, the 
Bush administration neither put enough military boots on the ground nor entertained any 
proposal to negotiate with the Taliban, even when elements within them were willing to do 
so. In fact, Washington‘s ―misguided‖ policy of eschewing reconciliation with the Taliban 
was often ―spurred on‖ by the Northern Alliance, whose eagerness to settle personal scores 
with the Taliban ―drove people who might otherwise have cooperated into the 
insurgency.‖210 
America‘s unwillingness to make a genuine commitment to Afghanistan‘s stability and its 
diversion of men and materiel to Iraq were seen in Islamabad as indicators that a complete 
US withdrawal was just a matter of time. Musharraf and the ISI feared that the resultant 
power vacuum left behind would likely be filled by India and Iran in view of the prevailing 
ascendancy of their Afghan allies. To obviate that possibility, they decided to back the 
resurgence of the Taliban, whom they continued to view as their only piece on 
Afghanistan‘s radically transformed geopolitical chessboard. This remained the case even 
after Karzai gradually succeeded in substantially increasing Pashtun representation in his 
government, largely at the expense of the Northern Alliance.211 For his Pakistani detractors, 
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Karzai‘s attempts to scale down the influence of the non-Pashtuns was ―too little too 
late.‖212 ISI support for the Taliban continued and its plans to disrupt the 2004 presidential 
elections in Afghanistan through large-scale insurgent attacks were aborted only after direct 
pressure on Musharraf from Bush himself.213 
In general, however, Washington‘s criticism of Islamabad‘s double game remained largely 
muted. Musharraf correctly calculated that the Bush administration‘s overriding emphasis 
on decapitating al-Qaeda gave him enough manoeuvrability to continue supporting the 
Taliban. While such duplicity might occasionally generate a slap on the wrist from 
Washington, Musharraf was confident that US patronage would continue to flow as long as 
he was perceived to be resolute in the fight against al-Qaeda. According to Robert Grenier, 
the CIA‘s Islamabad station chief at the time of the 9/11 attacks, Musharraf and the ISI 
―worked closely with us to capture key al Qa‘ida leaders…but they made it clear that they 
didn‘t care about targeting the Taliban.‖ Their position encountered no meaningful criticism 
from Washington, which was ―focused on al Qai‘ida, not on capturing or killing Taliban 
leaders,‖ whom it regarded as ―a spent force.‖214 
By 2006, however, a massive escalation of insurgent attacks in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan demonstrated that the Taliban were anything but a spent force. With Mullah 
Omar allegedly directing operations out of Quetta and his fighters making full use of the 
sanctuaries granted to them in FATA and Balochistan, the Taliban wreaked havoc in 
Afghanistan. Suicide attacks increased from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, remotely detonated 
bombings more than doubled from 783 to 1,677, and armed attacks nearly tripled from 
1,558 to 4,542.215 Drawing on lessons learned from the insurgency in Iraq, the Taliban 
increasingly began to use sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to target US 
and Afghan forces instead of engaging them in direct combat.216 With around 4,000 
fatalities in insurgent-related violence, 2006 became the bloodiest year since the start of the 
US occupation.217 The Taliban resurgence continued to intensify throughout 2007, with a 27 
per cent rise in overall attacks over the previous year and a 60 per cent increase in the 
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province of Helmand, the heartland of the insurgency.218 Although still most visible in the 
south and east, the Taliban penetration of Afghanistan‘s rural areas now manifested itself in 
western provinces such as Herat and central ones such as Wardak.219 Even more worryingly 
for the US and the Afghan government, the insurgents were demonstrating an increasing 
ability to strike targets within Kabul itself.  
In May 2003, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had declared the end of major 
combat operations in Afghanistan on the grounds that the country had been sufficiently 
pacified to move towards ―stabilisation and reconstruction activities.‖220 By the time 
Rumsfeld left the Pentagon in December 2006, his earlier pronouncement appeared 
embarrassingly premature as the US and its client government in Kabul found themselves at 
the receiving end of an increasingly assertive Taliban insurgency. Rumsfeld‘s successor, 
former CIA director Robert Gates, realised soon after taking office in Bush‘s second term 
that the US had got it seriously wrong in Afghanistan: ―While we were preoccupied with 
Iraq, between 2002 and 2005 the Taliban reconstituted in western Pakistan and in southern 
and eastern Afghanistan. Headquartered and operating in Pakistani cities including 
Peshawar and Quetta, virtually unhindered by the Pakistani government, the Taliban 
recovered from their disastrous defeat and again became a serious fighting force.‖221 
Pakistan‘s provision of sanctuaries to the Taliban was by no means the only factor behind 
the resilience of the insurgency, nor indeed of its eventual dramatic escalation. The chronic 
inability of the Karzai government to end corruption, provide essential services, disband 
regional warlords, and extend its tenuous writ beyond Kabul created a vacuum of 
governance that bred widespread public frustration and increased support for the 
insurgents.222 In much of southern and eastern Afghanistan, Karzai and the provincial 
governors he appointed enjoyed little or no legitimacy and were increasingly seen as 
impotent stooges of the country‘s foreign occupiers. A considerable portion of the blame for 
the return of the Taliban must be apportioned to the US itself, which refused to commit 
enough resources to rebuild Afghanistan‘s economy and indigenous security services, nor 
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provided enough troops of its own to ensure the country‘s security.223 Washington also 
failed to prevent a massive boom in the production of opium, a significant source of 
revenue for the Taliban insurgency.224 
Benefiting from the flawed policies of the US and its Afghan allies, the Taliban, according 
to one account, managed to engineer ―one of the most impressive comebacks against a US-
led military coalition in history.‖225 A 2009 report by the Carnegie Endowment examining 
the strategies employed by the Taliban to fuel their resurgence found reliable evidence to 
suggest that the insurgents ―have an efficient leadership, are learning from their mistakes, 
and are quick to exploit the weaknesses of its adversaries.‖226 By displaying a substantial 
level of ―strategic planning and coordinated action‖ that belied their popular image of 
primitive savages, the Taliban were building up their own parallel administration in major 
chunks of the south and east, had ―nationwide logistics,‖ and managed an ―impressive 
intelligence network.‖227 Although much of the original leadership of the movement 
remained intact,228 the scale of the insurgency testified to the emergence of a ―neo-Taliban‖ 
phenomenon comprising a new generation of Pakistani, Afghan, al-Qaeda and Kashmiri 
fighters, many of whom were more comfortable with modern technology than their 
predecessors from the 1990s as well as more radical in terms of their acceptance of suicide 
attacks.229 
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The success of an insurgency that grew primarily out of developments within Afghanistan 
and which incrementally acquired a self-sustaining momentum of its own cannot be 
attributed exclusively to exogenous factors. At the same time, it is debatable if the Taliban 
could have demonstrated the same level of resilience or revived their fortunes as much as 
they ultimately did without the sanctuaries and support they received from Pakistan. The 
complete transfer of command in 2006 from US-led coalition forces to NATO was seen by 
Islamabad as further evidence of Washington‘s desire to cut and run from Afghanistan.230 
Moreover, a growing strategic convergence between the US and India, including the signing 
of a nuclear cooperation agreement that reversed over three decades of American non-
proliferation polices, spurred fears in Pakistan that the US had picked India as its long-term 
partner in the region.231 In raising the temperature of the Taliban insurgency, Pakistan 
sought to hedge against a potentially unfavourable emerging regional scenario whereby an 
imminent US withdrawal might lead to greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan, this time 
with America‘s probable encouragement.  
Musharraf‘s decision to grant a safe haven to the Taliban after 9/11 played a critical role in 
the development of the insurgency. The relocation of the central shura under Mullah 
Omar‘s direct command to Quetta was particularly important because of the city‘s close 
proximity to the traditional Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban were 
also permitted a foothold in two other major urban centres, Peshawar and Karachi, with the 
former housing the movement‘s media and propaganda councils and the latter - Pakistan‘s 
largest city and commercial heartland - serving as its financial base.232 Having stitched up 
an alliance between the Taliban and Hekmatyar, the ISI allowed the Hizb-i-Islami to 
operate out of Peshawar as well as the Bajaur and Mohmand agencies in FATA that 
bordered north-eastern Afghanistan.233 In the meantime, the Taliban-affiliated Jalaluddin 
Haqqani was left unhindered to manage his network out of North Waziristan. Thanks to 
their bases in Pakistan, the Taliban and their allies were able to ―develop their strategies, 
recruit new members, contact supporters around the world, raise money, and - perhaps most 
important - enjoy a respite from U.S. combat operations.‖234 
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Taliban operations in Helmand in 2006, in which they fought British troops to a standstill 
and eventually forced them to make a humiliating withdrawal, provided NATO with 
―incontrovertible proof‖ of covert Pakistani support to the Taliban.235 Some members of the 
ISI provided weapons and ammunition to the Taliban and even covered the medical 
expenses incurred on treating wounded Taliban fighters.236 US and NATO officials 
discovered several instances in which the ISI provided intelligence to Taliban insurgents at 
the ―tactical, operational, and strategic levels.‖237 This included alerting Taliban forces 
about the location and movements of Afghan and coalition troops, which ended up 
undermining several anti-Taliban military operations.238 There was increasing evidence of 
suicide bombers being recruited from Pakistani madrassas and moved to safe houses in 
Quetta where they were trained and then infiltrated into Afghanistan.239 The ISI also took 
no steps to prevent the development of a ―lethal cottage industry‖ in FATA specialising in 
the production of IEDs, which were then used by the Taliban to devastating effect across 
the border.240 
IV. Standing by his Man 
 
Despite mounting evidence of Pakistan‘s footprint in the Taliban insurgency, Bush took no 
steps to chastise Musharraf, with whom he had struck up a close personal rapport. The 
continuing latitude given to Musharraf was in line with Washington‘s post-9/11 policy to 
avoid criticism of the Pakistani dictator, no matter how egregious his actions, as long as he 
remained resolute in the fight against al-Qaeda. Thus, the US simply sat back and watched 
as Musharraf consolidated his grip on power through a series of patently undemocratic 
measures. In April 2002, he called a public referendum to have his presidential term 
extended for another five years and massively rigged it to end up with a winning percentage 
of 97.5% of the total votes cast.241 A few months later, he made amendments to twenty nine 
articles of the constitution that validated all previous actions taken by his regime and 
concentrated significant power in the presidential office that he occupied.242 It was the 
position of army chief, however, that remained the real font of authority. Fully cognisant of 
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that reality, Musharraf retained his uniform in the declared interest of maintaining ―unity of 
command‖ and awarded himself a five-year extension in that office.243 
When asked for his response to Musharraf‘s political shenanigans, Bush avoided all 
criticism and confined himself to appreciating Pakistan‘s military strongman for being ―still 
tight with us in the war against terror.‖244 Washington also made no effort to reprimand 
Islamabad after Musharraf followed up his constitutional reengineering by massively 
rigging national elections held in October 2002.245 While international observers identified 
―serious flaws‖ in the electoral process, the Bush administration hailed it as ―an important 
milestone in Pakistan‘s ongoing transition to democracy.‖246 In June 2003, Bush invited 
Musharraf to the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland, a privilege granted to very 
few foreign leaders, where the American president applauded his Pakistani counterpart for 
being ―a courageous leader and friend of the United States‖ who had apprehended ―more 
than 500 al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists.‖247 In recognition of the ―leadership‖ displayed by 
―this man [Musharraf] and his government,‖ Bush announced a five-year $3 billion aid 
package of security assistance and economic support.248 
Desperate to ensure Musharraf‘s continued cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda, the 
Bush administration went to great lengths to avoid any policy position that might have 
weakened his internal position, especially after he survived the two attempts on his life in 
December 2003. Washington‘s restrained response to the A.Q Khan affair, in which the 
CIA presented Musharraf with irrefutable evidence of Pakistan‘s chief nuclear scientist 
operating an international nuclear smuggling network, was clearly a case in point. By late 
2003, Khan was discovered to have sold nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea 
over a period spanning well over a decade and many believed it highly unlikely that the 
Pakistani military, which had maintained a stranglehold over the nuclear programme since 
at least the late 1970s, had no inkling of a nuclear black-market spread across ten countries 
and involving at least thirty middlemen.249 The US made no attempt to investigate the 
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possibility of official complicity in Khan‘s illicit activities, nor did it put Musharraf under 
sustained pressure to grant access to the disgraced scientist. Instead, Musharraf was allowed 
by Washington to handle matters his own way. After persuading Khan to make a public 
confession on national television, he granted him an official pardon and then placed him 
under heavily guarded house arrest where he was denied visitors.  
The Bush administration was quick to accept Pakistan‘s response to the crisis, maintained 
that the affair was Pakistan‘s ―internal matter‖ and accepted Musharraf‘s assurances that 
Khan was acting alone without any official sanction or involvement.250 Thus, the ―single 
worst case of nuclear proliferation in the last 50 years‖251 was effectively placed in cold 
storage with ―not a squeak from the White House.‖252 Just months after Musharraf‘s 
decision to pardon A.Q. Khan, Bush declared Pakistan a major non-NATO ally of the US, 
thereby placing it within a select group of American security clients, and ramped up the 
provision of military assistance.253 Foreign military sales agreements rose from $27 million 
in 2002 to $492 million in 2005, with Pakistan gaining access to sophisticated American 
weaponry including surveillance radars; air-traffic control systems; military radio systems; 
anti-ship, anti-armour and air-to-air missiles; maritime patrol aircraft; and helicopter 
gunships. The pièce de résistance was a $5.1 billion agreement in 2006 to provide 36 F-16 
combat aircraft along with related spare parts and munitions, constituting the largest-ever 
American weapons sale to Pakistan.254 
Even as it bankrolled Musharraf‘s regime, the Bush administration continued to look the 
other way as Musharraf strengthened his dictatorship against its domestic opponents. 
Having given an undertaking to cast off his military uniform before the end of 2004 in order 
to secure parliamentary approval for his constitutional changes, he reneged on the 
agreement and kept holding the dual offices of president and army chief, but the volte face 
generated no criticism from Washington. In fact, just weeks before the expiry of the 
deadline for him to vacate the position of army chief, Bush met with Musharraf at the White 
House but made no mention of democracy; instead, he declared that he was ―very pleased‖ 
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with Pakistan‘s efforts to combat al-Qaeda and affirmed that he found ―nobody more 
dedicated‖ than Musharraf in that regard.255 There was a similar silence on Washington‘s 
part after Musharraf rigged local elections in 2005.256 However ―regrettable‖ it may have 
privately felt such actions to be, the Bush administration clearly did not regard them as 
sufficiently serious to warrant a reappraisal of its ―Musharraf-centric strategy.‖257 
In March 2006, Bush followed up a two-day trip to India in which he formally announced 
the nuclear pact between the two countries with an overnight visit to Pakistan. The decision 
to spend at least a night in the country in defiance of security concerns expressed by the 
American Secret Service was prompted by Musharraf‘s insistence on avoiding a snub along 
the lines of the one he had received from Clinton six years ago.258 In Islamabad, Bush ruled 
out a nuclear deal for Pakistan but reaffirmed his commitment to a ―broad and lasting 
strategic partnership‖ and was effusive in his public expressions of support for Musharraf, 
whom he praised for his ―plans to spread freedom‖ and his continuing determination to 
―bring these terrorists to justice.‖259 In their private meetings, Bush claimed to have pushed 
Musharraf to relinquish his military office and govern purely as a civilian but placed no 
apparent pressure on him to provide a timeline in that regard. He also raised the issue of 
insurgent infiltration into Afghanistan from Pakistani sanctuaries and was satisfied with 
Musharraf‘s assurances of continued cooperation.260 
With the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan in full swing, Musharraf visited the White 
House in September 2006 to sell his recently concluded peace agreement with the militants 
in FATA as a ―treaty‖ aimed not at negotiating with the Taliban but at actually fighting 
them. Bush was quick to accept Musharraf‘s explanation: ―When the President looks me in 
the eye and says, the tribal deal is intended to reject the Talibanisation of the people, and 
that there won‘t be a Taliban and won‘t be al Qaeda, I believe him, you know.‖261 By that 
time, however, senior NATO commanders in Afghanistan had formed a much more critical 
opinion of Musharraf‘s decision to virtually hand over North Waziristan to the militants, 
thereby drawing their guns away from the Pakistani army and redirecting them exclusively 
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towards Afghanistan.262 By the end of 2006, even the State Department was forced to admit 
that, as a result of Musharraf‘s deal, the Taliban had been able to use FATA as a secure 
base for sanctuary, regrouping, command and control, and supply.263 As for Musharraf, far 
from fighting the Taliban through the peace deal as he had professed to do, he told several 
NATO countries to resign themselves to an insurgent victory in Afghanistan.264 
For over five years, the US had given unstinted support to Musharraf in the interests of 
defeating al-Qaeda. By 2007, however, it finally began to dawn upon the Bush 
administration that it may have seriously erred in depending so completely upon a man 
either unwilling to honour his commitments or incapable of doing so. Thanks in large 
measure to Musharraf‘s peace deals with the militants in FATA, al-Qaeda had managed to 
bounce back from the heavy losses sustained and disruption incurred in the initial years 
after 9/11 by acquiring a new base from which to provide training and financing to its 
global affiliates. A US National Intelligence Estimate issued in July 2007 warned that al-
Qaeda remained America‘s preeminent terrorist threat and had ―protected or regenerated 
key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top 
leadership.‖265 
Senior members of the Bush administration including Vice President Dick Cheney and 
Secretary of Defence Robert Gates travelled to Pakistan to take a tougher line with 
Musharraf but found him reluctant to break the 2006 peace deal with the FATA militants.266 
Washington began to issue increasing public criticism of Musharraf‘s counterterrorism 
policies and expanded its use of drones in FATA for surveillance as well as targeted 
killings.267 Bush admitted in his memoirs that his friend had let him down: ―Over time, it 
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became clear that Musharraf either would not or could not fulfil all his promises. Part of the 
problem was Pakistan‘s obsession with India. The fight against the extremists came second. 
A related problem was that Pakistani forces pursued the Taliban much less aggressively 
than they pursued al Qaeda.‖268 This belated recognition of Musharraf‘s counterproductive 
policies did not lead to any diminution in American backing for his regime; in 2007, 
Pakistan received $1.7 billion in total US aid, of which $1.12 billion was security-related.269 
At the start of 2007, Musharraf had appeared to be in an impregnable position both at home 
and abroad. By the end of that year, however, his days in power were clearly numbered. His 
downfall was set in motion by a decision to sack Pakistan‘s top judge, who had been 
displaying a worrying streak of judicial activism. The judge‘s removal sparked a movement 
launched by Pakistan‘s lawyers for his reinstatement that quickly grew into a popular 
rebellion against Musharraf‘s rule in which the lawyers were joined by Musharraf‘s 
political opponents as well as broad segments of civil society. Even as Musharraf 
unsuccessfully attempted to stamp out the movement by unleashing his security forces on 
the protestors, another crisis was brewing in the heart of Islamabad, where hundreds of 
heavily armed militants from a range of indigenous extremist groups had occupied a 
mosque compound called Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), from which they called on the 
government to impose Islamic law in the country. After procrastinating for six months, 
during which the clerical leaders of the mosque let loose a vigilante force of male and 
female madrassa students to patrol the streets of Islamabad and crack down on perceived 
immorality, Musharraf bowed to growing international pressure and sent in the army to 
clear the compound.270 
Following a 36-hour gun battle, the Pakistani security forces finally prevailed after losing 
nine of their soldiers and killing around one hundred militants and students during the eight-
day siege of the compound.271 The mosque had for long been a recruiting ground for hard-
core militants and was known for its sympathies with al-Qaeda, which now reacted by 
calling for revenge against Musharraf and the army.272 That proved to be a clarion call for 
the militants in FATA led by Baituallah Mehsud, who terminated the peace deal with the 
government and declared jihad against the Pakistani state. The storming of the Red Mosque 
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was followed by a dramatic rise in suicide bombings across the country.273 By then, the 
process of Talibanisation initiated in South Waziristan in 2004 had permeated to varying 
degrees across FATA and was spilling over into settled districts of NWFP such as Swat. In 
December 2007, a host of disparate militant outfits operating in FATA coalesced under 
Baitullah Mehsud‘s leadership to form the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Taliban 
Movement of Pakistan, a loosely structured umbrella organisation of around 40,000 
fighters274 closely affiliated with al-Qaeda, which lent both ideological guidance and 
strategic direction.275 
In the meantime, the sacked chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, had been restored 
to his original position by the judiciary and was threatening to block Musharraf‘s plans to 
have himself re-elected for another five-year term by the existing parliament whilst still 
wearing his military uniform. Despite growing evidence of widespread popular 
disenchantment with Musharraf within Pakistan, Bush continued to stand by his man, 
especially after the Lal Masjid crisis reinforced the perception in Washington that only a 
pro-US military dictator could prevent Pakistan from succumbing to an extremist takeover. 
Thus, there was no public condemnation by the US of Musharraf‘s attempts to emasculate 
the judiciary; instead, it confined itself to futile statements urging patience and compromise. 
Moreover, rather than acknowledging Musharraf as a major liability that needed to be 
discarded in America‘s own self-interest, the Bush administration tried merely to ―soften 
the face‖ of his dictatorship by attempting a ―shotgun wedding‖ between Musharraf and the 
exiled Benazir Bhutto.276 Following secret meetings between the two that were sponsored 
by the US, Bhutto returned to Pakistan in October 2007 but the deal came apart just weeks 
later when Musharraf declared a state of emergency, a cover for what was effectively an 
imposition of martial law.277 
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With the judicial sword hanging over his plans to remain both president and army chief, 
Musharraf struck by declaring a state of emergency on November 3, 2007. He suspended 
the constitution, again sacked the chief justice of the Supreme Court and removed other 
judges of that court who declared his act illegal. Over sixty senior judges around the 
country were removed for refusing to take an oath to abide by Musharraf‘s new 
dispensation. Police swung into action against lawyers, politicians and human rights 
activists, and independent television channels were taken off the air.278 In an attempt to 
convince his Western supporters that his decision to impose martial law was not driven 
exclusively by the instinct for self-preservation, Musharraf claimed that it would facilitate 
the army to fight terrorism more effectively. However, on the same day that the emergency 
was declared, the army released twenty eight terrorists from jail, including eight self-
confessed suicide bombers, in exchange for Baitullah Mehsud freeing around three hundred 
soldiers that he had taken hostage.279 
In response to Musharraf‘s promulgation of martial law, Bush urged a speedy return to 
democracy and called on his Pakistani ally to divest himself of his uniform ―as soon as 
possible‖ but gave no indication of any change in US policy in case Musharraf ignored his 
pleas and continued to praise him as a ―strong fighter against extremists and radicals.‖280 In 
private, however, even Bush had realised by then that a Musharraf-centric policy was no 
longer a sustainable option but was nevertheless worried that ―throwing him overboard 
would add to the chaos.‖281 Even as Musharraf‘s political isolation grew at home, leading 
him in turn to pursue increasingly dictatorial policies, Bush refused to be the one to ―pull 
the rug out from under him‖ and attempted almost until Musharraf‘s eventual resignation to 
somehow keep him in office.282 Thus, the US supported Musharraf‘s re-election as president 
by his parliamentary allies for another five-year term but convinced him to finally retire as 
army chief, lift the state of emergency and announce elections for January 2008. However, 
any lingering hopes that Washington might have had of stitching up a power-sharing deal 
between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto were dashed when the latter was assassinated in a 
gun and suicide bomb attack in Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007.  
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Bhutto‘s murder ironically ended up being the last nail in Musharraf‘s own political coffin. 
He tried to delay the inevitable by postponing elections for another month but could not 
prevent a resounding defeat for his party at the hands of its opponents, chiefly Bhutto‘s PPP 
- now led by her widower Asif Ali Zardari - and the PML-N of Nawaz Sharif, who had been 
allowed to come back to Pakistan shortly after Bhutto‘s homecoming in October 2007. 
Once bitter antagonists, the PPP and PML-N now joined forces to form a coalition 
government after resisting pressure from the US to align themselves with Musharraf‘s party 
- the PML-Q (Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam) - and other pro-Musharraf political 
forces.283 Even though the election results had shown quite emphatically how unpopular 
Musharraf had become, he clung on to the presidency in the hope that his most powerful 
domestic and external constituencies, the Pakistani army and the United States, would 
continue to prop him up. Before long, however, both constituencies disabused him of that 
hope. 
In his capacity as a civilian president, Musharraf no longer enjoyed the same level of 
control over the military‘s policies as he had exercised whilst army chief and there were 
increasing signs of his hand-picked replacement, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, seeking to 
distance the military from what had by then become Musharraf‘s toxic political legacy. 
Kayani‘s refusal to manipulate the 2008 elections in favour of Musharraf‘s allies sent a 
signal to his former boss of his intention to curtail the military‘s involvement in politics.284 
With a popularly elected government in Pakistan comprising largely secular and moderate 
parties bitterly opposed to Musharraf and a new military leadership seemingly more focused 
on professional capacity-building rather than political intrigue, the deeply unpopular 
Pakistani president now seemed even to long-standing patrons in Washington as an 
undesirable anachronism that had outlived its utility.  
Facing threats of impeachment from his political adversaries who now enjoyed a clear 
parliamentary majority, Musharraf found that he could no longer count on the support of the 
army or the US in case he took steps to ward off his removal from office. On August 18, 
2008, in his ninth year in power, Musharraf resigned the presidency after being informed by 
Kayani that the military would not back any presidential move to dismiss parliament.285 The 
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US, which had by then declared Musharraf‘s future to be a matter purely for the ―internal 
Pakistani political process,‖ was cautious in its reaction to his departure from Pakistan‘s 
political scene.286 While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praised him as a ―friend to the 
United States and one of the world‘s most committed partners in the war against terrorism 
and extremism,‖287 there was complete silence from Bush himself about the exit of a man 
with whom he had enjoyed a ―good friendship‖288 and on whose regime he had by then 
lavished at least $12 billion over the last six years.289 
According to one American expert on Pakistan, Musharraf‘s abiding failure was that ―he 
wanted to be liked by everybody and he changed his appearance and his style accordingly. 
Towards the Americans, he was the tough anti-Islamist guy; to the Islamists, he was their 
buddy. He tried to be everything to everybody but never really had a mind of his own.‖ At 
the same time, however, he ―fooled the Americans just as skilfully as Zia, if not better; both 
men get an A-plus on that score.‖290 Another Pakistan expert in the US maintains that while 
Zia and Musharraf both possessed a certain degree of charm and were ―personable‖ 
individuals, the major difference between them was Musharraf‘s secular orientation and his 
articulation of a ―moderate‖ Islam, the kind of Islam ―that the US wanted to hear about.‖291 
Initially, Musharraf appeared to the US as ―someone that we could not only do business 
with but who could also deliver for us in a number of ways,‖ only to discover later that ―he 
was willing to go just so far and that there was no way the military was going to give up on 
its assets.‖292 A former American ambassador to Pakistan considers Musharraf ―effectively 
a replay of Zia, a reincarnation in every respect except for the Islamisation part.‖293 
Conclusion 
 
George W. Bush‘s policy of propping up the regime of General Pervez Musharraf in spite 
of its many imperfections was based on his overarching strategic goal of destroying al-
Qaeda. Allied to that, but of lesser consequence, were the objectives of defeating the 
Taliban, stabilising Afghanistan and ending Pakistani support to home-grown militants 
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operating in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. There can be little doubt that Pakistan‘s 
cooperation played a critical role both in the speedy overthrow of the Taliban as well as in 
significant damage to al-Qaeda in the initial years after 9/11. Responding to massive 
financial inducements and the occasional mild arm-twisting, Musharraf rounded up or killed 
hundreds of al-Qaeda personnel, incurring retaliatory attacks on his own life in the process. 
He also curtailed cross-border infiltration into Kashmir and launched a partial crackdown 
on Pakistani militant and sectarian outfits. 
The overall relationship between the US and Pakistan, however, continued to suffer from a 
fundamental divergence of interests. Musharraf‘s rationale in aligning himself with the US 
after 9/11 stemmed primarily from the Pakistani military‘s traditional preoccupation with 
the threat from India. Siding with the US against the Taliban - at least in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 - and al-Qaeda was deemed necessary in order to protect Pakistan‘s 
nuclear weapons from Indian designs against them; secure greater American engagement in 
trying to resolve Kashmir; forestall the possibility of a potentially anti-Pakistan alliance 
between Washington and New Delhi; and prevent India from establishing a foothold in 
post-Taliban Afghanistan. Much of the weaponry purchased from the US by Pakistan after 
9/11 - especially fighter jets, maritime aircraft and air-to-air missiles - were clearly intended 
for conventional use against India rather than for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency 
purposes. 
Like Zia before him, Musharraf endeavoured to make full use of America‘s need for 
Pakistan‘s services without making any major compromise on what he and his fellow 
generals viewed as their country‘s core strategic interests. Thus, a distinction was drawn 
between al-Qaeda and its affiliated Pakistani sectarian groups on the one hand and the 
Afghan Taliban and Kashmir-focused militant groups on the other; while the former were 
viewed as threats that needed to be confronted, the latter were still seen as strategic assets 
worthy of continued support, especially after India dramatically increased its presence in 
post-Taliban Afghanistan and the US shifted its attention and resources towards Iraq.  
Even as Bush turned on the aid pipeline and showered his Pakistani counterpart with praise 
for his courageous leadership, Musharraf allowed the Taliban to regroup in Quetta and 
launch attacks inside Afghanistan. Although Washington realised Musharraf‘s double game 
from fairly early on, it made no attempt to hold him to account, since its overriding focus 
was on al-Qaeda and not the Taliban. It was not until 2006, when the Taliban insurgency 
underwent a dramatic escalation, that the US became more critical of Pakistan‘s policies in 
Afghanistan. However, aid continued as before, including an average of a billion dollars a 
year in reimbursements to the Pakistani military for its counterterrorism operations.  
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There was a continuing reluctance on Washington‘s part to take any action that might 
jeopardise Pakistan‘s cooperation against al-Qaeda but by then, even progress on that front 
had slowed down considerably. The top leadership of al-Qaeda remained intact and was 
widely alleged to be headquartered in FATA. The army‘s half-hearted forays into FATA 
were prompted more by American pressure rather than a desire to extirpate militancy and 
terrorism from Pakistan. Musharraf‘s several peace deals with FATA‘s militants facilitated 
not only the resurgence of both the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda but set the stage for 
Pakistan‘s confrontation with its own Frankenstein monster in the shape of the Pakistani 
Taliban. By the time Musharraf left office, the Pakistani army was fighting in all seven 
agencies of FATA and the TTP were in total or partial control of many parts of the tribal 
belt.294 
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CHAPTER SIX: DIFFERENT APPROACH, SIMILAR RESULTS - 
OBAMA AND PAKISTAN 
 
 
Between 2002, when the US began to effectively bankroll the Musharraf regime, and 2008, 
when Musharraf finally exited from power, the Bush administration poured in almost $9 
billion in overt military aid to Pakistan.1 The overwhelming part of this assistance - around 
$7 billion - was technically not aid but instead fell under the head of Coalition Support 
Funds (CSF), that is, compensation for Pakistani military operations conducted in support 
of America‘s vital national security objectives in the region, chief amongst them being the 
fight against al-Qaeda. According to some estimates, declared military aid could well have 
been matched, if not surpassed, by covert cash flows as monetary rewards for specific 
Pakistani counter-terrorism efforts.2 In his biography, Musharraf boasted of having received 
―millions of dollars‖ in ―prize money‖ from the CIA for handing over almost 400 suspected 
al-Qaeda operatives.3 
Having invested so much for so long in Musharraf and his military regime, it took the Bush 
administration until its final year in office to wake up to the disconcerting reality that it had 
received nowhere near its money‘s worth. Osama bin Laden had not been captured nor his 
network eliminated. Although al-Qaeda suffered some serious reverses, especially during 
the initial years after 9/11, it had bounced back, in no small part owing to Musharraf‘s 
misguided policy of striking peace deals with its Pakistani allies in FATA. A February 2008 
threat assessment prepared by the US Director of National Intelligence declared that by 
using FATA as a ―staging area,‖ al-Qaeda had been able to maintain ―a cadre of skilled 
lieutenants capable of directing the organization‘s operations around the world.‖4 Another 
key US objective, defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan, remained similarly unfulfilled. Like 
bin Laden, Mullah Omar eluded capture and allegedly remained under the ISI‘s protection 
in Quetta. In the meantime, his insurgents continued to use Pakistani sanctuaries to mount 
increasingly lethal attacks inside Afghanistan. 
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By 2008, America‘s combined economic and military assistance to Pakistan over a six-year 
period amounted to over $12 billion. Additionally, between 2002 and 2006, it approved 
arms sales worth another $8.4 billion.5 Such largesse placed Pakistan amongst the world‘s 
leading recipients of American aid but was neither able to secure full Pakistani compliance 
with America‘s strategic interests nor ensure Pakistan‘s internal stability. Militant violence 
witnessed a precipitous rise during 2007, the last full year of Musharraf‘s rule, and 
continued to escalate the following year, with a spate of deadly suicide bombings across the 
country.6 Significant pockets of territory, not only in FATA but even in settled districts of 
the NWFP (which became Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010) such as Swat, fell to the militants, 
despite the deployment of over 100,000 army and paramilitary troops in western Pakistan.7 
Instead of confronting the forces of extremism, the new civilian government decided to 
appease them. In May 2008, Pakistani officials concluded a deal with pro-TTP extremists in 
Swat by which the government agreed to a phased withdrawal and consented to the 
establishment of Islamic courts in the area in exchange for the militants agreeing to 
discontinue their attacks on government forces.8 
Prior to succeeding Musharraf as army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani had 
spearheaded the ISI from 2004 to 2007, a period in which al-Qaeda consolidated its redoubt 
in the tribal areas, the Pakistani Taliban became a force to be reckoned with and the Afghan 
Taliban formalised their comeback by launching a full-blown insurgency inside 
Afghanistan. As head of the ISI, Kayani had been the primary executor of Musharraf‘s dual 
policy of selectively targeting some militants to placate the US and keep the aid spigot 
running but leaving unmolested, or even directly or indirectly supporting, those deemed to 
be strategic assets against India or in Afghanistan.  
Having become army chief, Kayani showed no inclination to jettison his predecessor‘s 
approach. In July 2008, the Indian embassy in Kabul was bombed by militants from the 
Haqqani network, leaving 54 people dead. Based on intercepted communications between 
ISI officials and the perpetrators, US intelligence agencies held the ISI directly responsible 
for planning the operation and claimed to have fresh evidence of ISI officials increasingly 
providing the militants with advance notice of impending American operations against 
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them.9 Under growing American pressure to rein in the ISI, the new elected government in 
Islamabad made a half-baked attempt to bring the agency under civilian control but quickly 
backed down when the army high command angrily resisted the move, leaving nobody in 
any doubt as to where ultimate power in Pakistan still resided.10 
In November 2008, just weeks after the election of Barack Obama as America‘s next 
president, the repercussions of Pakistan‘s ambivalent approach to countering militancy were 
on gory display in India‘s commercial capital of Mumbai, when 10 terrorists belonging to 
the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, officially outlawed by the Pakistan government still enjoying 
unchecked freedom of movement, mounted coordinated attacks that had been planned in 
Pakistan and which left 175 people dead, including six Americans. The head of the ISI at 
the time, General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, admitted to his American interlocutors that the 
planners included at least two retired army officers with ISI links but that the operation did 
not have the agency‘s sanction.11 However, one of the key suspects held in connection with 
the attacks subsequently confessed during interrogation that serving mid-level ISI officers 
were involved in operational planning, although the agency‘s high command may not have 
been aware of the actual nature and scope of the operation before it was launched.12 
The Bush administration‘s post-9/11 policy choices in both Afghanistan and Pakistan 
signified a failure of substantial proportions. Afghanistan was neither pacified nor rebuilt, 
al-Qaeda was driven out but only as far as Pakistan‘s tribal belt across the border and both 
attention and resources were increasingly diverted towards what turned out to be an even 
greater misadventure in Iraq. With respect to Pakistan, the administration‘s approach was 
similarly myopic and blighted by inherent contradictions that remained unresolved, not least 
amongst them being the decision to prop up a military ruler whilst ostensibly championing 
democracy promotion across the Muslim world. The sudden turnaround in relations 
between the US and Pakistan necessitated by 9/11 increasingly became a ―rickety 
foundation‖ upon which to erect America‘s regional strategy.13 According to a 
contemporary American expert on Pakistan, the US erred in defining the terms of its 
counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan too narrowly: ―Lurching from crisis to crisis, 
Washington lacked a vision for its relationship with Islamabad broader than the desire to 
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keep Afghanistan and Pakistan on the rails long enough to see bin Laden dead and 
buried.‖14 
I. Obama and AF-PAK 
 
During his election campaign, Democratic Senator Barack Obama had been strident in his 
criticism of the Bush administration‘s policy of prioritising Iraq over Afghanistan, which he 
declared the ―central front in the war on terror.‖ If elected president, he vowed to end the 
war in Iraq and make the battle against al-Qaeda and the Taliban ―the top priority that it 
should be.‖ While promising to send additional troops to Afghanistan to fight the 
insurgents, Obama declared that the greatest threat to American security resided not in 
Afghanistan itself but rather in Pakistan‘s tribal areas, where both al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
enjoyed sanctuary and support. The presidential aspirant emphasised that Bush‘s decision to 
provide ―a blank check to a general‖ had been a failure and that the US had to move beyond 
a ―purely military alliance based on convenience‖ or else confront ―mounting popular 
opposition in a nuclear-armed nation at the nexus of terror and radical Islam.‖15 
Shortly after his inauguration as president, Obama appointed former senior diplomat 
Richard Holbrooke as his Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) and 
commissioned former CIA analyst and South Asia expert Bruce Riedel to conduct a 
strategic review of American policies in what the administration lumped together as ―AF-
PAK.‖16 Based on the findings of the strategic policy review, Obama announced in March 
2009 that his administration had ―a clear and focused goal‖ to ―disrupt, dismantle and defeat 
al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the 
future.‖ While calling on Pakistan to show its commitment to ―rooting out al-Qaeda and the 
violent extremists within its borders,‖ Obama promised a departure from America‘s usual 
policy of ―providing a blank check‖ to successive Pakistani military regimes and undertook 
to forge a new relationship ―grounded in support for Pakistan‘s democratic institutions and 
the Pakistani people.‖17 
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A white paper containing the detailed findings and recommendations of the strategic review 
delineated the various aspects of the new administration‘s strategy for U.S.-Pakistan 
relations, including bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation; focusing Pakistan on the 
common threat; strengthening Pakistan‘s counterterrorism capabilities; increasing and 
broadening non-military aid; exploring previously untapped areas of economic cooperation; 
building up Pakistani governmental capacity; and asking allied countries to contribute more 
aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan.18 The administration subsequently supported 
Congressional efforts to pass legislation authorising a substantial increase in non-military 
assistance to Pakistan.  
Taking its name from its main sponsors in Congress, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill (known 
more commonly by the acronym KLB) sought to raise US developmental aid to Pakistan to 
roughly $1.5 billion annually for a period of five years.19 While military aid and 
reimbursements would continue to be provided, the KLB imposed stringent conditions that 
Pakistan would have to meet in order to qualify for security assistance. For instance, the US 
Secretary of State would have to certify annually before Congress that Pakistan was 
―continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks 
relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials…‖20 Another mandatory 
certification would have to be issued of Pakistan‘s ―sustained commitment‖ towards 
combating terrorist outfits, including the extent to which it had made progress in:  
(i) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its 
intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that 
has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or 
against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; 
(ii) preventing al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-
Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, 
including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing 
terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts 
of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided 
with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; 
(iii) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and 
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(iv) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the 
political or judicial processes of Pakistan. 
The bill allowed the Secretary of State, acting on the authority of the President, to waive the 
above limitations if it was ―important to the national security interests of the United States 
to do so.‖ In October 2009, Congress passed the KLB bill as the Enhanced Partnership with 
Pakistan Act, which senior administration officials such as Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton trumpeted as the opening of ―a historic chapter‖ in bilateral relations that would 
―strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the American people and the 
people of Pakistan.‖21 Within Pakistan, however, the new legislation immediately generated 
a storm of controversy and criticism, especially from the military itself, which publicly 
expressed its ―serious concerns‖ about the impact of the aid package on ―national 
security.‖22 The civilian government led by President Asif Ali Zardari - who had been 
elected to office after Musharraf‘s resignation - and his handpicked Prime Minister Yusuf 
Raza Gilani welcomed the prospect of more American dollars to revive an economy 
paralysed largely by the government‘s own corruption and incompetence. However, the 
opposition parties in parliament, backed up by a raucous Pakistani media, loudly and 
angrily denounced the ―insulting‖ language of the new legislation.23 
Stunned by the vehemence of Pakistani opprobrium when they had probably been expecting 
the fervent thanks of a grateful nation, the sponsors of the KLB legislation quickly issued an 
explanatory statement clarifying that it did not ―seek in any way to compromise Pakistan‘s 
sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan‘s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect 
of Pakistani military or civilian operations.‖24 The assurance managed to assuage wounded 
sentiments in Pakistan, which in any case was in no position to actually spurn the American 
aid offer. In fact, the army could well have engineered the domestic backlash in order to 
further strengthen its hand against an already beleaguered civilian government.25 Yet, the 
diplomatic fracas surrounding the aid package underscored once again the gaping chasm of 
mistrust between two countries supposedly allied in a close strategic partnership. 
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By 2010, total US aid to Pakistan comprising both military and non-military assistance 
increased to $4.3 billion, representing a 2,185 per cent increase over pre-9/11 levels and 
making Pakistan the second largest recipient of American aid, behind Afghanistan but 
ahead of Israel.26 While the increase in developmental assistance was important in 
signalling America‘s intention to broaden the scope of its engagement with Pakistan, it was 
never intended to be a major policy objective in and of itself. Instead, it was to be used as a 
complement to the Obama administration‘s core security interests in the region: destroying 
al-Qaeda‘s terrorist infrastructure erected in Pakistan‘s tribal areas, finding a face-saving 
exit from the quagmire in Afghanistan and preventing extremists in Pakistan from getting 
their hands on a nuclear weapon. Pakistani cooperation was deemed critical for the 
attainment of all three objectives. Like his predecessor, Obama sought to purchase that 
cooperation but, as was the case under Bush, the results were mixed. While willing - albeit 
under sustained American pressure - to mount operations against al-Qaeda and the TTP, the 
Pakistani army high command continued its hedging strategy of tolerating those groups that 
could serve its strategic interests in the future, especially once the US withdrew from 
Afghanistan. 
Months after Obama took office, the civilian government in Pakistan, no doubt with the 
prior approval of the army, concluded a deal with TTP militants in the Swat district of the 
NWFP (currently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) whereby courts would be set up to dispense justice 
in line with Islamic law in exchange for the militants agreeing to renounce violence against 
the state. Public pressure on both the elected government as well as the army to negotiate 
with the militants instead of fighting what was widely perceived as ―America‘s war‖ had 
been mounting ever since it came to power.27 Popular opinion within Pakistan 
overwhelmingly held US policies in the region as well as in the wider Middle East directly 
responsible for the rise in terrorist violence and was particularly embittered by America‘s 
growing use of drone strikes, which were seen as a blatant violation of state sovereignty.28 
Moreover, the collateral damage inflicted by drones in the tribal areas was seen as a direct 
cause of the terrorist retribution consequently visited on Pakistan‘s cities.29 
As was the case with previous peace deals, the Swat agreement soon unravelled, largely 
because the militants had no intention of abiding by its terms and simply wanted a lull in the 
fighting in which to regroup and consolidate their numbers. Instead of confining themselves 
                                                          
26
 Epstein and Kronstadt, ―Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance.‖  
27
 Matthew J. Nelson, ―Pakistan in 2009: Tackling the Taliban?‖ Asian Survey 50, no. 1 
(January/February 2010), 118. 
28
 Out of a total of 48 drone strikes in Pakistan during the Bush presidency, 36 took place in 2008, Bush‘s 
final year in office. ―Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,‖ New America International Security Program, 
accessed July 16, 2015, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan-analysis.html 
29
 Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, 25. 
224 
 
to Swat, TTP militants took over the adjoining district of Buner, just sixty miles from the 
Pakistani capital of Islamabad, setting off alarm bells in Washington. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton berated the Pakistan government for ―basically abdicating to the Taliban 
and the extremists‖ and issued a shrill warning that the situation posed ―a mortal threat to 
the security and safety of our country and the world.‖30 The TTP‘s refusal to abide by the 
Swat agreement and growing evidence of its brutal excesses quickly swung public opinion 
in Pakistan against further negotiations and in favour of military action.31 Emboldened by 
greater public support, the army launched a heavy-handed conventional operation against 
the TTP in Swat and adjoining districts that eventually cleared those areas but not without 
causing massive displacement of the local population.32 By mid-2010, however, most of the 
displaced residents had returned to their native areas and law and order had been restored to 
the region, albeit only through the army‘s continued occupation.33 
The Swat operation triggered off a spate of devastating terrorist attacks by the TTP across 
Pakistan, including a massive bomb strike on an ISI office building in Lahore that provided 
a blood-stained testament to the agency‘s growing loss of control over those it had 
cultivated for decades as strategic assets. The attacks prompted the army to gear up for yet 
another operation in South Waziristan, the stronghold of TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud and 
his al-Qaeda allies, but before the formal launch of the operation Mehsud was killed by a 
CIA-operated drone strike in August 2009. His replacement, Hakeemullah Mehsud (no 
relation), took over from where his predecessor had left off and masterminded a string of 
deadly attacks on government forces, including a particularly audacious assault in October 
2009, with direct involvement of former army personnel, on the heavily guarded 
headquarters of the Pakistan army in Rawalpindi.34 In addition to dealing a huge 
psychological blow to the morale of the army, the attack raised further question marks 
abroad about the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal. Although Hillary Clinton 
downplayed fears that the Taliban were going to take over the country, she considered the 
attack ―a reminder that extremists…are increasingly threatening the authority of the state.‖35 
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Days after the Rawalpindi attack, the army commenced its ground incursion into South 
Waziristan, the fourth foray there in less than a decade with the three previous ones having 
all ended in failure. After encountering stiff initial resistance, the army managed to clear 
most of the ground previously occupied by the TTP and managed to disrupt the group‘s 
command, control and logistics infrastructure but was unable to capture or kill the senior 
leadership. In fact, the TTP relocated much of its manpower either to neighbouring 
Afghanistan or to other agencies in FATA, from whence to wage an attritional guerrilla 
war. Fighting continued in South Waziristan as well as across other parts of FATA 
throughout 2010. One agency, however, remained off-limits as far as the army was 
concerned: North Waziristan, home to the Haqqani network, elements of the Afghan 
Taliban and various Taliban factions led by warlords who had concluded deals with the 
army to focus their energies on confronting US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan instead of 
directing their guns at Pakistan.36 Thus, even as the Obama administration acknowledged 
Pakistan‘s ―determination and persistence‖ in combating al-Qaeda and the TTP, it also 
accused Islamabad of continuing to support ―other Pakistan-based groups that operate in 
Afghanistan.‖37 
In order to mitigate the chronic mistrust between the two sides, Obama wrote a letter to 
Zardari in which he offered a long-term strategic partnership in exchange for Pakistani 
cooperation in ―defeating Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar e Taiba, the 
Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban and the assorted other militant groups that threaten 
security.‖38 Obama also highlighted his vision for South Asia that centred on the creation of 
―new patterns of cooperation between and among India, Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
counter those who seek to create permanent tension and conflict on the subcontinent.‖ The 
letter sought ―fundamental readjustments‖ by Pakistan before the long-term partnership 
offered could be put in place. However, according to the Pakistani ambassador to 
Washington at the time, Islamabad did not see a need for any readjustment of priorities and 
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Zardari‘s reply, drafted by ―a committee of Foreign Office and ISI bureaucrats,‖ merely 
regurgitated ―old clichés‖ about the threat from India.39 
In October 2010, senior officials from the two countries met in Washington for the third 
round of a US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, a brainchild of special envoy Richard 
Holbrooke. The meeting came close on the heels of an incursion into Pakistan by US-led 
NATO troops ostensibly in hot pursuit of Taliban militants but which ended up killing two 
Pakistani paramilitary border guards. In retaliation, Pakistan had temporarily closed the 
supply route into Afghanistan upon which US and other foreign forces relied heavily for the 
passage of key provisions.40 During the deliberations in Washington, the US apologised for 
the deaths of the Pakistani personnel but also demanded a sustained effort by Islamabad to 
target the Haqqani network. For its part, Pakistan expressed its concerns about America‘s 
increasing tilt towards India, demanded that India be kept out of any future attempts at 
negotiating a solution to the Afghan conflict, and tried to secure Obama‘s agreement to 
visiting Pakistan in 2011.41 
Although the Pakistani delegation in Washington was led by the foreign minister, the star 
attraction was army chief General Kayani - fresh from having just received a three-year 
extension in service - who was correctly identified by his American interlocutors as the 
ultimate decision-making authority within Pakistan on all national security matters. In a 
meeting with Pakistani officials including Kayani, Obama cautioned that a continuing 
absence of trust between the two sides would set them ―on a collision course.‖42 Kayani‘s 
response was to present Obama with a 14-page memorandum on Pakistan‘s strategic 
concerns and priorities which held the US responsible for ―causing and maintaining a 
controlled chaos in Pakistan‖ as part of an overall strategy aimed at depriving Pakistan of its 
nuclear weapons.43 Notwithstanding the continuing suspicion with which patron and client 
viewed each other, the Obama administration announced a fresh five-year package of 
military aid worth $2 billion.44 
With Pakistan consistently exhibiting one of the highest rates of anti-American sentiment in 
the world, Kayani was careful to maintain a public persona of independence and occasional 
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defiance when it came to his dealings with the US.45 He steadfastly refused to accede to 
consistent refrains from Washington to go after the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, 
arguing that the army was already heavily engaged in other parts of FATA and that there 
was insufficient public support for such an operation.46 Yet, away from the public gaze and 
on areas where he perceived a greater convergence of interests with the US, Kayani did 
provide considerable support. Classified US diplomatic cables released by the WikiLeaks 
website in 2010 revealed that Kayani had secretly allowed as many as 12 US Special 
Operations commandos to work as advisers to conventional Pakistani army units in 
operations along the Afghan border, despite repeated public pronouncements from both the 
civilian government and the military that US military presence within Pakistan would be 
confined to training at specified bases.47 Even more significant was Kayani‘s private request 
to the US to expand the coverage of drone surveillance even as he denounced their use in 
public.48 
Senior US military officials, in particular Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), invested considerable time and energy in cultivating Kayani, 
including by paying 27 visits to Islamabad between 2008 and 2011.49 Mullen established a 
close personal relationship with Kayani and largely sympathised with his view that Pakistan 
simply did not have enough resources and troops to put into the field against the Haqqani 
network while it was still engaged in Swat and South Waziristan.50 There was even 
speculation that the Pentagon had pushed the civilian government in Islamabad to extend 
Kayani‘s tenure as army chief.51 Rumours that the Obama administration in general wished 
to see Kayani remain in office intensified after the civilian government announced a sudden 
decision to prolong Kayani‘s term immediately after a trip to Pakistan by Secretary of State 
Clinton.52 
Washington was generally forthcoming in its approbation of the operations carried out in 
FATA and other Taliban-infested areas under Kayani‘s watch. The head of the US Central 
Command between 2008 and 2010, General David Petraeus, termed the army‘s counter-
                                                          
45
 In 2012, for instance, three out of four Pakistanis in a Pew survey of 1,206 respondents considered the 
US an enemy of Pakistan. See Musa Memon, ―Part 1 - PEW Report: Anti-American sentiment rife in 
Pakistan,‖ Express Tribune, June 28, 2012. 
46
 Karin Brulliard and Karen DeYoung, ―U.S. efforts fail to convince Pakistan‘s top general to target 
Taliban,‖ Washington Post, December 31, 2010. 
47
 Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, ―WikiLeaks cables show U.S. focus on Pakistan‘s military, nuclear 
material,‖ Washington Post, November 30, 2010. 
48
 Jane Perlez, ―Newspaper in Pakistan Publishes WikiLeaks Cables,‖ New York Times, May 20, 2011. 
49
 Brulliard and DeYoung, ―U.S. efforts fail to convince.‖ 
50
 ―Kayani‘s gambit,‖ Economist, July 29, 2010, accessed June 1, 2015,  
http://www.economist.com/node/16693723 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 ―3 more years for Kayani,‖ Express Tribune, July 23, 2010. 
228 
 
insurgency tactics ―quite impressive‖ and declared that they would be studied for years to 
come.53 At the same time, however, the impasse between the US and Pakistan on targeting 
the sanctuaries of the Afghan Taliban and their allied Haqqani network remained 
unresolved. While much of the blame could legitimately be attributed to the Pakistani 
army‘s schizophrenic policies towards tackling militancy, a considerable share of the 
responsibility must also be placed on the Obama‘s administration‘s failure to stabilise 
Afghanistan as well as the Karzai government‘s continuing inability to provide even a 
semblance of good governance.54 
Amongst the policy outcomes of his first AF-PAK strategic review in March 2009, Obama 
had announced an immediate deployment of an additional 21,000 US troops to Afghanistan 
to provide an enabling security environment in the lead-up to presidential elections in 
August.55 However, the troop increase was unable to slow down the momentum of the 
Taliban insurgency, which dramatically ramped up the scale of its attacks in a bid to disrupt 
the elections. While the elections eventually took place as scheduled, their credibility was 
gravely undermined by widespread fraud committed by loyalists of Hamid Karzai, who was 
running for a second five-year term.56 In its desperation to use the fact that elections had 
been held at all as proof that its new strategy in Afghanistan was working, the Obama 
administration, instead of holding Karzai to account, deemed it expedient to sanctify his 
rigged electoral victory.  
American backing for Karzai‘s continuation in office could not but have been viewed with 
disfavour by Pakistan‘s strategic planners, who had been stung by his often public 
harangues against the Pakistani army and the ISI and his pronounced tilt towards India. 
Karzai‘s prolongation in power for another five years made it even more unlikely that 
Pakistan would agree to American demands for a policy shift with respect to the Afghan 
Taliban. Mixed messages emanating from Washington regarding its actual objectives in 
Afghanistan only served to compound Islamabad‘s suspicions. In December 2009, after 
commissioning yet another AF-PAK review, Obama announced a surge of 30,000 more 
troops to fight the Taliban but effectively negated its impact by concurrently setting a 
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timetable for withdrawal commencing in July 2011. Such ambivalence was interpreted by 
Pakistan as indicative of dwindling American resolve to stay the course in Afghanistan and 
―relaxed what pressure Pakistan might otherwise have felt to reconsider its own stance 
towards the Taliban insurgents and get onboard with Washington‘s program.‖57 
Within the Obama administration itself, there was no clear consensus on the right strategy 
to employ in Afghanistan, thereby undermining the credibility of the plan that the president 
eventually decided to follow.58 While the US military supported the troop surge, State 
Department officials were more sceptical, with the US ambassador in Kabul, Karl 
Eikenberry, arguing that as long as the border sanctuaries of the Taliban inside Pakistan 
remained undisturbed, ―the gains from sending additional forces may be fleeting.‖59 When 
the surge failed to arrest the momentum of the Taliban, elements within the administration, 
most notably Richard Holbrooke, began to advocate reconciliation with the insurgents as 
part of a face-saving exit from Afghanistan. However, until his death in December 2010, 
Holbrooke made little headway in terms of actually influencing policy to that end primarily 
because he was largely ignored by Obama himself.60 
For Islamabad, which had for long been recommending a ceasefire and talks with the 
Taliban, such a policy shift by the US was not unwelcome but only provided that Pakistan 
itself facilitated the negotiating process and enjoyed a central role in determining its 
outcome. From Pakistan‘s perspective, the American troop surge on its own would not be 
enough to break what had effectively become a military stalemate with the Taliban; in other 
words, military force would have to be accompanied with a comprehensive road map for 
negotiations aimed at achieving ―inclusive‖ reconciliation, meaning a settlement with the 
Taliban high command.61 For much of 2010, however, the US approach to reconciliation 
remained much more narrowly defined and was subordinated to its military strategy. The 
troop surge was ―essentially meant to weaken the Afghan Taliban leadership and wean off 
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their middle- and lower ranking cadres,‖ thereby allowing Washington to exploit divisions 
within the Taliban to negotiate from a position of strength.62 
The fundamental policy disconnect between Washington and Islamabad did not augur well 
for the success of the nascent reconciliation process. Moreover, Pakistani fears of being 
excluded from that process by the US were heightened after Washington tried to bypass 
Islamabad in reaching out to the Taliban, initially by allowing the Karzai government to 
engage the Taliban directly63 and later by opening up its own channels of communication.64 
In response, Pakistan moved to stymie such initiatives, including by capturing and 
imprisoning senior Taliban officials involved in clandestine talks with the Afghan 
government, most prominently Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the highest ranking Taliban 
leader after Mullah Omar.65 Requests by the government in Kabul to extradite Baradar were 
turned down. At the same time, the ISI attempted to secure American backing for a deal 
between the Karzai government and the Haqqani network but was unable to overcome 
Washington‘s reluctance to do business with an outfit that maintained its links with al-
Qaeda and continued to attack US forces in Afghanistan.66 
II. The India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan 
 
Amongst the not inconsiderable shortcomings of the Obama administration‘s AF-PAK 
policy, a particularly glaring deficiency was its failure to set out a viable plan for addressing 
the adversarial relationship between Pakistan and India, a rivalry regarded by many 
observers as the key driver behind the Pakistani military‘s ongoing support to the Taliban 
insurgency. Shortly after his election victory in 2008 but before being formally inaugurated, 
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Obama had acknowledged that the extent of Pakistani cooperation with the US in 
Afghanistan would depend a great deal on how India and Pakistan managed their relations 
with each other. To that end, he suggested that the US facilitate ―better understanding‖ 
between the two countries and even try to push them towards a resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute ―so that they [the Pakistanis] can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with 
those militants.‖67 India was alarmed by any talk of internationalising an issue that it had 
always portrayed as a bilateral dispute between itself and Pakistan and quickly turned down 
Obama‘s offer of facilitation.  
New Delhi also managed to exclude itself from special envoy Richard Holbrooke‘s remit. 
Obama had initially planned to appoint a representative with overall responsibility for 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India but quickly caved in to protests from New Delhi that ―such 
a broad mandate [presumably including Kashmir]…smacks of interference and would be 
unacceptable.‖68 Following his appointment, Holbrooke made it clear that his mandate was 
restricted to Afghanistan and Pakistan and tried to reassure his sceptical Pakistani 
interlocutors, for whom India was a central concern, that he would ―deal with India by 
pretending not to deal with India.‖69 For many Pakistanis, Holbrooke‘s semantics could not 
disguise the fact that the new administration had succumbed to India‘s pressure not to 
hyphenate it with Afghanistan and Pakistan even as it ignored Pakistani reservations at 
being lumped together with Afghanistan. According to one US expert on Pakistan, right 
from the time the AF-PAK strategy was announced, the Obama administration saw Pakistan 
as ―first and foremost an extension of the American mission in Afghanistan‖ and even 
though Islamabad eventually persuaded Washington to discarded the appellation, the 
―mental framework stuck.‖70 
Despite the increase in developmental assistance to Pakistan, the Obama administration 
largely followed its predecessor‘s policy of viewing the bilateral relationship primarily 
through a narrow, security-driven lens. And like both Clinton and Bush before him, Obama 
made no secret of his preference for India as America‘s strategic partner in South Asia. 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was the first foreign leader to visit the Obama 
White House on a state visit and New Delhi was the first port of call for Obama‘s newly 
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appointed CIA director Leon Panetta, a gesture aimed at showing the ISI that ―the CIA was 
looking elsewhere for allies in South Asia.‖71 
In a pointed rebuff to Pakistan, Obama travelled to India and Afghanistan in November 
2010 but spurned Islamabad‘s invitation for a visit. While in India, his words only 
heightened the Pakistani army‘s paranoia about a rapidly emerging US-India axis. Obama 
declared India to be a world power that merited a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council and termed the alliance between the two countries ―one of the defining partnerships 
of the 21st century.‖72 In response, an exasperated General Kayani let it be known through 
the Pakistani media that the ―frames of reference‖ of the US and Pakistan about regional 
security issues ―can never be the same‖ and that America‘s once ―most allied ally‖ had now 
become its ―most bullied ally.‖73 From the Obama administration‘s perspective, the benefits 
of cultivating India - the world‘s second most populous country, a rising economic power, 
an enormous market for US manufacturers and, perhaps most significantly, a potential 
strategic counterweight in Asia to China - outweighed any considerations of how the 
growing Indo-US alignment might be viewed in Islamabad.  
Of particular concern to the Pakistani army was the potential impact of India‘s burgeoning 
strategic alliance with the US on events within Afghanistan, where Islamabad and New 
Delhi were by then waging an all-out proxy war. As alluded to in the previous chapter, 
India had managed to dramatically increase its footprint inside Afghanistan after the fall of 
the Taliban. By 2010, it had poured in $1.3 billion in developmental assistance, making it 
Afghanistan‘s largest regional donor.74 Pakistan consistently alleged that the Indian role in 
Afghanistan went beyond development to include use of its embassy and a host of 
consulates not only to erode Pakistan‘s influence but to foment separatist unrest in 
Balochistan75 and even to covertly assisting elements of the Pakistani Taliban.76 Through its 
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support to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, Pakistan sought to counter what it 
viewed as unacceptable Indian intrusion into its strategic orbit. 
Under both Bush and Obama, the US had deferred to Pakistani fears of Indian encirclement 
by urging New Delhi to confine its role in Afghanistan to development and to steer clear of 
any security cooperation with the Afghan government, a clear redline for Islamabad.77 
However, the Pakistani military establishment remained deeply suspicious of India‘s close 
relationship with the Karzai regime. After the ISI arrested Mullah Baradar and other 
Taliban members for going behind its back in talking to the Afghan government, Karzai had 
complained to Pakistan that it was ―sabotaging and undermining‖ his efforts at 
reconciliation but was informed in turn that if he wanted Pakistani cooperation, he should 
close down India‘s consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar that bordered Pakistan.78 
In February 2010, the India-Pakistan proxy war in Afghanistan heated up after an attack on 
two guest houses in Kandahar left 18 people dead, of which nine were Indians including 
two serving army majors. Also amongst the dead was the assistant consul general from the 
Indian consulate in Kandahar.79 American and Afghan intelligence quickly traced the attack 
to a joint operation mounted by the Haqqani network and the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-
Tayyaba.80 Although Islamabad denied any involvement, the Kandahar attack, in the 
estimation of one observer, sent both Washington and New Delhi ―a clear signal that the 
Pakistani military would protect its interests‖ in Afghanistan.81 A series of devastating 
terrorist attacks that took place in Lahore the following month were alleged by Pakistani 
authorities to have been carried out with Indian involvement.82 
Having invested so significantly in Afghanistan with a view to reducing Pakistan‘s 
influence there, India was jolted not only by the American decision to withdraw from 
Afghanistan but also because that withdrawal was now predicated not on defeating the 
Taliban, who were still viewed by New Delhi as outright Pakistani proxies, but instead on 
reconciling with them, a policy to which India was stridently opposed.83 With Pakistan 
primed to occupy centre stage in managing the reconciliation process with the Taliban, 
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India faced the grim prospect of being denied any meaningful role in influencing the 
Afghan endgame in the lead-up to a final US withdrawal.  
During his visit to India, however, Obama dispelled the impression that New Delhi was no 
longer relevant in Afghanistan. A joint statement with Manmohan Singh committed the US 
and India to ―intensify consultation, cooperation and coordination‖ on Afghanistan and 
reiterated their shared view that ―success in Afghanistan and regional and global security 
require elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.‖84 Such words, along with Obama‘s fulsome recognition of 
India‘s ―extraordinary contribution to Afghanistan‘s development,‖ only served to heighten 
the Pakistani military establishment‘s fear of Indian encroachment in Afghanistan, 
paradoxically making it ever more difficult for Washington to convince Islamabad to 
abandon its proxies in Afghanistan. According to an American source, ―by encouraging 
India to become the region‘s major economic player in Afghanistan,‖ the US itself 
effectively undermined its own strategic interests by increasing Pakistan‘s resolve ―to hang 
on to the Taliban, the Haqqani group and other insurgent networks to both counter Indian 
influence and protect Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.‖85 
III. The Year from Hell 
 
In December 2010, Obama announced his annual review of US policy in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The review came in the wake of a NATO summit conference in Lisbon where it 
was announced that all combat operations by ISAF forces in Afghanistan would cease by 
the end of 2014 and that the vast majority of some 138,000 international troops would leave 
the country by then through a phased withdrawal.86 While welcoming ongoing Pakistani 
operations in the tribal areas, Obama cautioned that much more needed to be done and 
declared his intention to insist to Pakistani leaders that ―terrorist safe havens within their 
borders must be dealt with.‖ On a friendlier note, Obama looked forward to visiting 
Pakistan the following year and emphasised America‘s commitment to ―an enduring 
partnership that helps deliver improved security, development, and justice for the Pakistani 
people.‖87 There would, however, be no presidential visit to Pakistan in 2011 and the 
―enduring partnership‖ between the two countries that Obama had referred to would instead 
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descend into a prolonged and bitter diplomatic brawl without precedent in their bilateral 
relationship.  
In an often tempestuous association that went back almost six decades, there had been some 
dramatic highs interspersed with periods of significant mutual estrangement. Amongst the 
latter, however, none could match the nature and extent of the deterioration in ties that took 
place in 2011, a year that could justifiably be termed the preeminent annus horribilis in the 
history of US-Pakistan relations. In January, Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor working out 
of the US consulate in Lahore, shot and killed two Pakistanis who he claimed were trying to 
rob him at gunpoint.88 Davis was apprehended and placed behind bars to await trial for 
murder. After initially claiming immunity for him on the grounds that he was a bona fide 
diplomat, the US subsequently backtracked and confessed that he was indeed working for 
the CIA.89 Nevertheless, Washington continued to put unrelenting pressure on Islamabad to 
let him go. After less than two months of incarceration, Davis was released and 
immediately spirited off back to the US following an arrangement worked out by the ISI in 
which the relatives of the men killed by Davis pardoned him in exchange for some $2.3 
million in ―blood money.‖90 
Davis had been part of a covert CIA team put together to monitor the activities of the 
Lashkar-e-Tayyba, the alleged perpetrator of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.91 Under Obama‘s 
presidency, the CIA had substantially increased its covert presence inside Pakistan without 
keeping the ISI informed about the number and identities of its personnel and the nature of 
their activities. Amongst those activities was stepped up recruitment of locals to form a 
clandestine network aimed at tracking down Osama bin Laden.92 Even though the ISI 
eventually bowed to American pressure and agreed to let Davis off the hook, the whole 
murky affair cast a deep shadow over its relationship with the CIA and further deepened an 
already acute level of mistrust between the US and the Pakistani army. Enraged by evidence 
of ―the creeping unilateralism‖ of CIA operations in Pakistan,93 especially those directed at 
groups deemed to be the army‘s strategic assets, General Kayani demanded from 
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Washington that it immediately recall some 335 American personnel including regular CIA 
operatives, all CIA contractors and most Special Operations forces deputed in the tribal 
areas to train Pakistani troops.94 
A vastly expanded CIA presence was but one prong of the Obama administration‘s covert 
war in Pakistan; the other prong, albeit one that was much more in the public domain, was a 
surge in CIA-operated drone attacks in the tribal areas, often without providing advance 
warning to Pakistani authorities. Unilateral drone strikes had actually been sanctioned in the 
final months of the Bush presidency, an indication of Bush‘s increasing frustration with 
Pakistan‘s inability or unwillingness to indiscriminately target all militants in FATA. Since 
the first known drone strike in Pakistan in 2004, only a small number of high-value targets 
on the CIA‘s hit-list had been killed by the drones and other potential strikes were aborted 
either because of delays in getting Pakistani approval or because the targets appeared to 
have been forewarned and had already bolted.95 Bush authorised 36 strikes in his final year 
in office but Obama took the use of drones to another level altogether by ordering 52 strikes 
in 2009 and 122 in 2010.96 
Taken together, the increased use of drones and the unilateral expansion of clandestine CIA 
operations in Pakistan constituted a tacit admission by the Obama administration that 
despite providing more assistance than ever before, Washington was still not receiving the 
level of cooperation from Islamabad that it desired. Even though the drone attacks aroused 
widespread public fury in Pakistan and further inflamed anti-American sentiments, the US 
showed no intention of scaling them down. Just a day after Raymond Davis was flown out 
of Pakistan to safety and even as violent protests against his release were taking place in 
Pakistan‘s main cities, the CIA launched a lethal drone strike on a tribal council meeting in 
North Waziristan that killed at least 38 people, including a number of civilians.97 
Employing unusually strong language, General Kayani publicly denounced the attack for 
being ―carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard to human life.‖98 In 
response, American officials claimed that the victims ―weren‘t gathering for a bake sale‖ 
and were indeed ―terrorists.‖99 
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Even as the US and Pakistan were still struggling to come to terms with the fallout of the 
Raymond Davis affair, the bilateral relationship went into a complete tailspin in May after 
American special forces finally tracked down and killed Osama bin Laden. Ever since 9/11, 
Pakistan‘s civilian and military leaders had steadfastly denied any possibility of bin Laden 
being present in their country, with General Musharraf having claimed as early as 2002 that 
the al-Qaeda head had probably died of kidney failure or, if still alive, was most likely 
holed up in a remote Afghan mountain hideout.100 Yet, when the end came for bin Laden, 
he was discovered and killed not in Afghanistan or even in Pakistan‘s largely ungoverned 
tribal areas but instead in the garrison town of Abbottabad, just 115 kilometres from 
Islamabad and home to the Pakistan Military Academy, the equivalent of America‘s West 
Point.  
In what was a shocking indictment of the Pakistani military‘s security protocols, two US 
Black Hawk stealth helicopters were able to enter Pakistan‘s airspace from Afghanistan, 
elude radar detection, and off-load 23 Navy SEALs onto bin Laden‘s sprawling compound. 
The SEAL team blew holes in the compound‘s walls, entered bin Laden‘s house, shot him 
dead and gathered up masses of electronic data equipment found on the premises. One of 
the helicopters was damaged as a result of a faulty landing and while the SEALs were 
completing their mission, a replacement was flown in, again undetected by Pakistani air 
defences. The damaged helicopter was then blown up in order to prevent its sophisticated 
avionics falling into the hands of the Pakistani authorities. By the time the Pakistani air 
force finally scrambled two F-16 jets to give chase, the two US helicopters, one of them 
carrying bin Laden‘s dead body, had already crossed back into Afghanistan.101 
Through its network of Pakistani agents and informers as well as its own operatives on the 
ground, the CIA had been monitoring the compound in Abbottabad on the suspicion that it 
contained the fugitive al-Qaeda leader, who it later emerged had been there all along since 
2006. By March 2011, Obama was satisfied enough with the evidence placed before him to 
initiate preparations for the raid. However, he turned down the option of enlisting Pakistan‘s 
cooperation or of even giving the Pakistanis advance notice so as not to risk the operation 
being compromised.102 
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The circumstances surrounding the raid, particularly bin Laden‘s undetected presence for 
five years ―practically under the Pakistani military‘s nose,‖ gave rise to serious misgivings 
in Washington about having invested billions of dollars in a client state that was, at best, 
utterly incompetent or, at worst, complicit in harbouring the world‘s most wanted 
terrorist.103 Within Pakistan, there was ―confusion, outrage, and embarrassment,‖ not only 
because of bin Laden‘s discovery inside the country but also because of the ease with which 
the US had been able to complete its operation without even being detected, let alone 
subjected to any resistance.104 Many Pakistanis now began to question their army‘s ability 
to prevent India from launching a similar unilateral strike on Pakistani soil.105 
Faced with enormous domestic and international criticism, the army chose not to accept 
responsibility for what was arguably its greatest embarrassment since the 1971 defeat to 
India. General Kayani did not deem the debacle to be of sufficient magnitude to warrant his 
resignation, nor indeed did he allow the civilian government to accept ISI chief General 
Pasha‘s offer to resign. The elected government and parliament, in turn, found themselves 
unable to summon up the backbone to hold the army high command to account. Instead, 
they ended up towing the army‘s line by condemning the US raid as a violation of Pakistani 
sovereignty, calling for an immediate cessation of drone strikes and threatening to close 
down the ground lines of communication for supplying NATO forces in Afghanistan.106 
For its part, the Obama administration was careful not to formally accuse Pakistan of 
complicity in harbouring bin Laden since Pakistani cooperation was still deemed essential 
for facilitating the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, in the aftermath of 
the bin Laden raid, senior US diplomats did deliver a ―stern message‖ to their Pakistani 
civilian and military interlocutors that patience in Congress was wearing thin and could 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and ISI chief General Pasha knew of the raid in advance and had made sure that the two helicopters 
delivering the SEALs to Abbottabad could cross Pakistani airspace without triggering any alarms. 
According to Hersh, the CIA did not learn of bin Laden‘s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the 
White House has claimed since May 2011, but instead from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer 
who betrayed the secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US. Moreover, Hersh 
maintains that while Obama did order the raid and the Seal team did carry it out, many other aspects of 
the administration‘s account were false. Seymour M. Hersh, ―The Killing of Osama bin Laden,‖ London 
Review of Books 37, no.10 (May 21, 2015), accessed June 13, 2015, 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n10/seymour-m-hersh/the-killing-of-osama-bin-laden 
The Obama administration has denied the veracity of Hersh‘s account and continues to reaffirm its 
original version of events. See Dion Nissenbaum, ―White House Denies Report That Pakistan Helped in 
Bin Laden Hit,‖ Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2015. Pakistan military sources have admitted that a former 
senior intelligence operative did indeed help the CIA in tracking down bin Laden but reject any advance 
knowledge of the Abbottabad operation. See ―Pakistan military officials admit defector‘s key role in Bin 
Laden operation,‖ Dawn, May 12, 2015. 
103
 Markey, No Exit from Pakistan, 139. 
104
 Fair, ―Pakistan in 2011,‖ 102-103. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 ―No repeat of bin Laden raid: parliament,‖ Dawn, May 14, 2011. 
239 
 
possibly affect the continued provision of aid.107 In July, some $440-$500 million worth of 
scheduled counterinsurgency training and equipment for Pakistan was suspended and 
another $300 million in CSF reimbursements withheld owing to lengthy delays by 
Islamabad in processing US visa requests.108 Even though the Pakistani military dismissed 
the cuts as having no impact on its ability to continue combat operations, independent 
analysts within Pakistan saw the partial suspension of military aid as an obvious indicator of 
the growing downturn in relations between Washington and Islamabad and warned that it 
could lead the army towards adopting a more hostile anti-US posture.109 
Through the summer of 2011, whatever little mutual goodwill that remained between the 
US and Pakistan was further eroded by developments in Afghanistan. In June, Obama 
announced his plan for an incremental drawdown of US troops leading up to a complete 
withdrawal by 2014 and asked the American people, and presumably those of Afghanistan 
as well, to ―take comfort in knowing that the tide of war is receding.‖110 In reality, the 
conflict in Afghanistan remained more intense than ever before, with the Haqqani network 
in particular mounting a number of devastating attacks on US and Afghan targets, including 
a prolonged assault on the American embassy compound in Kabul in September that made a 
mockery of Obama‘s claims that Afghanistan had been sufficiently stabilised to justify a 
withdrawal of foreign forces. 
That same month, former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in a 
suicide attack. Rabbani had been appointed by Karzai as chairman of the High Peace 
Council formed to negotiate with the Taliban and his death dealt a severe blow to the 
reconciliation process as well as to hopes for improved relations between Islamabad and 
Kabul, with the Afghan government directly accusing the ISI of involvement in Rabbani‘s 
murder.111 An infuriated Karzai immediately called off talks with the Taliban and quickly 
moved to stitch up a strategic partnership agreement with India by which New Delhi would 
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provide training to the Afghan army and police, a development certain to arouse 
considerable alarm in Islamabad.112 
Following the US embassy attack, Admiral Mullen travelled to Islamabad to again press 
General Kayani for action against the Haqqani network but, as before, failed to secure any 
such commitment. Frustrated by Pakistan‘s intransigence, Mullen, who had thought he had 
built up a personal relationship with Kayani, returned to Washington to testify before 
Congress that the Haqqani network was ―a veritable arm‖ of the ISI, with whose support it 
had conducted not only the attack on the US embassy but also ―a host of other smaller but 
effective operations.‖113 Mullen‘s remarks signified the most serious official charges 
levelled by the US against Pakistan since 9/11 but failed to bring about any modification in 
Islamabad‘s policy approach towards Afghanistan. In response, Washington continued to 
carry out drone attacks despite repeated Pakistani protests. It also despatched a high-
powered delegation led by Secretary of State Clinton to Islamabad to issue yet another stern 
warning that the US would act unilaterally if required against Pakistan-based groups 
attacking US forces in Afghanistan and that Pakistan would pay ―a very big price‖ if it 
failed to make a definitive choice between fighting terrorists or supporting them.114 
With mutual acrimony already at unprecedentedly high levels, the relationship between the 
US and Pakistan broke down completely in November after a NATO airstrike on a 
Pakistani outpost on the Salala mountain ridge along the Afghan border killed 24 soldiers. 
An enraged Pakistani military responded by closing down NATO‘s supply routes leading 
into Afghanistan; evicting US personnel from a secret airfield in Balochistan used, amongst 
other things, for launching drone strikes; and boycotting a major conference on Afghanistan 
to take place in Bonn in December. Moreover, Islamabad rejected Washington‘s 
expressions of regret and instead demanded an unconditional apology. In the meantime, the 
government initiated a review of ―all programmes, activities and co-operative 
arrangements‖ with the US and with US-led forces in Afghanistan.115 
Completed after months of protracted deliberations in April 2012, the review process laid 
down revised terms of engagement with the US including the immediate cessation of drone 
attacks and of any infiltration into Pakistan ―on any pretext‖; the banning of verbal security 
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agreements with any foreign country; an unconditional apology for the killing of the 
Pakistani soldiers and a demand that the perpetrators be punished; an end to overt and 
covert operations inside Pakistan; no private security contractors to be allowed into the 
country nor any foreign bases maintained on Pakistani soil; and Pakistani territory and 
airspace no longer to be used to transport arms and ammunition into Afghanistan. For its 
part, the Pakistani parliament and government reaffirmed their commitment to prevent their 
territory from being used for ―any kind of attacks on other countries‖ and declared that ―all 
foreign fighters, if found, shall be expelled from our soil.‖116 
Even as the review process in Pakistan was proceeding, the US kept up its drone strikes, 
albeit with considerably reduced frequency.117 Islamabad responded by keeping the supply 
routes into Afghanistan closed, although that had less to do with the continuation of drone 
attacks, which had for long been secretly condoned by Pakistan‘s civilian and military 
leadership, and more to do with the Obama administration‘s reluctance to apologise for the 
Salala attack. The closure of ground routes leading into Afghanistan from Pakistan 
compelled the US to use the Northern Distribution Network, a much longer route through 
Russia and Central Asia that cost $100 million a month more than the Pakistani passageway 
and would become even more expensive as the US began to move masses of weaponry and 
equipment out of Afghanistan in the lead-up to its final withdrawal.118 In response to 
Islamabad‘s denial of transit facilities, Washington withheld all military-related assistance.  
By mid-2012, however, both countries were keen to end the stand-off, the US because it 
undermined counterterrorism cooperation and increased the chances of a messy withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, and Pakistan because neither the civilian government nor the army could 
do without American money in the long-term or afford to prolong Pakistan‘s growing 
international isolation. The US had actually been on the verge of issuing an apology several 
times but had chosen to withhold it for varying reasons, including continuing attacks by the 
Haqqani network in Afghanistan as well as a decision by Pakistan‘s courts to sentence a 
local doctor to 33 years in prison for collaborating with the CIA in tracking down bin 
Laden.119 In July 2012, however, seven months after the Salala incident, the US finally said 
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it was ―sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military,‖ even though it stopped short 
of actually using the word ―apology.‖120 The expression of regret was enough, however, to 
satisfy the Pakistan government, which immediately agreed to reopen the transit routes into 
Afghanistan and even consented to withdrawing its demand for substantially increased 
transit fees.121 In response, the Obama administration asked Congress to release some $1.2 
billion of withheld military payments, although Pakistan had claimed it was actually owed 
reimbursements worth $3 billion.122 
Relations between Islamabad and Washington settled back again into an unstable 
equilibrium. Major differences persisted over Afghanistan, with Pakistan refusing to close 
down the Quetta shura or to target the Haqqanis in North Waziristan. Instead, Islamabad 
continued to advocate an even-handed reconciliation process inclusive of Afghan Taliban 
factions or affiliates operating from its territory as a prerequisite for a negotiated power-
sharing arrangement in Kabul.123 The US, on the other hand, remained wedded to a policy 
of weakening the insurgency as far as possible and only reconciling with those elements 
willing to fall in line with Washington‘s ―vision for Afghanistan‘s political future.‖124 In 
September 2012, the US State Department formally designated the Haqqani network a 
terrorist organisation, thereby reducing the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the 
group and placing Pakistan under increased pressure to curtail its activities.125 Earlier that 
year, Washington had placed a $10 million bounty on information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the head of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, for his alleged 
role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. 
Finding itself under considerable international pressure to discontinue the policy of using 
militants as proxies and with no end in sight to the war against its own Taliban, Pakistan 
attempted to broaden its range of interlocutors in Afghanistan by reaching out to non-
Pashtun elements of the power elite in Kabul including its old enemies from the Northern 
Alliance, even as it also reiterated calls for reconciliation between the Afghan government 
and the Taliban.126 However, measures towards facilitating a negotiated settlement could 
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not overcome the fundamental lack of trust permeating the triangular relationship between 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US. As he neared the end of his second and final term as 
president, Karzai‘s diatribes against Washington for its failure to secure Afghanistan 
became almost as frequent as those against Islamabad for its support to the Taliban. 
Moreover, he feared that the US would cut its own deal with Pakistan and the Taliban, 
leaving him out of the negotiating process.127 For its part, Washington had become 
increasingly disillusioned by the abject dysfunctionality of Karzai‘s regime, which had little 
to show for itself on the governance front after being propped up by American dollars and 
troops for over a decade.  
In November 2012, Americans went to the polls to elect Barack Obama for a second term as 
president. Six months later, Pakistan marked a major milestone in its troubled political 
history when, for the first time ever, one elected government completed its constitutional 
five-year term before peacefully transferring power to its elected successor. Having 
previously served two abbreviated terms as prime minister, Nawaz Sharif was elected for a 
third time with a comfortable majority. Washington publicly hailed Pakistan‘s successful 
democratic transition and announced the resumption of the strategic dialogue that had been 
stalled since 2011.128 As was the case during 2008, the army largely stayed out of the 
electoral process. Nawaz Sharif came to power armed with what he saw as a popular 
mandate to improve relations with India and negotiate an end to the domestic war with the 
Taliban, both areas falling within the military‘s self-appointed jurisdiction. Whether or not 
he would be able to loosen the military‘s grip over Pakistan‘s national security and foreign 
policies, however, would be another matter altogether, one beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Conclusion 
 
Barack Obama‘s approach towards Pakistan was an important component of his overall 
strategy in Afghanistan, which he depicted as a ―war of necessity‖ that Bush had 
overlooked in favour of waging his ―war of choice‖ in Iraq.129 However, the decision to 
lump Afghanistan and Pakistan into the AF-PAK paradigm was problematic and sent 
Islamabad a message that its significance lay primarily in its ability to advance America‘s 
interests in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the AF-PAK label, right from the outset there was 
very little clarity and even less consensus within the Obama administration on how to deal 
effectively with either country. Obama‘s troop surge was unable to defeat the Taliban or to 
even weaken their resolve. Matters were not helped by Obama‘s decision to nominate a date 
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for the withdrawal of troops at the same time that he announced the surge, leaving a serious 
question mark on America‘s long-term commitment to Afghanistan‘s security. The 
administration‘s subsequent attempts to negotiate a solution to the conflict were similarly 
unsuccessful.  
On Obama‘s watch, the US-Pakistan relationship was rocked by a string of crises, the most 
egregious of them being the raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden. Although 
bilateral ties partially improved in 2012, there remained a fundamental disconnect in the 
policy approaches of the two countries on the question of settling Afghanistan‘s political 
future. While both were in favour of a negotiated end to the insurgency, Pakistan was 
sceptical of the Obama administration‘s attempts to force the Taliban to the negotiating 
table through its troop surge and adhered to its long-held position that Afghanistan could 
only be pacified through a power-sharing arrangement worked out amongst all Afghan 
stakeholders, including the Taliban and its allies. In order to hedge against an adverse post-
NATO dispensation in Afghanistan, it continued to tolerate and even support the Afghan 
Taliban. 
As far as the Pakistani army high command was concerned, it made very little strategic 
sense to sever its links with the Taliban when Afghanistan‘s own future remained uncertain, 
with state collapse a real possibility. In case that happened and Pakistan had already burnt 
its bridges with the Taliban, it would have no card left to play in Afghanistan. Thus, 
Pakistan repeatedly turned a deaf ear to American calls for targeting the Haqqani network, 
nor did it make any attempt to move against the Quetta shura, despite repeated exhortations 
from the US to prevent the Taliban from using Pakistani territory as a base. A central factor 
behind Islamabad‘s intransigence was the army‘s acute concern about India‘s growing 
presence in Afghanistan and the need to exclude New Delhi from any role in shaping 
Afghanistan‘s security architecture, especially in the lead-up to the American withdrawal. 
The growing strategic alignment between the US and India only served to heighten 
Pakistani insecurities about potential Indian encirclement that Washington was either 
unwilling or unable to alleviate. 
From Islamabad‘s perspective, therefore, American demands for greater cooperation in 
Afghanistan were contradictory and self-defeating, in that they called on it to turn against 
the Afghan insurgents whilst also requiring it to bring them to the negotiating table. 
Compliance with such conflicting policies might have ended up providing the US a face-
saving exit from its Afghan quagmire but ran the risk of leaving Pakistan high and dry in 
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Afghanistan with ―less influence and fewer friends.‖130 Instead of aligning itself with the 
Obama administration‘s desire to ―fight, talk, build,‖ the Pakistani military establishment 
effectively adopted a ―cease-fire, talk, wait for the Americans to leave‖ approach that 
preserved its links with the Afghan insurgents whilst simultaneously seeking a decisive role 
for Pakistan in determining the outcome of any future reconciliation between the insurgents 
and the Afghan government.131 
Obama came to power promising to change the way in which America had traditionally 
done business with Pakistan. Instead of investing in its relationship with the military alone - 
invariably to the detriment of Pakistan‘s democratic development - Washington tried to 
strengthen the newly elected government in Islamabad in the hope that its material and 
diplomatic support would in turn facilitate greater civilian control over the military, 
promote internal stability, mitigate widespread anti-Americanism and, most importantly, 
secure greater Pakistani cooperation on issues of strategic concern for the US, particularly 
terrorism and the endgame in Afghanistan. To that end, Obama convinced Congress to 
sanction an unprecedented five-year $7.5 billion economic aid package for Pakistan. At the 
same time, military assistance on an even more substantial scale continued to be provided, 
amounting to some $8.3 billion between 2009 and 2012.132 
Four years after Obama enunciated his Pakistan strategy, there was little evidence to show 
that it had achieved its stated objectives. Increased economic aid was not enough to stabilise 
Pakistan‘s tottering economy133 and, in any case, much of what was provided was 
mismanaged by both donor and recipient.134 Despite receiving Washington‘s diplomatic and 
financial support, a corrupt and inept civilian government built up very little political capital 
domestically to resist the military‘s continued dominance over all matters affecting national 
security. Anti-American sentiment continued to rise, with some three quarters of Pakistanis 
surveyed in 2012 regarding the US as an enemy.135 Pakistan remained severely hit by 
domestic terrorism and, despite the military‘s operations in the tribal areas, the Pakistani 
Taliban remained a potent force. While Washington could cite bin Laden‘s killing as a 
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major policy success, the fact that it did not trust the Pakistanis enough to inform them of 
the operation in advance was a testament to the underlying brittleness of a supposedly close 
strategic relationship.  
247 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
One of the primary aims of this thesis was to develop a broader understanding of 
international patron-client relationships by examining not only their characteristics, goals 
and types but also – through employing the case study of US-Pakistan relations - to identify 
certain contradictions and paradoxes that can at times become their defining features. Apart 
from making a contribution to the rather limited existing scholarship on this distinct form of 
association between dominant and subordinate states in the international system, the thesis 
concurrently sought to take a new approach to the study of US-Pakistan relations by 
positioning them within a defined theoretical paradigm. 
International patron-client relationships stand apart from other forms of bilateral interaction 
between states on the basis of several major characteristics, all of which can legitimately be 
applied to the US-Pakistan association. First, there is a substantial disparity in the military 
capabilities of the states involved. Secondly, the greater the advantage the patron acquires 
over its competitors through its linkages with the client, the more value the patron will place 
on keeping those linkages intact, thereby giving the client its primary means of influencing 
the patron. Finally, the relationship between patron and client should be a self-evident 
reality, leaving no room for ambiguity in the perception of other nations. 
Based on a detailed examination of how the relationship played itself out over some six 
decades, it is the contention of this thesis that in making their policy choices towards each 
other, the US and Pakistan consistently ticked the boxes that constitute a patron-client state 
relationship. While there were undoubtedly periods of mutual estrangement and 
disenchantment, it was during times of crisis that the relationship became most clearly 
defined and on all such occasions, the form that it took was invariably that between a 
powerful yet needy patron and a demanding, problematic but strategically important client. 
Even during periods when relations had cooled off, it was never the case that the patron 
disassociated itself from the client completely or that the client transferred its loyalties 
entirely to one of the patron‘s principal competitors. In any case, such fluctuations only 
serve to remove a widely held misunderstanding about patron-client relationships as being 
rigidly structured and instead reinforce the reality that such associations are actually fluid 
and often volatile arrangements in which the client at times enjoys more influence than the 
patron. 
Contrary to a widely held public perception in Pakistan about the ubiquity of America‘s 
control over the country, the bilateral relationship, especially during periods of strategic 
248 
 
alignment, falls much more within the Influence Parity model instead of the Patron-Centric 
or even Patron-Prevalence model, as per the typology proposed by Shoemaker and Spanier 
outlined in Chapter One. By virtue of its superior power and resources, the patron is well-
placed to extract major concessions from a client, especially one that finds itself located in a 
high-threat security environment and is desperate for external support. At the same time, the 
strategic advantage that it can provide to the patron - be it military bases, logistical facilities 
or simply its geographical location - gives the client a powerful bargaining tool with which 
to extract maximum concessions from the patron. 
At the outset, this thesis laid out three primary research questions for examination. The first 
sought to discover the objectives that lead dominant and subordinate states in the 
international system to form patron-client relationships. The patron might be motivated by 
ideological goals, whereby it seeks to restructure its client in line with its own political, 
economic and cultural practices and institutions; by goals of solidarity, in order to 
demonstrate to its rivals its ability to recruit followers; and by strategic goals, by which the 
patron endeavours to secure access to, or even establish outright control over, all or a 
portion of a client‘s territory or major resource in order to deny the use of such strategic 
assets to its [the patron‘s] rivals. Client goals tend to focus on the nature and intensity of the 
threat closest to them. For the client, the relationship with the patron will be determined by 
the level of threat it confronts. If the threat level is low, the client will be much more 
difficult for the patron to manage than if the threat level is high, since there will be less of 
an incentive for the patron to surrender a measure of its sovereignty and internal autonomy 
to the patron. 
A second research question related to the differences between patron-client relationships 
and other bilateral arrangements amongst nations, most notably alliances. While there are 
varied descriptions of the constituent elements that make up an alliance, it is generally 
agreed that they are formal and often explicitly laid down arrangements in which states 
team up to balance against potential hegemons. The applicability of the alliance paradigm 
arguably applies more to major powers operating on a global canvas than to lesser powers, 
which constitute the overwhelming majority of states. As opposed to superpowers that enlist 
allies in order to balance against rivals with similarly substantial capabilities, weaker states 
must often rely on the assistance of outside states to balance a threat from within their 
region. However, such assistance is usually sought and obtained not under the framework of 
formal alliances but rather on the basis of more informal patron-client relationships. Such 
relationships are often preferred over formal alliances because of the greater room for 
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manoeuvre that they provide but their flexibility can also be their greatest liability in that 
their vulnerability to easy abandonment makes them more unreliable than formal alliances. 
The third and final question, which goes to the very heart of this thesis, pointed to an 
elemental contradiction that can be detected in certain types of patron-client state 
relationships, especially those belonging to the Influence Parity variety. It asked why a 
client would wilfully put its relationship with the patron on the line by pursuing policies 
manifestly against the patron‘s interests. The US-Pakistan case study that forms the 
centrepiece of this thesis is an attempt to answer this fundamental question. The history of 
the relationship, even during periods of ostensible strategic convergence, shows that the 
client will do everything in its power to protect and promote what it sees as its vital national 
interests, even if by doing so it acts against the declared interests of its patron.  
The fact that a client can get away with defying its patron should not necessarily be taken to 
mean that the client dominates the relationship and derives much more from it than the 
patron. Owing to its vastly superior power and its lingering potential to punish a client that 
strays too far out of line, the patron exercises significant influence over the client and 
usually extracts enough from it to at least fulfil its most immediate short-term interests. 
During the 1950s, Pakistan‘s geographic location and its provision of basing rights for US 
surveillance aircraft played a crucial role in America‘s containment strategy against the 
Soviet Union. The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan that hastened the end of the 
Cold War could not have been achieved without Pakistan‘s support. Similarly, after 9/11, 
Pakistan played a vital role in the expeditious removal of the Taliban from power and 
provided substantial assistance in the war against al-Qaeda.  
Over the last six decades, there have been enough instances described in this thesis of 
American pressure, at times exerted through actual threats, successfully conditioning 
Pakistan‘s foreign policy choices and even its domestic politics. Yet, the instances that 
demonstrated the limitations of American influence in shifting Pakistan‘s traditional view of 
its fundamental national security interests have been significantly more numerous. On that 
basis, the following three hypotheses postulated at the outset of the thesis can now be 
tested: 
1. Increased patronage has a positive correlation with the level of client compliance, 
that is, the greater the level of assistance provided by the patron, the more likely the 
client will be to comply with the patron‘s demands.  
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2. The greater the client‘s dependence upon the patron, the more likely the client will 
be to align its policies, especially those relating to strategic issues, in line with the 
patron‘s requirements.  
 
3. Clients deemed by the patron to be of significant strategic importance will be likely 
to receive more assistance but will be less compliant in fulfilling the patron‘s 
objectives. 
In the US-Pakistan context, the first hypothesis is, at best, only partially true. Increased 
assistance led to increased compliance but only on selective issues. During the 1950s for 
instance, in order to secure American patronage, Pakistan signed up in SEATO and CENTO 
but used American military aid not in defence against communist aggression but instead to 
deter India. Zia-ul-Haq waged the Afghan jihad on behalf of the CIA but only because he 
also considered it to be necessary in Pakistan‘s own interests; in the meantime, he oversaw 
the acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability. Similarly, despite increasing American 
assistance, Pervez Musharraf was much more compliant in terms of going after al-Qaeda 
than he was in turning against the Taliban. In other words, wherever the national interest 
was presumed to clash with the demands of the patron, client compliance with such 
demands diminished even as patronal assistance increased. Moreover, client compliance 
only increased on those issues deemed to be in the client‘s own national interest, and not 
just that of the patron. 
The second hypothesis carries even less evidence to back it up than the first. Pakistan‘s 
dependence upon the US for both economic and military aid was considerable during the 
1960s but that did not prevent it from initiating a war with India in 1965, even though the 
US was clearly opposed to the move and reacted by cutting off all military assistance. 
During the 1970s, Pakistan refused to align itself with the US nuclear non-proliferation 
agenda and continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons even at the cost of sacrificing the 
admittedly limited American economic and military aid it was receiving at the time. During 
the 1980s as well as after 9/11, dramatic increases in US assistance led to Pakistan‘s 
increasing dependence on American patronage, particularly in the form of weapons and 
spare parts, but it was not matched by any noticeable increase in alignment with US 
policies, particularly where they were deemed not to be in consonance with Pakistan‘s own 
strategic interests. 
What the US-Pakistan relationship tends to support much more unambiguously is the third 
hypothesis, which asserts that instead of making the client more susceptible to the patron‘s 
influence, increased assistance by the patron will actually make the client less likely to 
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comply with the patron‘s wishes. This is especially true of relationships in which the patron 
regards the client‘s cooperation as vitally important for the attainment of the patron‘s core 
security interests. Paradoxically for the patron, the assistance that it provides to a 
strategically important client can end up undermining the very reasons that led to the 
provision of such assistance in the first place. Chief amongst those reasons are ensuring the 
client‘s compliance and maintaining its internal stability. At the same time, as long as the 
patron‘s own strategic interests necessitate a degree of client cooperation, it will find itself 
compelled to keep the relationship going, thereby giving the client continued room to 
deviate from the patron‘s script to an extent where it can pursue its own national interests 
with relative impunity, confident in the knowledge that while its defiance might lead to 
occasional tensions with the patron, its continuing strategic importance will prevent a 
complete rupture and the consequent termination of material assistance.  
General Zia-ul-Haq was particularly adept at walking this delicate tightrope. The Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan was an obvious threat to Pakistan‘s security but also signified a 
priceless opportunity to Zia to make himself indispensable to the US. Access to American 
patronage, particularly in the form of new and sophisticated weapons of war, permitted 
Pakistan to redress, to some extent, a growing imbalance in conventional forces in favour of 
India. It also allowed Zia to keep his core domestic constituency, the army, content with his 
handling of affairs. Moreover, by earning the backing of the Reagan administration, Zia was 
able to deny US diplomatic support to his domestic political opposition. Finally, by virtue 
of Pakistan‘s alignment with vital US strategic interests in Afghanistan, Zia managed to 
extract from the US a tacit acceptance of Pakistan‘s accelerated push towards the 
production of nuclear weapons. 
For the Reagan administration, the overarching goal of inflicting a Vietnam-like defeat on 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan necessitated making a series of compromises with respect 
to Pakistan. Even though the CIA was bearing half the total costs of the Afghan jihad, it had 
virtually no say in determining where the money went or which amongst the mujahidin 
groups received the largest share of weapons. Although Pakistan was a client state whose 
financial solvency rested in large measure on foreign - primarily American - aid, it was Zia 
who got his way with the Americans that the ISI would exercise complete control over the 
day-to-day management of the Afghan resistance. As a result, the bulk of US-supplied 
equipment and weaponry ended up in the hands of those not necessarily well-disposed 
towards America but who were seen as best placed to protect Pakistan‘s long-term interests 
in Afghanistan. As envisaged by Zia, those interests centred on the creation of an Islamist 
252 
 
confederation of Pakistan and Afghanistan that would eventually make inroads into Soviet 
Central Asia.  
By making Pakistan one of the largest global recipients of US military assistance, the 
Reagan administration sought to attain two primary objectives: (a) ensure essential 
Pakistani cooperation in bringing about a Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, and (b) address 
Pakistan‘s security concerns through improving its conventional military forces, thereby 
obviating the need for nuclear weapons or, at the very least, decelerating Pakistan‘s push to 
acquire them. Victory in Afghanistan was eventually attained but the ISI-CIA-Saudi 
handling of the Afghan jihad bequeathed enduring and painful legacies to all victorious 
parties. With regard to the second objective, that of curtailing Pakistan‘s nuclear ambitions, 
US policy was a complete failure; if anything, Zia viewed Washington‘s unwillingness to 
link continued military assistance to a rollback of Pakistan‘s nuclear programme as further 
confirmation of his indispensability to the US. In the battle of wills between patron and 
client over the nuclear issue, Zia ensured that it was the US that blinked first. 
During the 1990s, the patron-client relationship between the US and Pakistan unravelled 
and America‘s once ―most allied ally‖ became its ―most sanctioned ally.‖ The interlude 
between the dictatorships of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf saw a series of weak 
democratic governments come and go in quick succession while the army retained real 
political power in its own hands. 9/11 dramatically revived the relationship and, in what 
was essentially a repeat of the 1980s, America showed its willingness to do business with 
yet another Pakistani military ruler.  
In the interests of successfully prosecuting its open-ended ―global war on terrorism,‖ the 
Bush administration went to great lengths to prop up General Musharraf‘s military 
dictatorship. Apart from billions of American tax-payers‘ dollars in military and economic 
assistance, this included making no criticism of Musharraf‘s domestic agenda, which 
involved the consistent use of political chicanery to prolong his own rule, even if it 
repeatedly came at the cost of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Washington was 
equally uncritical in its response to Musharraf‘s questionable handling of the A.Q. Khan 
affair and refused to place Pakistan‘s future cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda at risk 
by trying to investigate the not unlikely possibility of some degree of complicity between 
Khan and elements within the Pakistani military establishment.  
Like Zia before him, Musharraf largely succeeded in leveraging America‘s need for 
Pakistan‘s cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda to pursue what he and his fellow 
generals viewed as their country‘s core strategic interests, even if those interests were 
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directly at odds with American objectives in the region. Thus, throughout his period in 
power, Musharraf made a clear distinction between al-Qaeda and its affiliated Pakistani 
militant and sectarian groups on the one hand and the Afghan Taliban and Kashmir-focused 
militant groups on the other. While the former would be confronted not only for the danger 
they posed to Pakistan but also because going after them would keep the American aid 
pipeline going, the latter were still seen as strategic assets worthy of continued support, 
especially after India dramatically increased its presence in post-Taliban Afghanistan and 
the US shifted its attention and resources towards Iraq.  
Bush‘s close embrace of Musharraf was in keeping with the personalised approach towards 
Pakistan adopted by earlier American administrations in which short-term strategic interests 
legitimised support to a succession of military rulers at the expense of long-term democratic 
consolidation and structural reform. Musharraf leveraged Pakistan‘s geostrategic 
importance as well as his personal chemistry with Bush to shore up his position both within 
the army as well as against his political opponents. Even more than Zia, who had convinced 
many in the Reagan administration that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was only the 
prelude to a much wider advance through Pakistan towards the Persian Gulf, Musharraf 
successfully played on the Bush administration‘s fears that he was the only man - and the 
army the only institution - standing between an extremist takeover of the country as well as 
of its nuclear arsenal.  
Barack Obama attempted a break with several of his predecessors over the previous six 
decades by strengthening Pakistan‘s post-Musharraf democratic transition in the hope that 
significant American investment in a democratically elected government would in turn 
facilitate greater civilian control over the military and enhance cooperation on issues of 
strategic concern for the US, particularly terrorism and the endgame in Afghanistan. 
However, thanks in part to decades of American patronage which, moreover, was by no 
means curtailed by Obama, the military has entrenched its dominance over Pakistan‘s 
foreign and national security policies so completely that it would have been extremely 
difficult for any elected regime - even one more capable than the largely impotent and 
incompetent PPP government in office from 2008 to 2013 - to have wrested decision-
making authority from it.  
Like Bush before him, Obama failed to change the strategic mind-set of the Pakistani army 
when it came to Afghanistan. Although Washington‘s own state of confusion with regard to 
determining the eventual contours of the Afghan endgame was at least partly to blame for 
this failure, an even greater mistake on the part of the US was its inability or unwillingness 
to recognise that for Pakistan‘s generals, the threat from India remained paramount. To that 
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end, they would do whatever it took to guard against the possibility of India increasing its 
influence in Afghanistan, even if it meant running the risk of alienating their American 
paymasters by covertly supporting the very forces the US was battling in Afghanistan. The 
army correctly calculated that such a risk was well worth taking owing to Obama‘s pressing 
need for Pakistan‘s cooperation in facilitating a face-saving American exit from 
Afghanistan. Washington‘s ability to hold Islamabad accountable for its dual policy in 
Afghanistan was also circumscribed by its fear of isolating a country deemed too important 
to fail in view of the risk that its nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists. By 
walking the tightrope of selective cooperation and consistent defiance, the client yet again 
demonstrated its ability to manipulate the relationship as much as the patron, if not more. 
Patron-client state relationships have been an important feature of international relations for 
centuries and remain so today. Their informal nature and the suppleness and 
manoeuvrability that they lend to both patron and client make them a popular form of 
bilateral interaction between states. Yet, they are not without their risks, which this thesis 
has sought to highlight through its case study of US-Pakistan relations. Both countries have 
derived important short-term benefits from forging patron-client linkages; at the same time, 
the long-term costs for both, but particularly so for Pakistan as the much weaker power, 
have been far-reaching and, in some respects, calamitous. The genie of jihad that the US 
and Pakistan released in Afghanistan during the 1980s came back to haunt them both. 
America lost almost 3,000 lives on 9/11 while Pakistan has lost many times that number 
through participating in what it regarded for many years as America‘s war on terror but 
which it now admits has become its own. 
Perhaps most injuriously for Pakistan, American patronage invariably coincided with 
periods of military rule, the partial exception being the post-Musharraf period but even then, 
military-related inflows easily surpassed civilian assistance. While consistent American 
backing to a succession of military regimes has undoubtedly conferred important security 
benefits, it has also contributed towards entrenching the political dominance of Pakistan‘s 
armed forces along with perpetuating a national economy almost completely dependent on 
foreign handouts. American patronage has played its part in keeping Pakistan a national 
security state whose strategic direction is determined by a largely unaccountable military 
which, although always hungry for American aid, has not been reluctant to bite the hand 
that feeds it if required by considerations of national and institutional interest. Despite this 
fundamental contradiction, the bonds of patronage and cliency between the two countries 
will endure and their potentially negative future consequences will be accepted so long as 
(i) the patron assigns a higher value to the benefits accruing from the client‘s cooperation 
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than to the costs incurred through the client‘s defiance, and (ii) the client prefers the short-
term expediency of external patronage over the long, hard road to self-reliance. 
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